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Global War on Terrorism
Revisited

Edited by Mohd Mizan Aslam and Rohan Gunaratna

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Preface

The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is a term that was widely used to describe the international military campaign launched by the United States and its allies in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The attacks were carried out by the terrorists group Al-Qaeda (AQ), led by Osama bin Laden, according to the United States. The main objective of the GWOT was to dismantle terrorist networks, eliminate the threat of global terrorism, and bring those responsible for the 9/11 attacks to justice. The US-led coalition, with support from various other nations, initiated military operations and an invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 to remove the Taliban regime. The campaign aimed not only to defeat specific terrorist groups but also to prevent the emergence of new ones.

Over time, the scope of the GWOT expanded beyond Afghanistan to include other regions and countries where terrorism was a significant concern. The campaign involved military operations, intelligence efforts, diplomatic initiatives, and economic sanctions. Some of the key elements of the GWOT included the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security in the United States, and the implementation of various international counter-terrorism measures. While the military aspects of the GWOT have seen some success in disrupting terrorist networks, the overall impact has been complex and multifaceted. The war has been criticized for its long duration, high human and financial costs, and unintended consequences, including the destabilization of certain regions. In recent years the focus on countering terrorism has evolved into different strategies and approaches. The threat of terrorism remains a global concern, and efforts continue to address this challenge through international cooperation, intelligence sharing, and various counter-terrorism measures. However, it is important to track the emerging terrorism concerns amidst various counterterrorism efforts such as GWOT.

Another noteworthy development of the years of GWOT was a noticeable increase in the number of Central Asians and Europeans implicated in schemes around the world. However, this is not a wholly novel phenomenon. Apart from terrorism, the rise of ultra-nationalist elements and supremacists around the world, especially in Europe and Asia, also makes GWOT still significant. GWOT change is no longer based on religion but begins to play in the name of race and nationalism. The coming year will promise more incidents of terrorism and conflict that will make the terrorism industry remain relevant, showing that the GWOT is still needed.

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Section 1

A Thematic Analysis of Counter Terrorism Approach

Chapter 1

Anti-War Stance in Contemporary Fiction: Kamran Pasha's *Shadow of the Swords* and the War on Terror

Nisreen T. Yousef

Abstract

The chapter considers literary depictions of the "War on Terror" in a contemporary novel written by a Muslim author. It examines Islam's relationship with the West in Kamran Pasha's *Shadow of the Swords* (2010). The chapter argues that the author articulates his understanding of the relationship between Islam and the West by means of revisiting the Third Crusade following the 9/11 attacks. The novel refutes the assumption that the Crusades were fought mainly for religious purposes; in consequence, it modifies Samuel Huntington's thesis of the "Clash of Civilizations" by suggesting that the economic and political interests and the desires for expansion were dominant factors driving the Crusades. By presenting the Third Crusade and, by means of historical analogy, the ongoing "War on Terror" as an Imperialist project, Pasha supports Edward Said's views in his book *Orientalism* (1978). By presenting the vicious and destructive outcomes of the Crusades on people, the land, cultural heritage and human relations, the novel denounces the consequences of using military force and calls for resorting to diplomacy. Ultimately, Pasha's *Shadow of the Swords* reflects a solid anti-war stance and optimistic views on future Islam-West relationships.

Keywords: Kamran Pasha, the Third Crusade, the "War on Terror", *Shadow of the Swords*, 9/11

1. Introduction

Pasha is a Muslim Pakistani American writer and producer. He is currently a Hollywood screenwriter. Pasha is the author of *Mother of the Believers* (2009) and *Shadow of the Swords* (2010). He is also the writer of the 2005 ShowTime network series *Sleeper Cell* (2005), a Showtime's television series which is about a Muslim FBI agent defying a group of terrorists, as well as the remake of the NBC's series *The Bionic Woman* (2007). In addition, he wrote and produced the television series *Kings* (2009). Pasha wrote a film entitled *Taj Mahal* (2003) and currently is writing *The Voyage of Ibn Battuta*, which is about the adventures of the fourteenth-century Arab traveler to China. He worked in New York City as a journalist for three years. While he was working as a reporter, Pasha interviewed political figures including Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori and Pakistani Prime

Minister Benazir Bhutto [1]. His short film *Miriam* (2007), won the Gaia Award at the Moondance Film Festival in 2008 [2].

2. Summary of Pasha's *Shadow of the Swords*

Pasha's *Shadow of the Swords* focuses mainly on Saladin's capture of Jerusalem as well as the Third Crusade and is set in Cairo, Europe and the Holy Land. The novel begins with the omniscient third-person narrator recalling the story of Miriam, a Jewish little girl who, together with her mother, has been abused cruelly by the Crusaders. After her mother is raped and murdered, Miriam escapes to the desert and is later picked up by a Bedouin who takes her to Maimonides, her uncle and Saladin's own physician and political consultant. Despite his father's disapproval and with the Pope's support, Richard decides to launch his Crusade to the Holy Land, claiming that this is the only means to defend the Christian cause against Muslims. A love story between Saladin and Miriam develops and Miriam becomes Saladin's concubine. During his stay in the Holy Land, Richard is afflicted by a fever and Saladin agrees to send his personal physician, Maimonides to cure him. Miriam accompanies him to Richard's camp where she meets with Richard for the first time and decides to spy on Richard, exposing his military plans to Saladin. Following his treatment of Richard, Maimonides decides to take Rebecca, his wife and Miriam and to leave for Cairo. On their way, Miriam is captured by the Crusaders and taken to the Crusaders' camp where Richard falls in love with her. Mistaken for Richard, Sir William is captured by Saladin's men. Saladin establishes a solid friendship with Sir William, who spends more than a year in the Muslims' camp. During his stay, Sir William gets exposed to Islamic cultures and develops admiration and respect for them. Although Sir William exerts much effort to establish peace between Christians and Muslims, Richard insists on holding the city by force. In spite of their solid friendship, Saladin and Sir William meet on the battlefield and find themselves obliged to fight fiercely against each other. Saladin eventually kills Sir William and sheds tears over the death of his friend. However, the novel ends on an optimistic note, where Richard and Saladin manage to end the conflict in the Holy Land by agreeing to a peace truce [3].

3. A historical analogy between 9/11 and the third crusade

Pasha states that the 9/11 attacks provoked him to revisit the Third Crusade. In a conversation, Pasha asserts that the 9/11 attacks triggered him to write his novel. For Pasha these assaults were also a reminder of the medieval clash between Islam and the West. As Pasha states, the Third Crusade was the most similar historical analogy to present the relationship between Islam and the West. *Shadow of the Swords* is narrated from a third-person perspective; Pasha uses an omniscient third-person narrator. As Pasha indicates, his choice of the third-person narrator is essential to show the inner thoughts of the characters and to demonstrate how one incident can be interpreted differently by people from different background [4]. To expand on the author's view, this narrative technique is pivotal as the novel, on several occasions, deploys dreams as means of introducing the reader to the characters' inner struggle. In addition, it is essential as the novel's premise is to expose the paradox between the inner thoughts and the outward actions of several characters, with special regard to their misuse of religion.

4. The crusades: an imperialist project?

Discussing the relationship between Islam and the West, Huntington argues in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) that since religion is the chief defining feature of a civilisation, "fault line wars are almost always between peoples of different religions". Huntington also argues that neither the medieval nor the ongoing conflict between Islam and Christianity has its origins in contemporary situation. Rather, the tension stems "from the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based on them" [5]. The theory of the "Clash of Civilizations" frames the relationships between Islam and the West both in the medieval period and in our contemporary times primarily within cultural and religious conflicts. Nevertheless, Jonathan Riley-Smith argues in his book *The Crusades* that the neo-imperialistic interpretations of the Crusades gained wide currency among the Crusades historians in the 1950s. The imperialistic interpretations of the Crusades became appealing to the public. He maintains that Muslim historians also supported such notions [6]. In his book *Crusader Institutions*, Prawer describes the Crusades as "colonization" as the territorial expansion was a main feature of them [7]. In this regard, it is essential to discuss Said's views about the relationship between the Orient and the Occident in his book *Orientalism*, which preceded Huntington's theory by almost two decades. In this book, Said argues:

> *Taking the late eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point, Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it: in short, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient [8].*

For Said, Western systematized knowledge of the Orient, which started towards the end of the eighteenth century, has been transformed into a discourse of power. Western attempts to create an artificial dichotomy between the East and the West and to construct them as binary oppositions served as a crucial colonial discourse to sustain modern Imperialism. According to Said, a massive number of writers accepted and further contributed towards creating an "oncological and an epistemological" division between the Orient and the Occident (2). Describing this relationship between the Orient and the Occident Said maintains: "the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of dominance, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony..." (5). Thus, Said's views on the relationship between the East and the West undermines those of Huntington:

> *Exploring uses of the metaphor of the "Crusade", Brian Steed observes:*
>
> *The idea of Europeans imposing their own will on the Middle East is consistently characterized as crusader like. The imagery and rhetoric used emphasized these ancient conflicts as a way of encouraging local inhabitants to recall the mythology and history of the suffering inflicted on Islam by the crusaders [9].*

Osama bin Laden's statement following the 9/11 attacks in 2001 is a case in point. In a declaration that was broadcast on Al-Jazeera satellite television channel on Saturday, November 3, 2001, entitled "Bin Laden rails against Crusaders and UN" [10], bin Laden provided his own justification of the 9/11 attacks. For him, what he

describes as "a long series of Crusade wars against the Islamic world" and the Western presence in Arab and Islamic countries was what provoked the assaults.

The metaphor of the "Crusade" has also been used to refer to the West's response to terrorism. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, American President, George W. Bush used the allegory of the "Crusade" in his remarks on September 16: "This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while. And the American people must be patient. I'm going to be patient [11]". As Jonathan Phillips argues, Bush's use of the "Crusade" metaphor was used by Osama bin Laden to create parallels between the medieval Crusades and Bush's contemporary "War on Terror". With the rise of the Islamic State of Syria and Iraq, the term "Crusade" has been deployed to describe the West's reaction to the terrorist activities conducted by the network [12]. For instance, in Andrew Sharp's book: *The Rise of ISIS: The West's New Crusade*, the metaphor of the Crusade is deployed to describe the West's military act against ISIS [13]. Since the Crusades have been widely conceived as a historical analogy for current affairs between Islam and the West, literary use of the metaphor is worth exploring and carefully scrutinizing.

Examining the nature of the relationship between Islam and Christianity in the Middle Ages, Thomas Asbridge argues, "There is little or no evidence to suggest that these two world religions were somehow locked in an inevitable and perpetual 'clash of civilisations'". As suggested by views mentioned earlier, the Crusades did not present a case of a civilisational clash. In his novel, Pasha presents the Crusades as colonial projects connected with implied materialistic objectives of territorial expansion, political dominance and fame while religion is rendered a pretext for legitimizing the campaigns. Such representations complicate Huntington's views on what he describes as a civilisational clash between Islam and the West [14].

5. Humanity, land, culture, women and war

The novel provides several images of the Crusades' destructive outcomes; Pasha deploys variable techniques to show the devastating impact of war. These techniques include dreams and the narrator's as well as the characters' commentary. Pasha uses Richard's dreams as effective means to reflect the enormous impact of the war not only on the people of the Holy Land but also on the Crusaders themselves. Under the influence of the severe fever Richard has caught, he starts to have nightmares. In his first nightmare, Richard explains to his father that his presence in the Holy Land is intended to protect it. Nonetheless, Henry's remark shows the irony in Richard's claims: "By destroying it?" (187). Henry's response points out that the war is not a defensive but rather a destructive action as it leads to great damage and death. In the dream, Richard sees a shocking, comprehensive image of war. As the narrator says: "He glided over the bodies that lined the devastated courtyard of the Dome, passing through them as if splashing through a thin puddle.... It was blood of women and children, of innocents whose cries for mercy had been ignored by the frenzy of battle" (188). Such depictions are meant to show the fierceness and irrationality of war. Moreover, the narrator describes the cruel, destructive methods the Crusaders used to attack the Holy Land: "BOOM. The walls rattled as the battering ram struck the iron gates. BOOM, again and again... the ancient doors buckled. Crumpled like a parchment in the hands of a frustrated scribe" (126), which reflects the destructive effect of using force. Commenting on the deeds of the Crusaders, Maimonides says: "They have ransacked and pillaged their way through Europe. Entire villages have been laid

to waste. They have all the markings of the uncouth barbarians that descended like a plague on the Holy Land a hundred years ago" (153). Maimonides provides us with an impartial commentary on the cruel deeds of the Crusaders and the vast destruction they have inflicted on other humans and the land. Thus, with clear emphasis on the Crusaders' methods of attacking the Holy Land, Pasha presents the Crusades as a vicious military project.

By presenting the Crusaders' invasion of the Holy Land as primarily an act of destructive colonial pillage, I argue that *Shadow of the Swords* promotes connections between the medieval Crusades and contemporary Euro-American intervention in the Middle East. Both novels suggest that the contemporary acts of invasion for which the novels provide parallels in the historical past, only helped destroy the cultural heritage of some countries such as Iraq and led to terrible loss of human life on both sides. According to news report entitled "Iraq Wars in Figures", the US-led invasion of Iraq with the coalition of the United Kingdom and other nations was called "Operation Iraqi Freedom". Eventually, the operation proved to be very costly in both human loss and economic expenses. The number of US soldiers sent to Iraq was around 100–150,000, but later, Bush ordered sending 30,000 additional troops to bolster security in the country, especially in Baghdad. Between March 2003 and July 2010, 4421 US soldiers had been killed and the United Kingdom lost 179 service men and women. On the Iraqi part, there have been between 97,461 and 106,348 deaths of Iraqi civilians [15].

As Patrick Martin states, "The looting of Iraq's museums and National Library, with the destruction of much of Iraq's cultural heritage, is a historic crime for which the Bush administration is responsible". Martin argues a large number of the antiquities in the National Museum of Antiquities in Baghdad were stolen or damaged after the military invasion of Baghdad. He maintains such actions aim at "destroying their national identity". For him, the ultimate goal of this invasion was to take control of the oil sources in the country and to fulfill materialistic goals [16]. Similarly, in his book *Bush in Babylon* (2003), Tariq Ali argues that the occupation of Iraq has led to destructive ends. He maintains that the war broke up the Iraqi army, caused the destruction of law and order and inflicted torture on the people [17]. He provides a number of pictures to show how Western media was selective about the war images. He includes a photo of an Iraqi boy kissing Tony Blair (15). Nonetheless, Ali offers several other pictures that reflect a more comprehensive reality about military actions. For instance, he includes a picture of an Iraqi woman mourning the death of her child (209). In addition, he provides a photo displaying a heap of dead Iraqis at Abu Ghraib prison (223), which reflects the catastrophic outcomes of war on human beings.

Pasha highlights the horrible consequences of the Crusades on women. He establishes the notion as a crucial matter that provides the opening episode of the novel. The narrative begins with the story of Miriam. The third-person narrator informs us that Miriam and her mother have both been raped by the Crusaders and that her mother has also been killed (3–5). Moreover, Miriam is later captured by Richard's army on her way to Cairo (278). Historically speaking, Hansen and Curtis argue that the Crusaders did rape thousands of women (376). Fictional though the story is, Pasha tries to show the devastating effect of war on women both in the past and in our present time.

A discourse of saving women was used by some to legitimize the "War on Terror". As Sadia Abbas argues, the emancipation of Muslim women in Islamic cultures has been used as a pretext for the ongoing "War on Terror" [18]. Peter Morey and Amina

Yaqin observe that wives of prominent politicians in the West including Laura Bush and Cherie Blair used the discourse of protecting Muslim women in Afghanistan to justify the moral objectives of the "War on Terror" [19]. In a radio address, Laura Bush, for instance, argued that women and children in Afghanistan had been treated inhumanely by al-Qaeda. She maintained that women had been denied education and had not been allowed to work or leave home on their own. For her, all the countries in the world, regardless of their faith or culture, had an ethical obligation towards women and children in Afghanistan. Mrs. Bush argued that the military action that had been carried out helped Afghani women regain some of their rights such as education [20]. Kristen McNutt's paper "Sexualized Violence Against Iraqi Women By US Occupying Forces", which was presented to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 2005 Session in Geneva, reported incidents of rape and sexual violence by US military personnel. In a letter smuggled from inside the Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq by an Iraqi woman in December 2003, it was reported that women detainees were raped by American guards in the prison. She further noted that President Bush had insisted that these actions cannot be said to be the outcome of military action and were carried out only by a few of the recruits [21]. Accordingly, I argue that Pasha deploys historical analogy to reinforce notions that the "War on Terror" has left a negative impact on women in Muslim-majority countries, although the objective of protecting Arab and Muslim women was among the supposed objectives of the mission. Thus, it can be argued that Pasha calls for a rejection of war and warns against its destructive effects.

Pasha's *Shadow of the Swords* on the other hand, ends on an optimistic note where Saladin and Richard are able to end the conflict. As the narrator concludes: "Salah al-Din ibn Ayyub and Richard the Lionheart signed the treaty, bringing the Crusade to an end" (379).[1] Following Sir William's stay in Saladin's camps, Richard asks him about Muslims: "Are they like us?" (357). Sir William replies: "They are us" (357). Richard's question implies that Islam and the West need far more mutual and comprehensive understanding as their knowledge about each other is still insufficient. Sir William's response, I argue, reflects Pasha's views on the necessity of more tolerant and harmonious relationships between Muslims and the West and the need for stressing the common ground between the two sides. Following Sir William's death, Richard and Saladin decide to avoid repeating the same catastrophe again. They switch from a discourse of war and conflict to a discourse of brotherhood (374). After witnessing the atrocities of the war, Richard regrets his decision to launch the Crusade (365). Richard's ultimate remorseful stance on war, I maintain, is meant to urge the West to learn lessons from history and to reject war as a means of settling conflicts. Furthermore, al-Adil and Joanna appear at the end of the novel, standing beside each other in the ceremony held to celebrate the signing of the peace treaty (378). Rumors about their marriage have spread, but we are unsure whether they are married.[2] While historians are confident that Joanna refused al-Adil's marriage proposal, Pasha implicitly manipulates the historical chronicles to manifest his hopes for a better relationship between Islam and the West.

[1] Beha El-Din mentions, peace was concluded between Muslims and the Franks [22].

[2] According to the historical account written from both Muslim and Western perspectives, Richard's sister refused the marriage proposal. William Stubbs mentions that Joanna refused Saphadin's proposal as he was a Muslim. For her, in order to accept the marriage proposal Saphadin must convert to Christianity [23].

6. Conclusion

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, by revisiting the Third Crusade in a retrospective manner, *Shadow of the Swords* creates a historical analogy between Saladin's taking of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade and contemporary relations between Islam and the West. I argue that Pasha's representations of the Third Crusade suggest that it is inaccurate to describe the Third Crusade, and by extension the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing "War on Terror", as a clash of civilisation. The novel contests Samuel Huntington's thesis of the "Clash of Civilizations"; the Crusades in the novel are shown to have been largely launched to fulfill European desires for expansion, dominance and military reputation under the guise of religion. Through such depictions, Pasha at least in part support Said's argument in his book Orientalism. For Said, the relationship between the East/Islam and the West/ Christianity is a relationship of dominance.

Besides depicting the Crusades as an imperialist activity, *Shadow of the Swords* presents the campaigns as destructive actions that have inflicted severe harm on people, land, cultural heritage and human relationships. I contend that by means of historical analogy, the novel condemns the ongoing "War on Terror" and calls for the rejection of violence and urge for resorting to diplomacy instead.

Pasha's *Shadow of the Swords* constructs the impact of the military action on women it as a central matter. Pasha creates the fictional protagonist Miriam, making her endure the cruelty of the Crusaders against her and her mother throughout the novel in order to underline the harmful consequences of war on women. Pasha, through his literary depictions, suggests that war hinders efforts of alliance and cooperation between Islam and the West, implying that contemporary military action has a negative impact on human and intercultural relationships. Ultimately, he shows a strong anti-war stance.

Additional information

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Chapter 2

Cyber-Terrorism: An Appraisal of the Dimensions of the New Face of Terrorism in a Post-9/11 Period

Ayoade Onireti

Abstract

There is no gainsaying that the threats posed by terrorists have not abated since the declaration of a Global War on terrorism following the September 11 attacks. Instead, terrorism has gradually metamorphosed into something more sophisticated that can cause even more significant destruction on a massive scale. Over the last 20 years, terrorist attacks have assumed a new and worrisome dimension with States and major international corporations being victims of cyber-terrorism and online attacks. This new face of terrorism is gradually replacing the traditional hostage-taking, suicide bombings, and kidnappings etc that followed the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This paper, therefore, critiques the GWOT particularly the threats posed by cyber-terrorism in the post-9/11 period. Whilst detailing some of the recent cyber-terrorism attacks and other preparatory acts committed by terrorist organizations, this paper appraises the effectiveness and coherence of the mechanisms put in place by the West and its allies in addressing cyberterrorism under its so-called GWOT. This systematic appraisal of the GWOT will contribute immensely to the field of social sciences, by providing objective answers to controversial and much-disputed questions arising from the war. Further studies on the implication(s) of the disagreement between world 'super-powers' on a global strategy for cyberterrorism is needed.

Keywords: terrorism, global war on terrorism, cyber-terrorism, GWOT, online terrorism

1. Introduction

> *...Terrorism has become the systematic weapon of a war that knows No borders and seldom has a face.*
>
> *— Jacques Chirac [1]*

It has been over 20 years since the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was declared by President Bush following the 9/11 attacks. The term 'war on terrorism' was first used by President Bush in his address to the United States (U.S) Congress on the 20th of September 2001 as a rallying call for a global campaign against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Since then, terrorist organizations have gradually changed their *modus operandi* and style, especially in the way they launch their threats or attacks against

States, organizations, and even the public. In recent years, we have seen a complete shift away from the traditional suicide bombings, hijacking of aircraft, use of explosives, kidnapping of diplomats etc. usually by state actors to non-state actors as perpetrators of terrorism. We have also seen less sporadic and unplanned attacks, with a shift towards a more sophisticated, coordinated, and institutionalized attack being carried out, especially online. Although encouragement of terrorist acts through inciteful comments and extremist teachings on the internet is not a new trend, what is new is the online attacks that are gradually replacing the traditional hostage-taking, suicide bombings, and kidnappings that were hitherto commonplace.

This new face of terrorism raises serious concerns, especially when one considers the magnitude of destruction that could be caused by one online attack. Terror groups and violent extremists now use cyberspace for communicating, coordinating their attacks, spreading propaganda, fundraising, radicalization, and recruitment, providing them with an unprecedented opportunity to access a wider global community. To put this into context, imagine the catastrophic events that could happen if a terror group remotely gains control of the flight control systems of a country or shuts down the entire network system of public health providers like the United Kingdom's (U.K) National Health Service (NHS). With heavy reliance on the internet by most agencies, the denial of access to critical online services could have devastating economic consequences and negatively affect the safety and well-being of citizens.

In 2007, the world watched in shock as the Estonian government computer systems were attacked and completely shut down [2]. This politically motivated cyber-attack which lasted 22 days resulted in the degradation and complete loss of government servers including public websites, emails, online banking, and Domain Name System (DNS). The cyber-attacks ranged from manually launching pings to botnet DDoS to exploiting specific vulnerabilities in router software. Many of the detected attacks were described in detail on various Russian language forums and websites, which were easily available to those interested in finding a way to participate in the attacks [2.1]. Although the Russian government has consistently denied direct involvement in the attacks. No organization or group has claimed responsibility for the cyber-attacks [1.2]. Following the Estonian attack, other countries have experienced similar cyber-attacks that have negatively impacted their citizens. These include the 2012 'Flame' attacks on Middle Eastern countries where audio, skype conversation, and keyboard activities were recorded; Canada in 2011; India in 2012; and Israel in 2012 amongst others [3].

A report published in 2021 by the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) highlighted the increasing challenge of keeping the European aviation industry safe from cyber-attacks [4]. Although no impact on flight safety has been reported yet, the report revealed that cyber-attacks (especially ransomware attacks) on European aviation management systems rose by 530% between 2019 and 2020 alone. The report also stated that the price of ransomware mitigation measures is expected to cost global companies over 20 billion EUR a year going forward [4.1].

A major contributing factor to this rapid upsurge in online attacks by terror groups is the COVID-19 pandemic. The lockdowns and restriction of movements imposed by many countries created an avenue for terror organizations to re-strategize. But even before the COVID-19 pandemic, cyber-terrorism had gradually replaced the traditional hostage-taking, suicide bombings, and kidnappings adopted by terror groups. Equally, advancements in technology, especially the increase in the use of artificial intelligence have no doubt improved the capabilities and reach of terror groups and

further worsened the cyber-terrorism landscape. It has therefore become increasingly difficult to ignore the threats posed online by terror groups. It will be safe to conclude that cyber-attacks have emerged as the new battleground for the war on terrorism.

As its central question, this book reviews the effectiveness of the GWOT that has been in effect since 2001 and assesses whether the GWOT narrative is still appropriate or needs to be revised. This chapter therefore appraises the effectiveness and coherence of the mechanisms put in place by the U.S. and its allies in addressing cyber-terrorism under its so-called GWOT. This chapter also assesses some of the challenges created by the GWOT to the promotion of global peace. Although extensive research has been carried out on the GWOT, particularly from the Watson Institute of International & Public Affairs, Brown University. This Centre has published research on the consequences of the U.S. and NATO's wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. However, very little has been published on the threat of cyber-terrorism and how this has been addressed under the GWOT.

Before appraising the effectiveness of the GWOT, it is important to provide a context for the scope of cyber/online terrorism for this study. This contextualization is particularly imperative as terrorism is a broad phenomenon that could mean different things to different people in different situations. First, it is important to note that the controversy about what is considered terrorism has raged on for many years. This problem is further compounded by the absence of an international court or tribunal with specific jurisdiction over terrorist offenses. States are then left to define what constitutes terrorist acts within their jurisdiction. Hence, the phrase one man's terrorist is another freedom fighter has become commonplace. The debate about whether cyber-attacks should be regarded as an act of terrorism has further compounded this definitional controversy. The question then is – will online/cyber-attacks against unarmed civilians, a State or an organization constitute an act of terror?

The answer to this question will largely depend on the aim of the attack. Without addressing the fraught question of what will constitute terrorism, if the cyber/online attack aims to 'influence,' 'intimidate' or 'spread fear' for political, religious, or ideological reasons then it will be considered terrorism. To put it simply, if it can create fear of terror or further a terror group's agenda online, then it will be terrorism. This conclusion is premised on the fact that most national governments regard terrorism as an act intentionally perpetrated to influence, or intimidate the government, organization or the public to advance a political, religious or ideological cause etc. [5]. There is, therefore, no doubt that cyber-terrorism (also known as digital terrorism) could be defined as 'disruptive attacks by recognized terrorist organizations against the computer systems with the intent of generating alarm, panic, or the physical disruption of the information system' will fall under the ambit of terrorism [6]. If there was any doubt about the place and use of cyber-attacks by terror organizations, the U.S. discovery of an Al-Qaeda safehouse in Pakistan during a raid in 2002 devoted to solely training for cyberwarfare and computer hacking [7]. The U.S. officials referred to the suspects arrested in the safehouse as 'electronic jihadists.'

For the current purposes, if the purpose of the attack on the computer systems of a State or an organization is to further some ideological, religious, or political objectives, it will be considered terrorism. It is also important to note that the focus here is on non-state actors and terror groups. Since the GWOT encompasses all terrorist acts that fall outside the traditional classification of war, it would be expected that cyber-terrorism is included within the scope. It is also important to note that the focus here is on non-state actors.

This non-empirical assessment has been divided into four parts. The first part gives a brief overview of the significance of 9/11 and the emergence of the GWOT. This is followed by a quick reflection on the GWOT and an assessment of the continued use of the 'GWOT' metaphor. The third section reviews cyber-terrorism as the new face of terror. The fourth section assesses the response of NATO, the EU, and the U.S. responses to cyber-terrorism. In so doing, the coherence and the effectiveness of the current binding international instrument on cyber-terrorism is addressed.

2. Sept 9/11: the turning point

There is no gainsaying that terrorism is a global phenomenon which transcends every continent. Cyberterrorism is classed as one of the highest security threats in the world, thus it is always top of the security agenda for most countries. States put in place counter-terrorism strategies to deal with terrorist attacks even before they happen. A typical example of this is the United Kingdom's (U.K.) CONTEST strategy which is built around for main strands – 'Pursue,' 'Prevent,' 'Protect,' and 'Prepare' against terror attacks.

One could argue that there was no holistic approach to fighting terrorism on the international front before the 9/11 attacks. That event single-handedly changed the United States (U.S.) and its allies' attitude to fighting terrorism. On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of *Al Qaeda* (an international terrorist organization) hijacked four American commercial aircraft and attacked the World Trade Centre in New York and the Headquarters of the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon). These attacks resulted in the death of nearly 3000 people with many more severely injured. It should be noted that *Al-Qaeda* had in the past committed several terrorist attacks against the U.S., its allies, as well as civilians, and military targets in other countries before the 9/11 attacks. However, 9/11 was the deadliest terror attack on U.S. soil which marked a significant turning point in the U.S. approach to fighting terrorism. President Bush, buoyed by overwhelming support from Americans and its allies, announced a comprehensive plan to go after *Al-Qadea* and every terrorist group of global reach. That declaration is now commonly referred to as the "global war on terrorism." The declaration is 'global' in the sense that, for the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) an intergovernmental military alliance between twenty-nine European Union Countries, Canada and the U.S., invoked Article 5, which provides for its members to respond collectively in self-defense when one of them is attacked. One month after 9/11, the U.S. and its allies began an extensive military campaign against *Al-Qadea* in Afghanistan marking the beginning of a combined effort by international forces against terror groups which spanned more than two decades. The initial war aimed at *Al Qaeda* and militant Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan later extended to other militant groups such as the Taliban, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or IS) and their affiliates in countries like Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Niger.

The primary goal of the GWOT is to coordinate a single multinational force that is aimed at fighting terrorists as well as international cooperation of nations and intelligence sharing for countering -terrorism. This involved large-scale military deployment to countries perceived as harboring terrorists. Another important aspect of the GWOT is the combined international efforts at tracking and intercepting terrorist funds and the prevention of all forms of terror attacks.

2.1 A quick reflection on the GWOT and continued use of the metaphor

As we pause and reflect on the GWOT, questions have been asked about the effectiveness of the war. One of the most significant discussions on the GWOT over the past two decades is whether the campaign was a success or a complete failure. The U.S. and its allies' sudden withdrawal from Kabul further ignited the question of whether the aim of the war was achieved.

The answer to this question depends on who you ask. On one hand, we have proponents who will argue that the war has gone a long way in bringing peace to the world. This belief is premised on the successful prevention of large-scale terrorist attacks on U.S soil and other countries, the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the dispersal of terror cells and networks, tracking and intercepting terrorists' financiers, the arrest or elimination of senior members of terrorist organizations, as well as collective international collaboration in fighting terrorists.

On the other hand, we have critics who argue that the GWOT was a monumental failure that did not achieve the desirable result. Other critics argue that failures recorded in the fight against terror outweigh its successes. As emphasized by Richard Jackson, the GWOT military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have greatly increased deep-rooted hatred for America within the region and the Muslim world at large thereby strengthening the message of militant Islam. The attacks have also fostered a common cause amongst divided terrorist groups thereby encouraging more terrorist acts [8]. Another interesting argument put forward by critics is that the GWOT is an excuse for the pursuit of a larger U.S. agenda for controlling global oil reserves, expanding U.S. and allied forces' military presence, and curtailing some regional powers and repressive regimes within the Arab world. Those who argue that the GWOT was a monumental failure often cite the civil war and sectarian clashes that followed the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2004. The U.S. had misjudged the power exercised by Saddam Hussein in holding the country together, albeit through repressive means. The chaos and civil war that followed the overthrow of the Saddam regime with thousands of Iraq killed further enunciates the failure of the GWOT. In addition, the hurried withdrawal from Kabul and the rate at which the Taliban took back control of the country after 20 years ultimately confirmed the failure of the war campaign. Some top politicians from NATO member countries criticized the hasty withdrawal from Kabul as "the biggest debacle that NATO has suffered since its founding" [9]. The UK Defense Secretary, Ben Wallace, described the speed at which the Taliban took over Afghanistan as the "failure of the international community." Wallace explained that the mission in Afghanistan was not finished, even after over 20 years [9.1].

More objectively, a cursory look at some of the significant successes recorded by the allied forces during the GWOT campaign includes the killing of top Al-Qaeda leaders and top masterminds of the 9/11 attack like Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah as well as several other wanted terrorists. More important is the reduction in the number of terror attacks by international terrorist groups in the U.S. Another significant 'success' is the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which protected terrorists and the annihilation of terror cells across the region. On a global level, it can be argued that the GWOT contributed to a more peaceful world by reducing violent acts in many countries/.

However, these successes came at a huge price, both financially and in terms of the number of lives lost during the campaign. It is difficult to provide a precise figure of the total number of lives that have so far been lost because of direct or

indirect consequences of the GWOT. Statistics provided by the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, suggest that over 937,000 people have died in the post-9/11 war violence [10]. These figures include U.S. military members, allied fighters, journalists, interpreters, and humanitarian/United Nations (UN) aid workers who were killed because of the war. The Report estimated that about 3.7 million people were killed indirectly in the post9/11 war zones, bringing the total death toll to at least 4.5–4.6 million, so far [10.1].

In terms of the financial cost, there has been no official government estimate on the total cost spent on Post 9/11 military operations. Professor Neta Crawford however estimates that about 8 trillion Dollars have so spent on post-9/11 war-related military activity by the U.S. alone up until 2022 [11]. A huge chunk of this amount is said to have gone to unknown contractors resulting in massive fraud, wastage and abuse [12]. There were also reports of massive corruption around overcharging for the fuel supplied to the U.S. forces by Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) [13]. Analysts have said that we will still be dealing with the high societal cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 20 years from now. Another 'dark side' of GWOT is the extraordinary rendition of individuals to a third country as part of an extensive interrogation program. Although the U.S. continually deny this, the New York Times reported that about one hundred and fifty people were captured by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and transported to countries where they were tortured [14].

Whilst the debate continues about the effectiveness of the GWOT and why the war took so long, many observers have also questioned the relevance of the 'GWOT' narrative and its continued usage.

It is interesting to note that the U.K. government was the first to question the use of the term 'war on terrorism.' The UK's Secretary for International Development, Hilary Benn, in 2007 stated that the UK would no longer use the phrase 'war on terror [15]. Before this announcement, a memo was leaked to the Parliamentary Committee on Armed Services advising that they should avoid using colloquial expressions like 'global war on terrorism – GWOT,' instead, staff are advised to be specific in their references to the 'war in Afghanistan' or the 'war in Iraq' or simply say 'ongoing military operations [15.1] The U.K's position was later confirmed by the Former Head of the UK intelligence M15, Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller, who argued that the 9/11 attacks were a crime, not an act of war, therefore the term 'war on terror was essentially an erroneous terminology [16].

President Barack Obama rarely used the term 'GWOT' throughout his tenure. The GWOT narrative was also questioned by his administration as not the appropriate description of the military campaign against terror. A leaked memo from the White House to the Pentagon Défense Department Office of Review suggested that the Obama administration was not prepared to carry on the use of the term "GWOT', but rather the use of the term 'Overseas Contingency Operation' [17]. This in itself is symbolic. If there were any doubts from that memo, a 2013 remark by President Barack Obama at the National Défense University laid bare a shift in the U.S. approach away from the GWOT. President Obama openly questioned the strategy adopted by the U.S. during the war. He remarked– "*I believe we compromised our basic values - by using torture to interrogate our enemies and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law*" [18]. Obama stated further that America must define its effort not as a boundless, "global war on terror," but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America [18.1]. These remarks signaled a gradual close of the curtain to the GWOT, with a move towards targeted killings carried out by drones.

To add to that, the U.S. Department of Defense announced in June 2022 that it will stop awarding the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal hitherto given to all military service members for their efforts in the military operations in the war [19]. This medal is now only awarded to service members directly serving in counter-terrorism operations instead of any type of war. These two events signify a new epoch in the GWOT and a shift in focus by the U.S. Although fighting terrorism remains a priority for the U.S. government, more efforts are now being channeled away from the GWOT to the Russian war in Ukraine.

3. Cyber-terrorism: the new face of terror

There is no doubt that technology plays an important role in contributing to the global socio-economic order. For decades now, terrorists have used the online space to promote, propagandize, attack, and even livestream their attacks. Unlike the traditional forms of attack, cyber-attacks could be done with relative anonymity, except the attacker chooses to reveal their identities. More importantly, the internet allows terror groups to spread their message to a bigger audience. As Calafato and Carauna argue, cyber-terrorism has now evolved from being a support strategy to commit an attack to the attack itself [20]. When President Obama declared in his 2013 address that terrorism 'has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores in 9/1,' he was also referring partly to the increased use of automated attacks by terrorist groups. Cyber-space has become a readily available tool for terrorists to launch their attacks. The increased use of cyber-attacks as a terrorist tool has heightened the need for an appraisal of the place of cyber-terrorism within the GWOT.

It was reported as far back as 2008 that hackers and cybercriminals made alliances with drug traffickers in Afghanistan where their activities and proceeds were used to support terrorist groups [21]. The Increased use of encryption keys for peer-to-peer traffic has made it difficult to track criminality over the internet thereby creating a conducive atmosphere to terror to commit their atrocities [22].

Despite the increased use of the internet as a tool for terror attacks, it appears that there was no holistic strategy for cyber-terrorism under the GWOT. In other words, cyber-terrorism was not included in the so-called GWOT strategy. The truth is that cyber-terrorism has simply not been treated the same as other traditional terrorism despite the physical and serious attacks and disruptions to infrastructure that could arise from this. The fight against cyber-terrorism has been restricted within the realm of national and regional responses. This conclusion is premised on the lack of a holistic strategy for cyber-terrorism and the disagreement amongst the nuclear powers which makes the implementation of any international strategy on cyber-terrorism a mere paper tiger. Whilst admitting that the United Nations has put in place several measures to address cyber-terrorism including putting together a global Counter-terrorism Strategy (UNGCTS) and creating the United Nations Office of Counterterrorism (UNOCT) in 2017 to lead and coordinate all U.N. approaches to preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. Despite all these measures, there is no consensus definition of cyber-terrorism by the international community making the application of any law difficult to apply in practice. In practical terms, States and regional blocs are left to develop their strategies against cyber-terror attacks. For instance, the UK Cyber Security Strategy presented to Parliament in 2009 refers to the establishment of a cross-government program to address the country's strategic cyber security objectives which include working closely with the

wider public sector, industry, civil liberties groups, the public and with international partners amongst other things [23]. The strategy simply recommends that the UK work closely with its international partners in addressing this menace without a clear strategy as to how this will be done. The Report does not specify in plain terms the strategy it would adopt on the international front in cases of cyber-terrorism. Similarly, the recent UK Government Cyber-security strategy 2022–2030 also mirrors the 2009 strategy, with no mention of any holistic, international strategy for cyber-terrorism. The core of the recent strategy rests on public sector organizations, including government departments, arms-length bodies, agencies, local authorities, and other wider public sector organizations [24].

The reason behind the lack of a 'concrete' 'collective' strategy for cyber-terrorism like what we see under the 'GWOT' by Western countries and the U.S. is simple and not far-fetched. First, cyber-terrorism is an act committed within cyberspace and the 'battle' needs to be on the internet which has no limits and physical enemies. The cyber-terrorism methods adopted by most countries are therefore shrouded in secrecy so as not to allow the terrorists or hackers to maneuver their way through the defenses. More importantly, as the global dependency on digital and connectivity continues to grow, new vulnerabilities that threaten the political and economic systems emerge every day. Nations are therefore extremely careful about sharing sensitive information and data, especially about their national security. The implications of releasing national security data also raise questions about national sovereignty and the consequences attached could be far-reaching.

Also, the complexity and vulnerability of sharing online data as well as the potential scope and reach of online attacks deter countries from collaborating on this issue. In addition, states like China and Russia are viewed by the U.S. and the West as active actors that engage in mining data of other countries to assess their weaknesses, influence the activities within the country, or push out their propaganda and global market strength. Hacking claims by the U.S. against Russia have continued for decades. For instance, it was alleged that Russia executed several cyber-attacks on 21 U.S. states during the last election to help Donald Trump win the election. Russia has repeatedly denied the allegations. The U.S. Department of Justice in 2021 charged four Russians, who worked for the Russian government with cyber offenses including attempting, supporting, and conducting computer intrusions against the global energy sector between 2012 and 2018 resulting in the hacking of thousands of computers belonging to hundreds of companies and organizations in approximately 135 countries. The defendants were accused of planning to disrupt, if not paralyze, the delivery of critical energy services to hospitals, homes, businesses, and other locations essential to sustaining communities. The U.S. Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco described the accused as "Russian state-sponsored hackers who pose a serious and persistent threat to critical infrastructure both in the United States and around the world" [25]. On the other hand, Russia also accuses the U.S. intelligence agencies of hacking thousands of iPhones belonging to Russian users including foreign diplomats. The 'cold war' between Western countries and the U.S. against Russia and China has hurt cyber-terrorism on the international front. That said, there have been several instances where States have joined forces to address cyber-attacks. A good example of this was the joint effort by 13 countries including the UK's National Crime Agency, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Intelligence, and Germany's security agency to shut down a prolific ransomware called HIVE. The law enforcement agencies from these countries were able to identify the decryption keys used by HIVE and managed to share them with many of the victims, helping them regain access to their data without paying

the cyber criminals. This company had hitherto extorted more than $100 million in ransom payments within 2 years [26]. In a similar operation, the UK's security agency, in an unprecedented operation involving 17 countries collaborated and successfully took down Genesis Market, one of the most dangerous marketplaces selling stolen account credentials to hackers worldwide. This was the first time a large number of countries were coming together for a cyber/online operation. That operation also resulted in transitional operations across the globe against the users of this platform, resulting in 119 arrests, 208 property searches and 97 knock-and-talk measures [27]. The significance of Genesis Market takedown cannot be over-emphasized. Genesis was a major cyber-criminal that would offer the sale of what is referred to as 'bots' that had infected victims' computers and organizations' devices through malware or account takeover attacks. Upon purchase of the bots, criminals would automatically get access to the data by using saved login, cookies, and autofill from data. What this tells us is that major collaborative efforts against cyber-terrorism might never be revealed to the public due to the pervasiveness of the internet until, perhaps arrests have been made. This is almost certainly due to the sophisticated nature of cyber warfare, where bombs and gunfire are not used but rather it is a warfare that requires experts and highly trained experts who try to prevent large-scale disruptions of computer networks and systems. Since there is no holistic strategy under the GWOT that encompasses cyber-terrorism, it is therefore important to assess how the U.S., the E.U., and NATO T have responded to this. In so doing, some of the challenges and impediments against a holistic strategy for cyber-terrorism will be highlighted. To be clear, what is discussed below is not included in the GWOT, but they are ancillary to the global war against terrorism. As earlier established the fight and the battlefield for cyber-terrorism take place in a completely different sphere - cyberspace.

4. NATO, the EU, and the U.S. responses to cyberterrorism

4.1 NATO

As a military alliance at the forefront of the GWOT, NATO's main priority is to protect its members from any form of attack. NATO recognized that all threats, including cyberterrorism, are part of its core assignment of defense and deterrence. In 2016 the organization reaffirmed its defensive mandate and recognized cyberspace as an area of its operations. NATO's response to cyber-terrorism is also enshrined in its collective defense clause as set out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty - an attack on one is an attack on all. As earlier mentioned, the only time Art. 5 was triggered was after 9/11. It is almost impossible for Art 5. To be triggered because of a cyber-attack on member nations because cyber-terrorism is much more complex and difficult in comparison to a bomb blast or drone attack. To demonstrate its seriousness and readiness against the growing sophistication of cyber threats against its members, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Belgium in 2018. NATO acknowledged that war within cyberspace must be as effective as it is in the air, land, and sea [28]. However, NATO's response to cyber-terrorism is different from its response to traditional terrorist attacks. Again, this is due to the nature of cyber-warfare which according to the organization requires a comprehensive approach through unity of effort at the political, military, and technical levels [29]. NATO sees itself as a platform for its allies to consult politically, exchange national responses and if possible, consider collective responses for cyber-terrorism attacks. To achieve this objective,

NATO works with, the European Union, the U.N, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on cyber defense amongst others. NATO also defines targets for Allied countries' implementation of national cyber defense capabilities via the organizations' Defense Planning Process. The defense method and strategy include regular such as annual cyber coalition exercises, crisis management exercises, and provision and training for dealing with cyber-attacks as well as high-level meetings of military decision-makers. NATO also have several practical tools to enhance point of contact in cases of cyber-attacks in all its allied capitals. These contacts are trained in cyber-defense assistance including provisions and response capabilities. Another important strategy used by NATO against cyber-terrorism is that 'technical information is also exchanged through NATO's Malware Information Sharing Platform, which allows indicators of compromise to be shared rapidly among Allied cyber defenders, reinforcing the Alliance's overall defense posture.' [29.1]. The E.U. and NATO share protected information relating to cyber responses including best practices for each situation. Both organizations also have enhanced cooperation in several areas including training, research, and exercises, with tangible results in countering cyber threats. The Technical Arrangement on Cyber Defense between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (now known as the NATO Cyber Security Centre) and the Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies, and agencies (CERT-EU) provides a framework for exchanging information and sharing best practices between emergency response teams.

When Estonia became a target of cyber-attack in April 2007 NATO swung into action. NATO and the U.S. sent experts to the country to help recover data and reinforce their cyber-security capabilities. After restoring access to the internet, NATO in 2008 established a world-class cyber defense center in Tallinn, Estonia. This effort made Estonia one of the top countries in cyber defense and cyber-security [30].

4.2 The EU

It is important to note that the European Union was the first regional body to call for a strategy to address terrorist use of the internet. The European Commission in 2013 approved the creation of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) to function within Europol. The primary aim of the European Cybercrime Centre is to have a coordinated approach to cyber-attacks and to support its Member States in establishing operational and analytical capacity for investigating and assisting its international partners in fighting cyber/online attacks. The EC3 is strategically created to become the central point for the EU's fight against cybercrime including cyber-terrorism attacks that could affect critical infrastructure and information systems of E.U member states.

On the international front, for the first time an international Convention on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime or the Budapest Convention came into effect in July 2004. The following year, the Council of Europe's Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism of 2005 was passed.

It is important to note that the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was drawn up by Europe. Even though the Convention was drawn up by the Council of Europe, it has been ratified by the United States. The significance of this Convention is that it was the first multilateral legally binding international instrument for the international community to address cybercrime with powers and procedures for computer network searches and interceptions. So far 68 countries have ratified the Convention [31]. However, countries like Russia and China have refused to ratify the Convention.

Russia argues that adopting the Convention would violate its sovereignty and the rights of its citizens. Besides the 'cold war' earlier alluded to, Russia's main concern is that ratifying the Convention will give agencies like the FBI covert power to come to the country for searches. President Putin was holding on to the transborder search of Russian computers by the FBI during the investigation of two Russian citizens Alexey Ivanov and Vasily Gorshko in 2001, hence the reference by Russia to its citizens' rights [32]. Another nuclear power that has refused to sign the Convention is India. India's main reservation is that they were not included during the drafting process of the Convention and have also raised some concerns about sharing their data with Western countries. Apart from that, the biggest obstacle under the Budapest Convention is the provision of Art Art 32(b) which permits a party to the Convention to only 'access or receive, through the computer system in its territory, stored computer data located in another party, if the Party obtains lawful and voluntary consent of the person who has the lawful authority to disclose the date to the Party through that computer system.'

The implication of Art 32 (B) is that consent must be given voluntarily given. This could engage sovereignty and create a lot of political disputes amongst countries that have ratified the Convention, especially given the risk associated with allowing security agents from another country to access or search the computer system of their country. This provision could also potentially engage the domestic laws of signatories. Another lacuna in the Budapest convention is the lack of a clear statement regarding mutual assistance from signatories. Although the Convention obliges parties to cooperate in the best possible way, it does not impose an immediate obligation to offer information. All these raise questions about the effectiveness of the Convention, especially its enforcement in practice.

4.3 The U.S.A.

As the world leader in the fight against terrorism under the GWOT, the U.S. also play a leading role in the fight against cyber-terrorism. Much of all the cyber-terrorism operations highlighted in this chapter include the direct contribution of the U.S. agents. In addition to spearheading the GWOT as well as cyber-terrorism prevention. The U.S. has made several contributions both domestically as well as on the international front. To better respond to cyber threats, President Obama signed an Executive order that gives the U.S. powers to impose sanctions on cyberterrorism. The Executive Order authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on individuals or entities that engage in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities that are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States [33]. On the domestic front, the US Department of Defense (DoD) deals with cyberterrorism and protecting its information grid. For instance, the U.S. created the Air Force Cyber Command (AFCYBER command) in 2008 to assist the DoD in preserving U.S. cyberspace from all forms of cyber-attack. In 2021 President Biden announced a new Executive order to improve U.S. cyber security. The new Executive order has 10 comprehensive strategies for defending the U.S. against cyber-attacks.

The U.S. has also imposed comprehensive sanction packages against more than a dozen Russian-speaking cyber criminals who targeted institutions across the world, including the NHS during the height of the pandemic. As global dependency on digital services and connectivity grows, the U.S. continues to assist countries hit by

Cyber-attack. These include improving the detection of Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Incidents on Federal Government Networks, and establishing a cyber–Safety Review Board, modernizing Federal Government Cybersecurity amongst others.

Besides the measures, sanctions, and judicial intervention that are shared with the public, much of the details and methods used by the U.S. in countering cyber-terrorists are kept secret for obvious reasons.

5. Conclusion

Having appraised the effectiveness and coherence of the mechanisms put in place by the U.S. and its allies in addressing cyber-terrorism under its so-called GWOT, one of the main findings that has emerged from this assessment is that cyber-terrorism was not included in the GWOT. Cyber-terrorism, unlike traditional forms of terrorism, does not necessarily require any form of violence, however, the result could be catastrophic. The study also indicates that the approach and strategy used in addressing cyber-terrorism have been completely different from those used in traditional warfare against terror groups. Actions are taken on a regional and domestic level without any effort that we can refer to as a global war on cyber-terrorism. Whilst tremendous effort has been made to have an international instrument on cyber-terrorism that was spearheaded by the E.U., 'great power' countries like Russia, India, and China continue to frustrate any effort to have an international and holistic strategy on cyber-attacks and cyber-terrorism. Though the curtain on the GWOT appears to have been closed with the complete withdrawal from Kabul. Much of the remaining war on terrorism is done remotely using drones. Nonetheless, the cyber-space remains and will continue to be a hot battleground for terrorist activity with key actors changing from terror groups to States themselves.

As demonstrated in the analysis, international frameworks and instruments on cyber-terrorism are only effective and applicable if a state is a signatory to that instrument. This raises a lot of questions about the application and effectiveness of the instrument in countries that are not signatories. Consequently, there is a need for agreement and harmonization, especially from countries like Russia, China, and India if the international instrument on cyber-terrorism is to have any effect.

Since access to the Internet is relatively easy, cybercrime is becoming more organized and established as a transnational business. Questions around cyber-terrorism will continue to remain relevant in years to come. Therefore, further research on GWOT, with more focus on the challenges posed by cyber-terrorism to global peace and security as well as the implication(s) of the disagreement between the world 'super-powers' on a global strategy will need to be undertaken.

Conflict of interest

"The authors declare no conflict of interest."

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Chapter 3

Perspective Chapter: Historical Experience of Governments of Pre-Revolutionary Russia to Overcome Individual Political Terror

Alexey Suvorov

Abstract

Terrorism has become a prominent feature of the social and political life of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth early twentieth centuries. Its most dangerous form was political terrorism, with the help of which the opposition, extremist forces sought to bring confusion to the government camp, revolutionize their supporters in order to seize state power or achieve serious political concessions from the government. This was manifested to the greatest extent in the 1970s and 1980s of the nineteenth century in the activities of the Narodnaya Volya and at the beginning of the twentieth century in the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists. As the danger grew, the government was forced to look for ways to contain and suppress this dangerous type of state crime: it sought to strengthen and develop law enforcement agencies, direct public efforts to isolate and curb it.

Keywords: terror, terrorist idea, Russian social democracy, Narodnaya Volya, section III, police department, St. Petersburg security department, Zubatov, Rataev, Plehve, Stolypin, emergency legislation, revolutionary terrorism, anarchism, maximalism, unmotivated terror, national separatism

1. Introduction

Terrorism in its various manifestations has become one of the most acute problems of the modern world community. Concerned about the growing danger, government agencies in many countries are taking practical steps to contain and suppress it. Among them are the development of software and legal support, the creation of anti-terrorist centers and special police units, the establishment of closer international cooperation, etc.

The problem of combating terrorism is attracting more and more attention of researchers—philosophers and historians, sociologists and jurists.

A number of authors, when considering the formation and development of political investigation in pre-revolutionary Russia, touch upon the historical aspect [1]. Unfortunately, not everyone managed to go beyond the traditional historiography

of the Soviet period, which denigrated and caricatured the historical past of Russia, especially the activities of law enforcement agencies.

Truthful and impartial coverage of pre-revolutionary law enforcement activities is an integral part of the overall task of not only re-creating an objective approach to national history, but also extracting instructive lessons from it for the present. In this regard, the experience of previous anti-terrorist activities is of considerable interest.

As is known, terrorism became a noticeable feature of the social and political life of Russia in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its most dangerous form was political terrorism, with the help of which the opposition, extremist forces sought to bring confusion to the government camp, revolutionize their supporters in order to seize state power or achieve serious political concessions from the government. This was manifested to the greatest extent in the 1970s and 1980s of the nineteenth century in the activities of the Narodnaya Volya and at the beginning of the twentieth century in the activities of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and anarchists.

Rampant terror seriously destabilized the political life of society and to a large extent contributed to the country's involvement in the abyss of anarchy and bloodshed in 1905–1907. As the danger grew, the government was forced to look for ways to contain and suppress this most dangerous type of state crime: it sought to strengthen and develop law enforcement agencies, direct public efforts to isolate and curb it, and so on. At the same time, serious difficulties arose. First, the country was essentially not prepared to face this kind of crime. Law enforcement agencies had no experience in anti-terrorist struggle. Second, they were opposed by well-organized, carefully conspiratorial, terrorist centers, groups and communities, who were well equipped with technical means and financial resources. Third, the terrorists enjoyed the sympathy and often the support of a significant part of Russian society, as supposedly disinterested fighters for the happiness of the people. A vivid illustration of this was the acquittal of the terrorist Vera Zasulich, which was greeted with enthusiasm and jubilation in wide circles, the so-called progressive public. Fourth, Russian terrorists, as a result of targeted propaganda, found some protection and support from a significant part of the European public. All this complicated the deployment of an effective anti-terrorist struggle and required considerable sacrifices, additional efforts and funds.

2. Prevention and suppression of terrorism during the activity of the III division

Priority attention in the prevention and eradication of terrorist plans and actions was given to increasing the efficiency of the work of the higher police, who were in charge of the timely detection and suppression of the most dangerous crimes against the state. For more than 50 years (since the speech of the Decembrists), III Department of SEIVK (III Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Office) was the supreme state body here. It was the think tank of the entire state security system. All the most important information about the internal political situation in the country came here. Here, operational plans for detective activities were developed, instructions and circulars for local security agencies came from here.

The gendarmerie, which had previously performed the functions of the highest military police and was part of the army, became the executive body of the III Branch in the field.

The government sought to create exemplary, elite units from the new military-police formations through a careful selection of personnel, especially officers. Increased salaries, favorable conditions for life and work, almost complete independence from local authorities made the gendarme service quite prestigious, which contributed to the constant influx of the best personnel into it. At the same time, the requirements for these units also grew from year to year. They had to promptly report on all important incidents in the country, know the mood in society, timely disclose and suppress any manifestations of disobedience to the authorities, anti-government actions and thoughts.

In the detective work of the III Branch, secret agents began to be widely used, the perusal of correspondence became widely practiced and denunciation was encouraged. According to the chief manager of the III Department, Count A.Kh. Benckendorff, persons suspected of anti-state actions "in most cases are included in the surveillance lists" [2].

Possessing great powers and the most qualified personnel, using increased attention and comprehensive support from the government, the high police bodies for a long time (until the mid-1970s) successfully coped with their duties—to uncover and prevent crimes against the state system, the emperor and his environment, focusing on the prevention of political crime. If Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century was shaking under the blows of violent revolutionary upheavals, accompanied by outbreaks of bloody terror, then in Russia for several decades after the speech of the Decembrists, relative calm reigned.

The growth of the opposition movement in the country since the 1960s, persistently promoting terrorist actions, required an expansion of the scope of detective activity, a qualitatively new approach to its forms and methods. The staff of the III Division and the number of secret agents were significantly increased.

In 1867, a new Regulation on the Corps of Gendarmes was issued, according to which the district gendarme departments were abolished. All provincial gendarme departments, including transport departments, began to report directly to the Main Directorate of the Gendarme Corps [3]. Under the law of 1871, the ranks of the Gendarme Corps were given the opportunity to openly investigate these crimes together with representatives of the prosecutor's office as judicial investigators in criminal cases. Thus, in addition to the body of observation and denunciation, the gendarmerie also became the body of the judicial investigation of the most serious political crimes.

During these years, increased attention was paid to the qualitative composition of gendarmerie personnel, educational training, moral and business qualities. All departments were tested for professional compliance. Schools were established for the training of officers and noncommissioned officers, where, in addition to legal and general political sciences, advanced domestic and foreign experience in detective work was studied. Service in the gendarmerie enjoyed growing popularity among the youth of that time.

The work carried out to strengthen the bodies of political investigation made it possible by the mid-1970s to significantly strengthen the rule of law and order in the country, and to stop the activities of dangerous anti-government groups and communities. The largest search cases related to terrorism were the disclosure and suppression of the activities of secret communities under the leadership of N. Ishutin and S. Nechaev. And in total, according to the results of detective activity in the 1970s, 86 political trials were held [4].

3. Responding to terrorism at the end of the 1970s and 1980s of the nineteenth century

A serious test for the political search services was the populist period of revolutionary struggle, which began in the second half of the 1970s, when the boundaries of political confrontation expanded unprecedentedly and its most dangerous forms began to be widely used up to mass terror against statesmen, especially law enforcement officials. By this time, the terrorists had improved their tactics, adopted more effective equipment in the form of explosive devices, acquired the skills of deep conspiracy and began to master the methods of neutralizing sent agents.

Analyzing the new criminogenic situation, the composition and structure of crime, law enforcement agencies developed appropriate measures to counteract, prevent and suppress especially dangerous types of state crimes. In July 1878, by order of the emperor, a Special Conference was convened with the participation of the leaders of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, the III Branch and the Gendarme Corps to determine a strategy for combating state crime. The meeting supported the proposal of the chief manager of the III Division and the chief of the Gendarme Corps N.V. Mezentsov about the more effective use of secret agents in suppressing the activities of terrorist organizations and about the need to apply tougher measures to the speeches of opposition, extremist elements [5].

In 1878, an additional 400,000 rubles were allocated to strengthen the gendarmerie corps [6]. In detective work, the main emphasis was increasingly placed on the use of professional agents of internal and external surveillance, perusal of correspondence became widely practiced, detailed card indexes and forms were compiled for known state criminals with their photographs.

Provisional rules, adopted in early September 1878, gave the gendarmes the right to arrest citizens "for participating in street riots or gatherings of a political nature," as well as "politically unreliable" persons. This made it possible to isolate and prevent the transition of many criminal elements to the commission of more serious state crimes. Cases against the most dangerous terrorists were recommended to be sent for consideration in military courts under the laws of war [7].

After the assassination attempt on the tsar by A. Solovyov (April 1879), the whole country was divided into six temporary governor-generals. Each of them was headed by the most authoritative governor-generals who were endowed with additional powers, especially to combat dangerous state crimes: to arrest and submit dubious persons to administrative exile, to send cases for consideration in military courts and approve their sentences, etc.

After the assassination of the head of the III Division and the chief of the Gendarme Corps, General N.V. Mezentsov (August 1878), an imperial decree "On the temporary subordination of cases of state crimes and certain crimes against officials to the jurisdiction of a military court established for wartime" was issued. The proceedings in the military courts were carried out according to an accelerated, simplified procedure.

Investigative activity on terrorism not only became more complicated from year to year, but also became more and more dangerous. The disclosure and detention of terrorists were increasingly accompanied by armed resistance, and law enforcement officers became the main targets of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, powerful barriers of police countermeasures increasingly stood in the way of criminal forces, their activities were blocked and often promptly suppressed by preventive measures.

Much, for example, was done in this regard in the 1970s. At the same time, these years also revealed significant shortcomings, miscalculations and omissions in the formulation of a political investigation related to anti-terrorist activities. Outdated approaches to organizing the work of these services often had an effect, and in some places the necessary professionalism was lacking.

Part of the miscalculations and omissions of law enforcement agencies in the fight against terrorism in the late 1970s and early 1980s should be attributed to the relatively lighthearted attitude on the part of the governing bodies to the danger, the sociopolitical consequences of this type of state crime and the underestimation of the strength and potential capabilities of terrorist organizations. As a result, the number of victims of terrorist acts increased. Separate daring attempts were committed with impunity, the criminals often managed to escape, as happened in the cases of the murders of N.V. Mezentsov, adjutant of the Kiev gendarme department G.E. Geiking, Kharkov governor D.N. Kropotkin, with the explosion in the Winter Palace and some other cases.

The situation with the protection of Emperor Alexander II was clearly unsatisfactory, despite the additional measures taken after the assassination attempt by Karakozov and Solovyov. The assassination attempts of 1879 and 1880 showed that often only a happy coincidence saved him from death.

Bold and dangerous in conception and execution, the attacks testified not so much to the strength of the fans of the bomb and the revolver, but to the revealed weakness of law enforcement, its inconsistency with the changed situation. Based on strict centralization, weakly connected with local administrative bodies, having no reliable support in society, the high police system was unable to successfully fight in the new conditions with well-organized and carefully secretive groups and communities. Therefore, the government began to seriously reform it.

The most cardinal step in this direction was the abolition in August 1880 of the III Branch with the transfer of all protective functions, together with the Gendarme Corps, to the reorganized Ministry of the Interior, headed by Count M.T. Loris-Melikov. All management of political investigation, including those related to the fight against terrorism, was concentrated in the State Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which existed with some reorganizations until 1917.

The most experienced specialists of law enforcement agencies, who have proven themselves in gendarmerie-detective, forensic-investigative activities, were involved in the leadership of the Police Department and its subdivisions.

On the ground, along with the gendarmerie departments, new police formations, the search departments, began to actively engage in search activities for political crimes under the auspices of the Police Department. Local detective agencies were not only expanded numerically, but also significantly improved in terms of quality.

All this was not long in affecting the results of anti-terrorist activities. Particularly sensitive blows were dealt to the main terrorist organization—the party "People's Will." In November 1880, its leader, Alexander Mikhailov, was arrested, and 3 months later, his successor Andrei Zhelyabov. In January 1881, while crossing the border, Nikolai Morozov, a major terror theorist and participant in many terrorist attacks, was caught. By the spring of 1881, such active militants of Narodnaya Volya, members of its Executive Committee, as A. Barannikov, N. Kolodkevich, S. Shiryaev, A. Zundelevich, S. Ivanova, N. Bukh and S. Zlatopolsky were tracked down and arrested. The discovery and arrest (January 1881) of N. Kletochnikov, a terrorist agent who served in the Police Department, who disrupted the implementation of

some operational plans of the detective agencies and protected many criminals from retribution, must be considered a major success of the investigation.

Unfortunately, the restructuring of the protective organs, its first tangible results, did not prevent such a grave state crime as the assassination of Emperor Alexander II. The roots of this crime must be sought in the miscalculations and omissions of the previous security agencies, which showed carelessness and liberalism in relation to inveterate state criminals. According to the gendarmerie general A.I. Spiridovich, "the protection of the sovereign was set criminally carelessly" [8].

The regicides and their accomplices were quickly caught and severely punished. Meanwhile, the government drew conclusions from the tragic events of March 1 about the need to further strengthen the police and detective services, and especially about strengthening the protection of the emperor and major statesmen. Moreover, the Police Department began to receive numerous reports about impending assassination attempts on the new Emperor Alexander III [9].

Strengthening the detective and punitive functions of state bodies was facilitated by the Regulations issued on August 14, 1881 on measures to protect state order and public peace.

With the coming to the leadership of D.A. Tolstoy, an additional post of Deputy Minister of the Interior was introduced, who directly carried out the general management of the State Police Department, the Gendarmes Corps, and also coordinated the activities of governors and mayors on the prevention and suppression of state crimes. Until 1887, this post was held by General P.V. Orzhevsky. The directors of the Police Department at that time were V.K. Plehve and P.N. Durnovo.

To develop measures to strengthen the protection of Tsar Alexander III, a temporary council was created under the leadership of the newly appointed St. Petersburg mayor, Major General N.M. Baranov. The protection of the king was strengthened by increasing the number of palace guards, which in 1881 was headed by Adjutant General P.A. Cherevin. The departure of the emperor for the coronation in Moscow was postponed for 2 years.

In the 1980s, there was a noticeable increase in the number of personnel of the Gendarme Corps and provincial gendarme departments. In the fight against dangerous state crimes, the role of governor-generals, governors and city governors became increasingly important. Since the 1980s, the leading role in political investigation has increasingly shifted to the departments for the protection of public order and tranquility, which have been successfully confronting political terrorism in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Warsaw, often extending their influence to the periphery. Their experience was approved in the Regulations on the organization of the secret police in the empire, published in December 1883. These regulations recommended, as necessary, to establish similar offices in other parts of the country [10].

In the early 1880s, the work of the St. Petersburg search department, headed by Colonel Georgy Porfirievich Sudeikin, who had previously proven himself well by serving in the Kiev Gendarmerie Department, had excellent results. Using well-chosen internal agents, the employees of the St. Petersburg detective managed to thwart a number of terrorist acts, isolate and neutralize many dangerous criminals. In 1882, Sudeikin was simultaneously appointed inspector of the secret police of the empire, heading the entire political search in the country.

A particularly major success of Sudeikin was the recruitment of an active Narodnaya Volya, the former staff captain Sergei Degaev, with the help of whom he intended to completely put an end to the main terrorist organization, Narodnaya Volya.

At the end of their criminal activities, the surviving militants of the Narodnaya Volya managed to deal with G.P. Sudeikin, whose name was quite reasonably associated with their tragic ending. He was brutally murdered in December 1883. It was a serious loss for the detectives.

As a result of detective and interrogation activities in the 1980s, 17 Narodnaya Volya trials were held, at which 74 death sentences were pronounced [11]. This, in fact, meant the complete defeat of Russia's main terrorist organization.

However, the defeat of the Narodnaya Volya party did not mean the end of the Narodnaya Volya terror: in the 1980s and partly in the 1990s, terrorist groups and circles operated revived and re-created in various parts of the country, considering themselves followers of the First March. During 1882–1883, 78 people's volunteer circles were opened throughout the country [12].

In view of the continuing threat of terrorist attacks against the most prominent statesmen, including Emperor Alexander III, his coronation in Moscow (May 1883) required the adoption of special security measures. The validity of the emergency measures taken to protect the emperor was confirmed when in 1887 in St. Petersburg the terrorist group of P. Shevyrev-A. Ulyanov, which was preparing regicide, was discovered and neutralized.

All this indicated that even after the liquidation of the main terrorist organization, the internal political situation in the country did not allow weakening the fight against the most dangerous types of state crime and required further strengthening of the relevant services. The gendarmerie departments and detective departments not only received additional replenishment of qualified, capable workers, but were also better equipped technically, more fully mastered the best domestic and foreign experience in detective work.

The basis of detective activity increasingly became work with secret agents within underground organizations and external surveillance. In the 1980s, there were more than 1000 agents of internal surveillance, of whom about 100 were in St. Petersburg [13].

In connection with the increasing use of various types of explosives in terrorist activities, the government issued a number of decrees on measures to tighten the procedure for storing, using and transporting explosives and components for their manufacture. In 1883, more stringent regulations were introduced for transporting explosives across the border [14].

By the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s, investigative departments became more and more active in the search for terrorism. The instruction of the Police Department dated May 23, 1887 significantly expanded the rights and powers of these departments and regulated their interaction with the gendarme departments [15].

At the turn of the century, the effective investigative activities of the Moscow Security Department were implemented under the leadership of talented political detectives N.S. Berdyaeva, A.S. Skandrakov and especially S.V. Zubatov, whom contemporaries called "the genius of the detective." Gendarme General P.P. Zavarzin, a colleague and follower of Zubatov, wrote about him: "Zubatov was the first to set up a search in the empire on the model of Western Europe, introducing systematic registration, photography, conspiracy of internal agents, etc." [16].

The system of interrogation of arrested revolutionaries introduced by Zubatov is characteristic. He never resorted to intimidation or coercion, but sought to convince his opponents of the fallacy of the chosen path, and thanks to his erudition, his polemical gift, he often succeeded: the revolutionaries who fell under his influence, having been released, broke with their terrorist past.

Zubatov's activities unfolded in close contact and full mutual understanding with the then Moscow chief police chief, Major General D.F. Trepov.

In a short time, the Moscow Security Department, under the leadership of Zubatov and Trepov, became exemplary and carried out tasks of an all-Russian scale. Former head of the Special Section of the L.A. Police Department Rataev wrote: "The Moscow security department ... in those days was considered a school of secret agents and surveillance" [17].

The Moscow security department under Zubatov and Mednikov uncovered a group of terrorists "Narodnoye Pravo" led by the Narodnaya Volya members M. Natanson and N. Tyutchev (1894), I. Rasputin's group, which was preparing an assassination attempt on Tsar Nicholas II (1895), the heads of the Narodnaya Volya printing house in Petersburg (1896), hunted down groups of Narodnaya Volga people in the Volga region (1899), a group of Social Revolutionaries led by G. Gershuni was arrested in Minsk (1900), an attempt on the tsar was prevented in 1895, etc. In 1902, Minister V.K. Plehve appointed Zubatov head of the Special Section of the Police Department, subordinating to him all the security departments of the empire. Thus, the experience of the Moscow detective was transferred to other regions of the country.

The investigation and mass arrests of terrorists in Russia have led to an increase in their emigration to European countries. Their leading centers settled there, publishing activities were intensively developed, weapons and explosive devices were purchased and manufactured, and cadres of militants were trained. Many of the prominent Russian political émigrés carried out an active propaganda campaign abroad in defense of Russian terrorism.

Abroad, since the 1970s, quite a few Russian agents have been spying on the revolutionaries. However, due to the growth in the number and increased activity of Russian political emigrants, this work became more complicated from year to year.

In 1881, the Police Department established a permanent secret agency in Europe with centers in Paris and Geneva, and later in Berlin. For about 20 years, it was led by General P.I. Rachkovsky. A high-profile case was the defeat in November 1886 by a group of foreign agents under the leadership of Rachkovsky of a printing house in Geneva—the basis of the revolutionary activities of the Narodnaya Volya group abroad [18].

In 1890, Rachkovsky's agent A. Gekkelman revealed to the French authorities a terrorist group of Russian emigrants who, in the vicinity of Paris, were improving explosive devices to assassinate the Russian emperor.

P.I. Rachkovsky had a serious influence on one of the leaders of the "Narodnaya Volya" Lev Tikhomirov, who was in exile, helped him break with the revolutionary environment, receive an imperial amnesty and return to Russia in 1889.

Quite often, the Police Department also received valuable information about the movements of émigré revolutionaries, their actions, plans and intentions through the channels of the Russian diplomatic services.

On the issues of detention and extradition of terrorists, the Russian government sought closer cooperation with foreign countries, although it did not always meet with the necessary understanding.

Thus, strengthening and improving detective activities, extending its influence not only to all major regions of the country, but also beyond its borders, the Police Department by the mid-1980s had practically liquidated the main terrorist organization—the People's Will party. All the main activists of terror were arrested and punished.

4. Fighting mass terrorism at the beginning of the twentieth century

The experience gained in the fight against people's will terrorism was used by law enforcement agencies at the beginning of the twentieth century in the confrontation with an even stronger and more insidious enemy—the Social Revolutionary (SR) terror, reinforced by the revolutionary terror of other political parties and organizations. This confrontation was complicated by the generally unfavorable political situation in the country, caused by the defeat in the Russo-Japanese war, and the growth of the mass opposition movement, which resulted in the first Russian revolution.

The current situation required the expansion of the scope of detective and investigative activities, greater professionalism and creative search for new approaches to its organization. A significant contribution to the improvement of this activity was made by the new Minister of Internal Affairs V.K. Plehve, who in 1902 replaced D.S. Sipyagin.

Convinced that "the strength of the revolutionary parties only reflects the weakness of the police," V.K. Plehve directed his main energy to strengthening law enforcement agencies. Particular attention was paid to the formation and strengthening of search departments, both in the capital centers and on the periphery. Plehve sought to turn them into the main and most authoritative divisions of political investigation.

The Special Department of the Police Department, established in 1898, coordinated the activities of security departments and gendarmerie departments. Its first leader was a real state councilor, L.A. Rataev, who was replaced in 1902 by Colonel S.V. Zubatov. Along with the security departments, the role of the gendarmes also increased during the period under review.

Improving the structure of law enforcement agencies, the government sought the main thing—to increase their effectiveness, especially in the suppression of the most dangerous types of state crime. The mechanism of search activity to neutralize terrorism in the work of local police and gendarmerie bodies was built mainly in two forms: the identification and capture of the entire group or the arrest of its individual members for the gradual liquidation of the entire organization.

The expansion of the activities of the security departments, their close interaction with the gendarmerie departments, the arrival of young, enterprising workers in the detective service and the introduction into practice of advanced methods of detection made it possible at the very beginning of the new century not only to put an end to the remnants of the Narodnaya Volya terror, but also to deliver the first sensitive blows to the terrorism of the new waves. So, in Tomsk in 1901, the first Socialist-Revolutionary printing house was opened and party activists were arrested. In 1902, the head of the "Northern Union" of the Socialist-Revolutionaries A. Argunov was arrested in Yaroslavl. In Kiev, the security department under the leadership of Colonel A.I. Spiridovich managed to track down and neutralize the main SR terrorists, and by 1903 the main leaders of their Combat Organization (BO)—G. Gershuni, P. Kraft and M. Melnikov were arrested here. As a result, an agent of the Police Department, E. Azef, came to the leadership of the BO SRs.

Unfortunately, the successes achieved could not be consolidated and developed in subsequent years, and the rise of the revolutionary terrorism of 1905–1907 was met by law enforcement services that were largely weakened. Miscalculations and underestimation of the growing danger, inconsistency and softness of the highest power structures, and serious personnel losses have affected here. A particularly heavy loss was the tragic death of Minister V.K. Plehve.

Plehve's successors as Minister of the Interior P.D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky and A.G. Bulygin, director of the Police Department A.A. Lopukhin and head of the Special Department of the Police Department N.A. Makarov turned out to be insufficiently firm and consistent leaders, unable to oppose anything serious to the growing wave of terror. The replacement in 1902 of Rachkovsky by Rataev noticeably weakened the activities of foreign agents. Serious damage to detective work was caused by the unreasonable removal from service in 1903 of S.V. Zubatov.

The general weakening of the political leadership in the country negatively affected the state of law enforcement agencies. By 1905, government policy was showing inconsistency, lack of system and dangerous complacency. The rulers clearly lacked statesmanship. And farsighted people with a subtle state instinct were not given a go.

The so-called "spring" of Svyatopolk-Mirsky cost the country dearly, costing a lot of blood and disasters. Appointed in 1905 by the St. Petersburg Governor-General, D.F. Trepov recognized the state of the capital's security department as unsatisfactory. The instability of the internal political situation in the country, the well-known destabilization of law enforcement activity is also evidenced by the frequent change of heads of the Police Department. After the assassination of the Minister of Internal Affairs Plehve in July 1904, five directors of the Police Department were replaced until 1906 (A.A. Lopukhin, S.G. Kovalensky, N.P. Garin, E.I. Vuich, M.I. Trusevich) and several heads of the Special Section of the Department.

Since the first targets of the terrorists were police and gendarmerie officers of various ranks, their losses in this regard increased from year to year. According to the materials of the State Duma, only from October 1905 to April 1906 more than 670 employees of the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs suffered (were killed or injured) at the hands of terrorists [19]. The security agencies not only lost valuable personnel, but in an atmosphere of escalated fear they often experienced difficulties in recruiting workers for the service.

A massive ideological attack on these bodies by all types of opposition also left a serious imprint. An opinion was instilled in society about the arbitrariness allegedly reigning here, sheer abuses, the use of unlawful methods of activity, etc. The opinion about the reprehensibility, the inhuman nature of this service took root in every possible way.

The situation was also complicated by the fact that the fighting parties were in unequal conditions in terms of moral and ethical principles and legal foundations. If the terrorists acted by any, often barbaric methods and methods, then law enforcement agencies worked, as a rule, within the strict limits of the law, using only permitted, civilized means. This was figuratively noted by the outstanding philosopher V.V. Rozanov: "Revolutionaries win by being frank. "I want to shoot in the belly" - and shoots ... Before that, no one has the spirit. And they win ... And the victory of the revolutionaries, or their 50-year success, is based on the fact that they are inhuman, and the "old system," which, the "bastard," they exterminate, remembers the "cross on itself" and does not dare strip off the image of man" [20].

In particular, the police services have never resorted to extrajudicial means of eliminating their opponents. For example, their work was seriously complicated by the ideologist of terrorism, publicist V. Burtsev, who repeatedly exposed secret agents. Nevertheless, the secret services treated him in civilized ways, allowed him to freely cross the border, distribute their publications and even entered into discussion correspondence with him. Burtsev's closest assistant, former police officer M. Bakai, was treated liberally as well.

In April 1906, P.A. Stolypin, who took over the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior, with all his energy, was unable to quickly turn the tide, the wave of crime and terrorism grew for some time even under him. The friction that sometimes arose between the security departments and the gendarmerie departments, which were losing their former privileged monopoly position in the investigation, hindered effective work in terms of approaches to the search [21].

The enumerated shortcomings and mistakes, omissions and weaknesses in the activities of the security agencies came out most prominently against the backdrop of a growing revolutionary wave, especially such dangerous and disgusting manifestations of it as political terrorism.

Even before Stolypin came to the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, significant changes were made in the personnel of law enforcement agencies. Moscow chief police chief D.F. Trepov was appointed in January 1905 as Governor-General of St. Petersburg, Lopukhin was replaced as director of the Police Department by S.G. Kovalensky and head of the St. Petersburg security department Ya.G. Sazonov was replaced by Colonel A.V. Gerasimov. To protect the emperor in 1905, the palace police was established, which was headed by an experienced detective worker, General A.I. Spiridovich.

Having entered high positions, first the Minister of the Interior, and then the Prime Minister, P.A. Stolypin began to take radical measures to improve the political situation in the country and, above all, to curb the rampant terrorism. The program was based on the strengthening of security departments, the elimination of duplication with gendarme departments, a differentiated approach to revolutionary parties, the wider introduction of modern means and methods of detective activity and the tightening of punitive measures against malicious criminals [22].

In the difficult fight against political terrorism, Stolypin relied both on experienced veterans of the detective service and on a new generation of capable workers. He put Maximilian Ivanovich (M.I.) Trusevich at the head of the Police Department, who became the author of a progressive system of political investigation that survived until 1917. When selecting employees, not their noble origin was taken into account to a greater extent, but their business and moral qualities, devotion to official duty and personal courage. Under Stolypin, the detective talent of the head of the St. Petersburg security department, Colonel A.V. Gerasimov, was fully developed. Stolypin showed particular concern for more effective moral and material incentives for law enforcement officers. More attention was paid to the professional training of political detectives. By 1907, the number of security departments increased to 27 [23]. In February 1907, the Regulations on Security Departments were issued, which determined the legal basis for their functioning, structure, scope and principles of activity. The Regulations spoke of the inadmissibility of interference in the affairs of these departments by other authorities, except for the Police Department. At the same time, the governors, gendarme departments and general criminal police were recommended to provide them with all possible assistance in carrying out the tasks of political investigation. It was especially emphasized that the main measure of the successful work of security departments "will always be not the number of liquidations they have carried out, but the number of prevented crimes ..." [24]. The creation of a single registration department with a central information desk in the Police Department contributed to the increase in the efficiency of search activities. In the detective work of the period under review, internal and external surveillance were firmly established as the main methods of search. In 1907, the Police Department developed detailed instructions for organizing outdoor surveillance, in which it determined the basic requirements

for the selection of persons for the spy service and formulated the main tasks and principles of their activities [25]. However, for all its importance, the spy service was of an auxiliary nature against the background of general intelligence and search activities. The leading role in the political investigation belonged to internal agents acting directly in underground organizations, aware of their goals and intentions, of the place and role of individuals in them. In the directives of the Police Department to the security agencies, the task of carefully selecting secret agents, their effective use, concern for protection and appropriate encouragement of their complex and dangerous service was persistently set. In 1907, a detailed Instruction on the organization and conduct of internal (intelligence) surveillance was developed. It formulated the basic principles of recruiting secret agents, organizing their work, guidance from security agencies, protection from "exposure," etc. [26]. Secret agents expanded from year to year. Not so long ago, Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii (GARF) (State Archive of the Russian Federation) employees found that in 1880–1917 there were about 10,000 people [27, 28]. Police Department agents worked in almost all underground organizations. Many of them were not disclosed after October 1917. A number of researchers rank among police agents, for example, even Stalin [29], although, in our opinion, there are no reliable data for this. Colonel A.V. Gerasimov, head of the St. Petersburg security department, organized work with secret agents. Subsequently, he recalled: "My most important task was to establish well the apparatus of the so-called secret agents in the ranks of revolutionary organizations. Without such agents, leading the political police is the same as without eyes" [30]. The first major search case of A.V. Gerasimov against terrorists was the arrest in St. Petersburg in March 1905 of the main composition of the Fighting Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionaries [31]. Evno Azef, who in 1893 became a secret agent of the Police Department, proved to be an exceptional, truly legendary personality among Gerasimov's secret collaborators. Azef worked in foreign agents, then in the Moscow and St. Petersburg security departments. At the same time, having gained confidence in the leadership of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, he became one of the leading persons in their Combat Organization.

Many of those who knew Azef well for terrorist activities highly appreciated his business, intellectual qualities. At the same time, there was not yet such an agent in the detective agencies of pre-revolutionary Russia, on whom such a stream of curses fell upon in the Socialist-Revolutionary, and then the Soviet press, so many labels would be hung. The main accusation was that he simultaneously served two opposing camps. Frustrating the plans of the terrorists, he at the same time contributed to a number of terrorist attacks: he provided weapons, finances and took part in the development of plans, although he personally did not participate in any of the assassination attempts. With such activity, he gained confidence among the Socialist-Revolutionary leadership, and after the arrest of Gershuni, he actually headed their Fighting Organization. Having become the most valuable employee of the detective agencies, Azef ensured the conduct of many major operations to neutralize terrorists. A.V. Gerasimov, under whom Azef ended his activity as an agent, wrote in his memoirs: "Azef turned out to be my best employee for a number of years. With his help, I managed to largely paralyze the activities of terrorists" [32].

Only in 1905–1908, with the help of Azef, such major terrorist attacks as assassination attempts on the Moscow Governor-General P.P. Durnovo, Nizhny Novgorod, Baku and Irkutsk governors, as well as two assassination attempts on Emperor Nicholas II took place.

The massive scope of the revolutionary movement and the growing role of internal agents in the fight against it also affected the change in the tactics of detective

activity. Gerasimov later wrote about this: "My task was to protect, in certain cases, from arrests and preserve those centers of revolutionary parties, in order to keep the existing revolutionary center under careful and systematic control, not to lose sight of it, to keep it under a glass cap. – limited mainly to individual arrests. Here, in general terms, is the scheme for setting up a political search and organizing a central agent, which I carried out and which, for all its complexity and danger, had a positive significance in the fight against the renewed individual terror" [33].

Foreign agents demanded increased attention from the security agencies, because the number of Russian political emigrants increased from year to year. Only in European countries, according to the Police Department, at the beginning of the twentieth century. Their number reached 20,000 [34]. Many of them not only hid from retribution for their crimes, but also launched active revolutionary, including terrorist, activities.

The main center of foreign agents was still located in Paris. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, its branches operated in a number of countries and large regions of Europe. In 1905–1909, the talented political detective Abram Harting successfully led all foreign agents. During the period of the first Russian revolution, the agents of Harting largely contributed to the disruption of the mass transportation of weapons and explosives for the militants to Russia.

In the fight against dangerous state crime, especially in the form of terrorism, contacts and cooperation with the governments and special services of European states continued and developed in the years under review. In March 1904, Russia signed agreements with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Norway, Turkey and Bulgaria on a joint fight against anarchism, providing for the assistance of the authorities in the detention and extradition of criminals [35]. In 1907, an agreement was signed with Finland, according to which the detective authorities of Russia received the right to freely search for and arrest their political criminals on its territory. This agreement was of great importance for the fight against terrorism, because in Vyborg in 1907 there was the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionaries, and in the "Hotel of Tourists" (on Imatra)—the headquarters of their Combat Organization. However, the search and arrest of terrorists in Finland were still difficult due to the noticeable anti-Russian sentiments of a significant part of Finnish society.

Along with the strengthening of search activities, the government, given the difficult and dangerous situation in the country, has significantly tightened its punitive policy against especially dangerous criminals. Issued on August 19, 1906, the Law on the establishment of courts-martial in areas declared under martial law or in a state of emergency protection provided for the consideration of cases of malicious terrorists, robbers and pogromists in courts-martial according to a simplified procedure.

Explaining the essence of these measures at a meeting of the State Duma (March 1907), Stolypin said that when solving important state issues, the government "has to go between the bomb and the Browning. And where the argument is a bomb, there is, of course, a natural response - the mercilessness of punishment!"

Stolypin demanded the harshest punishments for attempts on the ranks of security agencies, who, as you know, were the first to be attacked by terrorists. During the years 1900–1910, for example, 33 governor-generals and governors, 16 town governors, police chiefs, prosecutors and heads of gendarmerie departments [36], not to mention a large mass of servants of a lower rank, were victims of assassination attempts.

A successful fight against terrorism would be impossible without the correct understanding and support of it in society. The government supported in every possible way those organs of the press and those publicists who objectively reflected

the essence of this struggle and exposed the ideologists of terror who tried to pass off state criminals as national heroes and martyrs.

The decisive measures of the Stolypin government, together with the further improvement of the activities of detective services, support in society, made it possible by 1909 to bring down the wave of mass terror, arrest and bring to trial the most dangerous militants, and significantly improve the entire domestic political situation. There was a noticeable decline in SR terrorism: if in 1906 they committed 74 terrorist attacks, in 1907—1957, then in 1908—only three and in 1909—two terrorist attacks [37].

Following the Social Revolutionaries, the militants of other political parties and groups gradually stopped the terror. The improvement of the situation in the country was evidenced, in particular, by the active departures of the emperor, both to various regions of the country and abroad.

Against this background of the widespread fading of political terrorism and the stabilization of the domestic political situation, the assassination in September 1911 of the outstanding statesman P.A. Stolypin took place.

Investigating the murder of Stolypin on behalf of the emperor, Senator M.I. Trusevich, and then the Senate Commission under the leadership of N.Z. Shulgin noted that, despite the appropriate measures taken to protect distinguished guests in Kiev, those responsible for their safety made major miscalculations and omissions, which were the result of negligence and carelessness.

The tragic events in Kiev highlighted the general shortcomings of the security system, which were further exacerbated after the death of Stolypin: duplication and unhealthy rivalry between different types of police services, intrigues, nepotism and hostility between senior leaders, treason and direct cooperation of some of them with the criminal environment.

Personnel losses incurred in the fight against terrorism often turned out to be irreparable, not compensated by the influx of sufficiently trained, honest and energetic workers.

The work of the security agencies was complicated by the increased discrediting of their activities by the liberals of the revolutionary opposition, who, as a rule, resorted to its gross distortion and falsification. At the same time, a campaign in defense of the victims of government repression became widespread in society, sowing unhealthy sentiments of sympathy and even support for extremist, terrorist elements.

All this complicated and weakened the activities of security agencies in the fight against the most dangerous type of state crime—political terrorism. However, the noted shortcomings—weakness and miscalculations in the work of their services—do not give grounds for negating the positive that they have done in the name of a just cause—protecting the legitimate interests of the state and society.

In a difficult and uncompromising struggle, which cost considerable efforts and sacrifices, a large galaxy of faithful servants of the Fatherland of various ranks showed their energy, will, talent and high sense of duty. Their noble deeds are a worthy example for all employees of relevant services in modern conditions.

Thus, the historical experience of the struggle of the law enforcement agencies of pre-revolutionary Russia with political terrorism comes down, in our opinion, to the following main provisions.

As terrorism unfolded, the government rebuilt the system of political investigation in the direction of greater efficiency, flexibility, close interaction of its various links, timely and most complete information support. The transfer of senior management of detective and inquiring activities in the field of combating state crime to the III Department of the SEIVK, and then to the Police Department of the Ministry of

Internal Affairs, the establishment of security departments and the establishment of their interaction with gendarme departments, the expansion of the rights of governors and mayors ensured the successful performance of the assigned functions by law enforcement agencies at the relevant historical stages in anti-terrorist confrontation.

The decisive condition for the containment and suppression of terrorism was the careful selection, placement and renewal of employees of the relevant services, taking into account their educational and intellectual levels, professional suitability, moral qualities, ideological stamina and devotion to official duty. Constant attention to the improvement of the style and methods of detective work, the development of advanced domestic and foreign experience and the introduction of the latest means of political investigation are the most important components of success in this area.

During the period of mass deployment of terrorism, external and internal surveillance became the main methods of political investigation. The security and detective agencies tried to carefully select secret agents, especially internal surveillance, recruiting them mainly from members of a terrorist organization.

In connection with the increase in political emigrants among the terrorists, the Ministry of Internal Affairs established a permanent agency abroad, systematically replenishing it with the best agents of domestic special services and recruited foreign citizens. Along with the detection and suppression of terrorist plans, foreign agents did a lot of work to objectively inform the world community about the political situation in Russia and about the nature of the ongoing anti-terrorist struggle.

An indispensable condition for a successful anti-terrorist struggle was the formation of a correct attitude toward terrorism and the removal of the romantic veil from members of terrorist groups. An important role in this direction was played by publicistic speeches in the press, as well as religious sermons. At the same time, decisive measures were taken to suppress any form of terror propaganda.

Prompt, severe, but fair punishment for terrorism is the most important condition for its prevention and suppression. All historical experience shows that liberalism in this matter only stimulates its development. The use of the death penalty as a punishment for the most cynical crimes, especially in cases of recidivism, is a completely justified measure of retribution and punishment.

On the issues of preventing and overcoming political terrorism, the Russian government sought to strengthen and develop international cooperation: to conclude treaties and agreements on the detention and extradition of terrorists, meetings were held between representatives of special services to exchange experience in detective work.

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Chapter 4

Radicalization: An Educational Approach

Claudio Melacarne and Marina Slavutzky

Abstract

This chapter aims to discuss the possibility of applying educational principles of Transformative Learning Theory to understand and eventually prevent violent radicalization. To begin, keywords – radicalization, extremism, and terrorism – are briefly presented to draw and limit the spaces usable for understanding this complex debate. Next, some space is dedicated to the correlation between Transformative Learning Theory and radicalization. Finally, a short biography is used as a case study to describe how everyday life can generate an environment where people can learn how to think radically and eventually risk transforming these thoughts into violent acts.

Keywords: radicalization, terrorism, extremism, education, transformative learning

1. Introduction

The current study aims to bring together two traditions of research: "radicalization and terrorism studies" and Transformative Learning Theory. In the first field, extensive literature has been developed in the last decades addressing primarily the comprehension of terrorist phenomena, the role of public policies, dominant cultures, policy measures, and economic systems [1]. Although radicalization has increasingly been subjected to scientific studies, a universally accepted definition of the concept has not been developed yet. In the next section, some space will be dedicated to the definition of radicalization, extremism, and terrorism.

Even if the first years of research have been dominated mostly by a security approach, lately many scholars have switched the attention to education and primary prevention, and in this domain adult learning studies have also become increasingly involved in understanding radicalization phenomena. Studies with a psycho-educational background have allowed the focus to be shifted from ways to predict terrorist acts through intelligence strategies or the gathering of data thought to be predictable "signs" of violent behavior, to ways to strengthen the resilience of the most vulnerable individuals, support communities in avoiding divisive public discourse, and provide training to educators and social workers on how to manage cultural diversity.

Under the lens of Transformative Learning Theory [2], it is possible to conceptualize radicalization as a process of perspective transformation. In the realm of adult education, Transformative Learning Theory emerged as a theory and approach to foster inclusive thinking by elevating experience and validating prior learning —or creating new ones— that enable us to face novel circumstances. Within this approach,

radicalization might be viewed as a type of pre-critical thinking [3]. The theories of adult learning actually make it possible to de-ideologize the word "radicalization" and to consider how a preventative educational approach could be able to stop this process from deviating in the direction of extremist or even terrorist action [4].

After analyzing some contributions from both of these traditions, the present study brings up an excerpt from an individual's personal history as a case of a lifepath that has undergone stages of radicalization, sometimes close to violent radicalization, yet without ever escalating direct violence nor terrorism. This story certainly has no value in terms of generality and transferability, but it is an interesting example of how educational studies can make an important contribution in terms of understanding the phenomenon and prevention.

2. Radicalization, extremism and terrorism

A first terminological clarification concerns the occasional use of the term radicalization, since it is noted and agreed that currently there is no universally accepted definition of this concept in the academic world and at the institutional level. The term "radicalization" has been used for many social phenomena in the past decades, but the meaning we know now has a recent origin [5]. Before 2001 the term had been used to refer to a shift toward more radical politics, with no specific reference to religion. By 2004, the term had acquired a new meaning and several studies focused on the way Muslims may adopt radical and extremist positions [6]. In the last years, researches with multiple disciplinary perspectives have been developed.

The word radicalization derives from the Latin term *radicalis* and refers to "root." It has been used therefore in the past as a botanical metaphor, in order to name a process that takes toward the roots and causes of a concept or a thing. During the last decades, the word has been used in many different ways and frequently also as a synonym of violent extremism or terrorism.

As a political expression, "radical" was used for the first time in 1797 in Great Britain, when Charles James Fox made a speech about the need to proceed with "radical reforms," meaning to go straight forward to the root causes of social problems and act to develop a profound change [7]. During the following decades, and also due to the consequences of the French Revolution and of the establishment of industrial society, "radical" has been used in the political world, but since the beginning, the use of violence was questioned. In other words, many used to wonder if it was possible to achieve huge social changes in a peaceful way or not.

In the 19th century, the radical movements were mostly non-violent activists, like the suffragettes in the late 19th and early 20th century. Their demonstrative public actions were considered by institutions illegal, but not illegitimate. In fact, some of the 19th century radical demands have become mainstream entitlements today. At that time, "radical" referred primarily to liberal, anti-clerical, pro-democratic, and progressive political positions [8].

As Sedwick points out, the meaning of "radical" is related to social context and the notion of what is "normal," "moderate," or "mainstream." These meanings change over time and they define the landscape within radicalization that could be understood and accepted [5].

In contrast to the term's use in research on political and social sciences, in which the relational dynamics in processes of escalation from individual to collective level had been underlined, "radicalization" more recently has been described as the gradual

adoption of extremist ideas that promote and could lead to acts of terrorism with a particular attention to individual cognitive and ideological transformation [9].

One question that is raised by many authors who study radicalization is about its relation to violence. Some include violence in their general definition – for example, Doosje and colleagues [10] define it as a process through which people become increasingly motivated to use violent means against members of an out-group or symbolic targets to achieve behavioral change and political goals. Della Porta [11] gives a similar description when she defines it as a process of escalation from nonviolent to increasingly violent repertoires of action that develops through a complex set of interactions unfolding over time.

Radicalization studies use a large range of approaches, from studies focused on religious ideology to more complex models based on social and psychological theories on radicalization. Instead of religious beliefs by themselves driving individuals to violence, many of the new perspectives agree with the idea that ideology becomes more extreme in response to a "cognitive opening," an "identity crisis" or a "group bonding" process [12].

Antonelli [7] brings up two main definitions made during a panel of 21 European experts organized within the project "Horizon 2020 Trivalent." First of all, radicalization could be considered as a socialization process through which a person adopts a paranoic vision of the world and of politics. This process occurs after the interiorization of an extremist ideology that legitimizes the violent or terrorist action. In this sense, there are some similarities that could be drawn with becoming part of a sect, such as the gradual distancing of previous social bonds and the establishment of totalitarian connections with people who share the same vision. In addition to this, the experts pointed out that radicalization can also be seen as a recruiting process and as political participation. In this sense, radicalization is a process through which people build bounds and belong to an organized universe. Radicalization therefore would be a way of non-conventional political participation in which violence has an expressive and instrumental role.

Another important aspect of the definition of radicalization processes is the difference between the terms action and cognition. McCauley and Moskalenko distinguish "opinion" or "cognitive" radicalization from "action" or "violent" radicalization. The first type is connected to cognitive commitment to radical ideas, while the second would lead people to act on these radical ideas [13]. Similarly, Malthaner & Lindekilde define radicalization as a composite process, made of cognitive radicalization, changes in activist practices, and relational mechanisms that interact in complex ways [14].

Some authors adopted terms like "violent radicalization" or "radicalization leading to violence," and others use it together with "violent extremism." Brouillette-Allarie and colleagues define violent radicalization as a non-linear process by which an individual or group undergoes systemic transformations that legitimize them to support or facilitate the use of violence [15].

Schmid reminds us that "radical" people are not violent per se, and although they may share some characteristics with extremists, such as isolation, anger, and feelings of discrimination, there are also important differences. For example, radicalization often assumes the ability to accept discursive dialectics as a method of seeking a solution or pursuing a political goal or, in general, a transformation of the status quo. The radical person contemplates the possibility of constructing a space in which there are also differences and can apply critical thinking to his or her own perspective. Consequently, a radical attitude does not necessarily result in violent behavior.

The author tries to distinguish radicalization from extremism by focusing on pluralism. He explains that extremists can be characterized as political actors who tend to disregard the rule of law and reject pluralism in society, as in historical perspectives, such as Fascism or Communism. According to this approach, extremists are involved in actions finalized to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities, and this would distinguish them from mere radicals who accept diversity and believe in the power of reason rather than dogma [8, 16].

Many researchers invite us to consider that extremism is a condition and not a process, like radicalization. Furthermore, in the academic debate, extremism is often understood as a process that rejects the democratic constitutional state and fundamental values, while radicalization can be conceived as the willingness of actors to increasingly challenge the existing political or social order. It could be misleading to think about the distinction between violent extremism and nonviolent extremism - while the radicalized person may or may not engage in violent acts, we cannot say the same for extremism, which needs to use some form of violence to assert its position. A consequence of this reasoning stems from the fact that a considerable part of the literature on terrorism tends to equate radicalism with violent extremism and consequently both phenomena with terrorism [17].

A further distinguishing criterion is the possibility that democratic systems manage radicalization differently from extremism. While there is a possibility for radical thinking to be present in the community or in controlled spaces where the evolution of radicalization processes can be managed and monitored, it is much more difficult to view extremism as a phenomenon that can be reconciled with the pluralism of ideas. Two radical (nonviolent) positions may see the democratic dialectic as a means of assertion while two extremist positions see dialectic as an obstacle to the confirmation of one position at the expense of the other. According to Schmid [8] we should recognize that there are some forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, although they may be deemed illegal under domestic law, may be accepted under international humanitarian law. It is therefore believed that it is not useful to apply the terms indiscriminately, especially since the ethical and moral yardstick changes in relation to political action in a social context. Something that may be interpreted as an "emancipatory" phenomenon from a community, may at the same time be labeled as "terrorist" by the institutional establishment.

A definition of radicalization accepted by many researchers is the following:

> *An individual or collective (group) process that often begins within a situation of political polarization where the normal dynamics of institutional/public dialog, and tolerance between political actors and divergent interest groups are abandoned by one or both sides for tactics of conflict. These may include (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various forms of political violence other than terrorism, or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes. This process is generally accompanied by adherence to an ideology far from the mainstream or status quo-oriented positions toward more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous worldview and acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order because the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate [8, p. 27].*

Even if "Terrorism" could seem to be an easier concept to define, as Ahmed highlights it remains a contested concept with over 200 definitions [18]. In the 19th century, terrorism was developed as a term to denote violence committed by

non-state actors. There are not only different understandings of "terrorism" but also different types of terrorism, such as regime terrorism, insurgent terrorism, left-wing terrorism, right-wing terrorism, ethno-nationalist terrorism, jihadist terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, and cyber-terrorism, so even if we think about radicalization leading to terrorism the issue is still complex [8].

Some authors define terrorism as an act of violence (domestic or international), usually committed against a general target (person or group) without any intention to focus the action on "combatants." Terrorism is commonly used to achieve changes in public debate, and political agenda, to create a disrupted situation that spreads fear in a larger population [10]. It is pointed out by many that it is generally a group phenomenon. In several studies, radicalization and terrorism frequently occur alongside each other, as one research object, and researchers fail to offer a more precise distinction between the two phenomena. The associated use of the terms "radicalization" and "terrorism" can be problematic and used to legitimize excessive countermeasures, such as extensive surveillance of the public sphere. While terrorism is a specific way of action (violence against civilians), aimed at causing an immediate effect (to spread fear), radicalization refers to the development of specific political objectives. In this framework, terrorism is only one possible outcome of radicalization, among many others [17].

"Radicalization" is not only a socio-psychological aspect and a scientific concept but also, more importantly, a political construct introduced into public and academic debate mainly by security agencies facing a focus predominantly on religiously motivated terrorism [8]. This trend has started to shift in the last years, and it is therefore important to develop further studies on diverse kinds of radicalization, such as extreme-right or extreme-left groups and on educational and preventive approaches.

3. Transformative learning and radicalization

In the social sciences and also in adult learning research, the concept of radicalization has emerged as an area of intense debate [19]. Theories of adult learning and education enable us to deal with the radical ideas that we adopt throughout our lives as adults and to view radicalization as a process that occurs in daily life.

This area of research tried to link adult education studies and radicalization. Transformative learning is one of the theories used in this field. It was developed by Jack Mezirow in the 1990s and combines constructivism and cognitivism to explain how adults learn and adapt to new environments and constraints [20]. It focuses on the conditions that facilitate the capacity to create transformation from learning - this happens when processes that promote reflection about the premises through which one interprets everyday life events within social and organizational contexts are activated [21].

Mezirow emphasized the importance and centrality of history and personal experience for understanding the frame of reference people use in everyday life. His research underlines the role of the disorienting dilemma as a springboard to promote critical reflection and critical self-reflection. Mezirow theory is based on an epistemology of "rational discourse" and "dialogue in communicating with others." His original study focused on the change we could promote in planning educational settings for adults, can uncover the limits and conditions that contrast the use of self-directed and critical perspectives [22].

Transformations happen in two different types of occurrences. In the first instance, a sudden and concentrated transformational trigger or crisis causes an

instantaneous disorientation in belief and knowledge systems. In response, the person looks for fresh interpretations of the situation fairly instantly. This kind of transformation is typically linked to severe traumas, medical emergencies, and illness. In the second scenario, change is brought about by a series of little, consecutive, and incremental events that work together to create a more gradual and cumulative alteration. It is best explained from a phenomenological perspective on individual experience. The person suffers contradictions and worries during the distortion episodes, which are perceived as problems. Consequently, the person looks for a fresh perspective on what happened in order to regain a sense of self-coherence and competence [20].

Mezirow's theory invites us to consider radicalization, in particular radical thinking, as a process. It can be acknowledged as a manifestation of a transformation of the perspectives of meaning in an exclusive, rigid, and defensive sense. Transformation refers to the process and conditions that can facilitate the development of more inclusive perspectives, open and critical describing. If we assume that radical thinking is the process in which the adult uses a previous interpretation to build a known interpretation of his experience, transforming a radical thinking means educating adults using a previous interpretation to build a new interpretation and to be able to drive and self-direct it [2, 4]. Radicalization and radical thinking become dangerous when they lead people to not being able to take part in a dialectical setting and being open to consider different perspectives as potentially understandable.

An interesting concept brought up by Mezirow [3] is precritical thinking. It is related to the stage of thinking in which the categories through which we read the world are taken for granted as ontologically true, instead of historically generated [21].

4. A case study

In order to reflect on how Transformative Learning Theory concepts can be applied to radicalization studies, a case study based on an in-depth interview is presented. The interview was conducted with a person who got involved for some years with a far-left movement in Northern Italy.

The interviewee, who will be called Jack as an invented nickname, got in touch with a radical movement in his young adult life. At that time, as he recalls, he "was a person with no reference group, and especially at university I was an alien." That sense of non-belonging ended when he "got to know the autonomous collectives where there were guys who were actual runaways. There was ideology but basically there were all these people looking for a place in the world and they were total extremists."

Jack describes below how his adult history was initially marked by experiences characterized by a strong political mission, by practices born on the border of legality in which people claimed rights with a dual motivation, personal/psychological and social/political. Part of his identity was being constructed within a context in which a vision of the world and the solution to even basic needs were being offered, albeit with illegal actions.

> *Then it happens that one evening, with the organizations, I take part in an occupation (of living quarters), where people from the suburbs come, families that are bad off (but also not) united to fight a classist society. I go in with them and occupy. An occupied house, premises where a couple of times a week we used to have political meetings, where there was a machine to cyclostyle leaflets, for our leafleting. Let us say*

> *the initial ideology was basically an autonomous communist kind of ideology, a workers' autonomy (where there were also foreigners). I follow this, I like these occupations (I have no home).*

Jack goes through several critical moments in his life and one of them is his arrest. It is a kind of "critical incident" that he narrates. This incident, however, does not seem to give rise to any particular repentance or reflection on the lifestyle or ideology embraced. With Mezirow, Jack uses old patterns of meaning to make sense of a new event, but his perspectives of meaning do not change.

> *I did several occupations, in Milan, and I had become an expert in home occupation (I knew that the crime "occupying" is a misdemeanor if you do not get caught while doing it) - my specialty was smashing locks of abandoned private houses and stuff like that. In '85/86 I started confronting anti-nuclear issues, I participated in demonstrations where we took a lot of blows, especially in front of the Caorso (Piacenza) power plants. Then in 1986, I participated in the demonstration in Montalto di Castro where I got arrested, under surreal circumstances and surreptitious charges. A stupid thing: after the demonstration, I went to look for some of my fellow protesters (I went because I was considered the one with the most respectable face) at a truck stop. I entered the premises where there were only uniformed policemen…I try to get out, but more uniformed policemen arrive so I go to the counter, I say, "a coffee" but I cannot pronounce anything else. I get loaded into an armored car, and arrested on charges of having blunt weapons (which I did not have). I spent 10 days in jail and then I got out, on probation for six months, I had to sign in three times a week in Cremona where I practically did not even live anymore. Since I worked in Milan once a week I would take the Milan - Cremona train to sign in at a specific time, 04:56.*

Jack's informal network shrinks and moves more and more within a group that shares the same worldview, practices of social struggle, and lifestyles. Jack begins to find even more spaces within which his thinking is radicalized, supported in becoming increasingly impervious to positive dialectics.

> *In Milan, I was a cook, in an establishment of a Red Brigades sympathizer, one who in the courtroom when he was convicted said the famous phrase "he who is born square cannot die round."*

Participation in a community center and Jack's ability to manage people and projects provide him with a further opportunity to reinforce the idea that this path was an interesting one to follow. Jack makes his perspectives on the use of violence to impose an idea explicit; he declares himself opposed to it like many of his peers. However, the context he inhabits is in some ways ambiguous, offering potential spaces to transition from the status of radical militant to terrorist.

> *With a small group of friends from the collective I entered the Leoncavallo community center. I started to be a delivery guy with a cooperative we had set up inside Leoncavallo, where many were considered flankers of the Red Brigade Walter Alasia group. The activities carried out were mainly self-financing concepts for political prisoners and their relatives. We believed that the detained Red Brigade participants were inside for political reasons. I was against terrorism, however, out of curiosity our*

> *autonomous group had some form of dialog with other groups that we later found out were bordering on terrorism, meddling in aiding and abetting terrorist groups.*

Jack's perspectives do not change over time, they remain the same. Even when this story was collected, Jack reaffirmed his belief that "housing is a universal right" and if there are vacant spaces it is only right that they are occupied by those in need.

> *Among us people circulated who had done jail time or ex-factory collectives, I do not know if they were ex-Front Line (armed gangs) who maybe had some trouble with the police, so our idea was let us start again from the bottom let us work on post-industrial society, theoretically. It's not that we were against illegality, I mean from my point of view illegality was a tool that in the moment you say, I want to change the drug law, I say it incorrectly, but it was already a battle. I plant marijuana, it's illegal. But in short, I believe that housing is a universal right and since in Milan, I do not remember the times it was said, there were 300,000 empty office apartments vacant, we went to occupy.*

What makes Jack's thinking radical is not just the ideology, it is the practice in which he participates that reinforces his perspective. This practice has an implicit message: either you are in and share the cause, or you are out. So far, the story told is to some extent what Mezirow would call a process of assimilating new knowledge into old patterns of meaning. There are no events that are not read from the ideological perspective.

> *After that, if you want to throw us out let us talk about it, you have to give us a place. I did an occupation in Porta Ticinese, we were evicted by the municipality, and then we had a negotiation with Pillitteri (mayor pro tempore) they sent us all to Bruzzano in a big estate, in a big residence. For a year we all lived there: how cool! Then they gave all the families a home, while we youngsters were just taken out.... So, you occupied another one and so on ... I lived in Via Quadrio in Milan where there was a former factory that had been abandoned for thirty years, there was no water, there was shit, basically, we carried water canisters, I illegally latched onto electric lines stuff like that...for all the gigs... Then we squatted on Lancetti Street, it was a 12-story building that had never been used, we went in, and it was a nice week. Somehow, we knew it was illegal what we were doing, however, it highlighted the housing contradictions.*

The following interview excerpts indicate some important parts of Jack's story. We cannot say that Jack has transformed his perspectives of meaning. His ideas remain radical, probably more open to dialog than they once were, but they have not been subjected to "reflective criticism." Or, not venturing into overly complex interpretations, Jack has critically reflected on the premises that led him to make certain choices, but this process has not undermined them. They remain as an expression of a worldview and its rules of the so-called "autonomous."

> *Many turned to robbery, then they started dealing cocaine i.e., they really became thugs, some were arrested several times (...)*

> *We used to do expropriations: for example, if a bathroom fixture store fails, we look if there is something inside that we are interested in and we take it ... it's a level of legality/illegality i.e., I do not know how to say it, but for us, that level, it was a right*

> *social balance. Different from those who went to rob, for example, those who robbed paninari (rich kids), fascists with full wallets... that happened too, but I did not really do that because I have a problem with violence.*

In the last excerpt, Jack becomes more aware of the implicit rules that guide his life and activism practices. On the one hand, it is an experience that prompts this reflection. His need to have a free space for action, which was being restricted by the explicit and implicit rules of the "Leoncavallo" community center. The awareness that many of his friends were embarking on a dead-end road, mixed with violent actions, including the use of weapons and drugs. Jack says he was to some extent always open and even intrigued and fascinated by the "worlds of marginality." He himself chose to live with them. His perspectives of meaning remained stable until two assumptions were challenged, two perspectives of meaning that were important to Jack: to maintain an autonomy of judgment and to be able to carve out spaces to grow personally and professionally. Jack understood that the time had come for him to give up that path when his circle of reference grew too restrictive, potentially violent and criminal.

> *It's the famous point of no return when you basically cannot go forward anymore, because on the one hand, you are so compromised on the other hand it's the others who prevent you from going back. Being inside radicalization means being able to understand not the point from which you cannot escape but the point of no return and violence toward people, that is that cold moment when you say, well let us go shoot this guy's legs, that is: on one hand there is a story that tells me, "you all think alike" but usually inside, so this mechanism, there is always someone who manipulates or tries to manipulate is actually the one who has one foot in and the one who sometimes gets saved because he leaves.*

This story tells us of a small but important transformation. It is not about redemption. Even today, Jack does not totally disown his choices, he vindicates them like many of the ideas he held as a young man. He feels more consciously that what saved him from undertaking criminal actions was his need to continue reading and informing himself, even on subjects contrary to his ideology. But, above all, his words seem to emphasize that in his case the strongest resilience factor was his constant need to have autonomous space for action, realization, and thought. Ultimately, Jack found himself in a space that was very unstructured formally (social center) but with very structured and hierarchical implicit dynamics. His radicalization process is in fact a process of validation first and accommodation later.

5. Conclusion

As we have seen, a protective factor for Jack was not so much his set of values or the encounter with a mentor who helped him not to commit violent acts, but the occasional experience of a self-directed learning process. The specificity of this story is to highlight how sometimes the transformation of certain perspectives of meaning cannot be planned, it occurs through participation in disorienting experiences and dilemmas. Jack understands that "embracing ideology and taking it to guns" would have led him down a road of no return. As Jack grew up, he did not want to lose the autonomy to decide his own future, which contrasted with the culture of the social center, where either "you're in or you're out."

This story describes radicalization from the lens of learning processes. This perspective can be useful to understand how people can develop a radical thinking and be more vulnerable to extremism and it is interesting for different reasons. The first thought is about the idea that radicalization has certainly generated historical disasters but also great emancipatory and transformative movements in human societies. Radicalization has two faces, bad or good, and it changes according to the social, political, or cultural systems of meaning. The second is about the history of the debate. Radicalization has been an implicit issue discussed in many ways in the tradition of adult learning without being explicitly discussed as a topic of interest. We need to reconsider the past research on adult learning theory and apply it to this new topic. Finally, framing radicalization from an educational perspective might drive researchers and educators to explore the limits of transformation and its cultural and ethical implications [23, 24].

Radicalization is not an attribute of an environment (structuralism or culturalism) or a personal trait (ontology). It is a phenomenon that emerges as a result of learning or education. The theory of transformative learning presents an intriguing analytical framework for comprehending the phenomenon of radicalization. It includes the notion that radicalization can occasionally be understood as a type of cognitive distortion, a representation of inflexible, and unchangeable thinking. But when it leaves space for constructive critique and coexistence, it can also manifest as an emancipatory process of thought.

According to Transformative Learning Theory inputs, radicalization can also be understood as a normal occurrence in daily life, since it enables us to deal with the unconventional ideas people may come up with at any time. The relation between transformation and radicalization enables educators to work with individuals who run the risk of converting radical ideas into violent acts.

The challenge that the radicalization construct presents to the transformative theory in the ethical sense is the final area of possible development and attention. What makes a transformation good or bad? Being radical may be a risky path as well as a transformative one for both individuals and society. More rigorous research on transformative learning could be done to explore connections with values and rights as an expression of micro-radicalization processes.

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Chapter 5

Radiological Terrorism: An Imminent Threat? Possible Forms of Attack and Medical Provision for the Population in Case of an Attack

Vili Zahariev and Nikolai Hristov

Abstract

The chapter "Introduction" defines terrorism as a phenomenon in the modern world. Introduced are the concepts of terrorism, radiological terrorism, mass fear, radiophobia, radiation accidents, and the possibilities for successful diagnostics and treatment in radiation accidents. The chapter "Possible Scenarios" describes the possible scenarios for deliberately exposing large groups to ionizing radiation, namely the detonation of nuclear warheads, an explosion in a nuclear installation or nuclear waste depot, a dirty bomb, the contamination of foods or waters, a source of ionizing radiation with high activity for contaminating a relatively small group of people with high doses. The chapter "Analysis of preceding radiological incidents" provides a quick historical recap of relevant incidents. The chapter "Health Consequences" focuses on the historical experience of radiation accidents in the past in terms of health consequences for the population and the adequateness of the reaction of medical personnel. The chapter "Psychological Effects" focuses on the disproportionate burden imposed by the psychological effects of radiation accidents – technogenic or man-made. The chapter "Medical Provision" focuses entirely on the clinical practice and public health background of radiation accidents.

Keywords: radiophobia, dirty bomb, diagnostics, treatment, first aid, radiological terrorism

1. Introduction

> *"A violent act is called a terrorist act when the physical results are completely out of proportion to the psychological ones".*
>
> *Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris, 1962 [1]*

Of all forms of terrorism, radiological, chemical, and biological pose the greatest threat. Radiological terrorism deserves special attention. The main weapon of terrorists is violence, and the means is fear. Due to the existing in the population

radiophobia, the use of sources of ionizing radiation (SIR) will cause a very strong psychological effect. The amplification of the effects – fear of terrorism and fear of radiation makes the possibility of realizing radiological terrorism very high. After such a terrorist act, the health, economic, political, and psychological consequences will be enormous.

In its nature and consequences, the radiological terrorist act is a de facto accident, which, however, was deliberately and knowingly caused. This means that the experience gained from previous emergency situations must be used in the medical provision of the population [2, 3]. In this way, the health effects on the population and medical provision activities can be clarified. A thorough analysis of the information from the radiation incidents that have occurred so far shows that the main reason why radiation injuries remain unrecognized is insufficient knowledge of the consequences of SIR irradiation and their clinical manifestations. This leads to inappropriate and, in some cases, incorrect treatment of the injured in the first hours after the accident, aggravating their condition and limiting the possibilities for effective treatment. This requires medical professionals to have up-to-date information on behavior in cases of radiological terrorism and radiation injuries.

2. Possible scenarios

The bombing of the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington showed the world that Al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations are capable of using other, so far unconventional, means. In 2002, US security forces arrested Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jose Padilla, who was planning to use a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) in a US city [4]. Thus, the world started talking about radiological terrorism, as an element of the possible arsenal of terrorist organizations. Radiological terrorism is a typical example of an "asymmetrical threat", which contains unconventional, nontraditional, unknown, and unexpected tactics, actions, or means that are difficult to counter successfully. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) uses the term radiological terrorism as an umbrella term for nuclear and radiation terrorism [2]. Nuclear terrorism refers to the deliberate use of a nuclear weapon or causing an accident in a nuclear facility, and radiation terrorism is the deliberate use of radioactive substances (sources or materials). If nuclear munitions are excluded, all other possibilities of using SIR will not lead to the occurrence of a large number of seriously injured people but will cause a very strong psychological effect, which is actually one of the main goals of terrorism – creating panic among the population and mistrust of the official authorities, as well as their ability to guarantee the security and normal functioning of the state. The various possible options for radiological terrorism are:

2.1 Nuclear weapons

Although nuclear weapons have so far only been used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the sheer number of dead and injured, as well as the long-term consequences, serve as a very effective deterrent to their use again. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA) to the US National Response Framework (NRF) states that even a small nuclear detonation in an urban area could result in over 100,000 deaths (and many more injured), massive damage to infrastructure and thousands of square kilometers of contaminated land [5]. The use of a nuclear weapon is unlikely but cannot be ruled out. In general, nuclear

weapons are subject to increased control by the relevant institutions, and the possibility of theft is unlikely. The creation of an improvised nuclear device (IND) requires a significant amount of U-235 and Pu-239 of very high purity (4–5 kg of plutonium or 16 kg of highly enriched uranium) and special equipment, working technology, and highly qualified specialists. There are about 100 civil objects in the world that work with highly enriched uranium that can be used for terrorist purposes. The biggest security concerns are to be found in Russia, India, and Pakistan. In relation to this, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) appeals to all nuclear states to introduce urgent measures aimed at improving the effectiveness of the protection of these sites. The other direction is the transition to work with low-enriched uranium [6, 7].

2.2 Explosion in a nuclear facility

This act is difficult to implement due to the increased security and automated safety systems that automatically shut down the installation in an emergency. Nuclear power plants, the largest objects in this group, are constructed in such a way that even if an airplane hits them, they will not cause destruction, leading to serious radioactive contamination. But that does not mean they are completely safe. According to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.NRC) reports, 47% of the country's nuclear power plants have failed to repel fake terrorist attacks [8]. Of particular concern is the war in Ukraine and the security of nuclear facilities in the country. The Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, is on the front line. The collapse of the Nova Kakhovka dam wall increases the risk that the plant will run out of water needed to cool the reactors, which is supplied by the dam.

2.3 Explosion in storage facilities for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel

These sites are more difficult to consider as immediate sources of radioactive contamination as they are located in relatively unpopulated areas, so this type of terrorist act is very unlikely and will not cause serious problems. It is more likely that security breaches will be sought to be used as a source for obtaining radioactive materials to make a "dirty bomb".

The stated options for nuclear terrorism are difficult to implement and highly unlikely. Furthermore, the overwhelming effect of a nuclear weapon is mainly due to the shock wave and high temperature, and only in 5–10% to ionizing radiation.

2.4 Dispersal of radioactive material (dirty bomb)

The idea of using a "dirty bomb" was born during the Korean War. In 1951, General Douglas MacArthur proposed using radioactive sources on the border to prevent further Chinese involvement [9]. A dirty bomb is a device that is a combination of a conventional explosive and radioactive material. Its purpose is to disperse the radioactive sources over a relatively large distance and cause large-scale radioactive contamination, in which a large group of the population will fall. The number of casualties resulting from the explosion would be relatively small, mainly traumatic injuries to people who were in the area of impact of the detonated device caused by the shock wave and particles of the dirty bomb material. The probability of serious early radiation damage is also very small [2, 3]. According to mathematical models, the expected maximum radiation dose rate at the explosion site is about 10 mSv/h. In this case, a stay of 100 hours at the epicenter of the blast is required for a 5%

probability of severe acute radiation syndrome (ARS) [10]. The probability of occurrence of stochastic radiobiological effects (oncological and hereditary) is measured in fractions of a percent to a few percent of the level of consequences of spontaneous exposure. According to some studies, over a 40-year period, one additional cancer death per 10,000 people [11]. The main effect will be on the psyche of the population and the need for very large financial resources to restore normal activity and decontamination of the environment. The following radionuclides deserve special attention: 137Cs, 60Co, 238Pu, 90Sr, 238 U, 226Ra, 192Ir, 241Am, and 252Cf. Half of these are alpha-emitters and will pose a health hazard only through internal contamination. In 1995, the IAEA established the "Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)", which records information on cases related to the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials from 143 countries. Every year, there are at least 150–200 reports of disappearance, theft, or loss of control over radioactive materials. In 2022, a total of 146 incidents were reported. For the entire period so far, information has been received on 4075 slats, of which 344 are related to trafficking or malicious use [12]. The most likely scenario is the detonation of a "dirty bomb" in the central part of a large city. In this regard, the accident in Goiania is very telling [13, 14].

2.5 Contamination of a water source or food products with radioactive substances

Unlike the "dirty bomb", radioactive contamination of drinking water or food products can be detected with some delay when it has already been consumed. Panic among the population, which has no way of knowing whether they have consumed contaminated water or food, will again be the leading factor. In this case, the state will more easily deal with the radiation problem by stopping the water supply from the contaminated water source or, respectively, the contaminated food. In terms of food, it will most likely be agricultural products that are stored in bulk or in a food processing plant [2, 3, 15].

2.6 Using a powerful source of ionizing radiation

The use of such a source will lead to serious health consequences for the irradiated persons. The problem is related to the fact that irradiation can be very difficult to detect, even in the presence of certain pathological changes, due to their nonspecific nature and the lack of information about the causative agent. Many similar cases of accidents with lost radioactive sources remaining for a long time in the environment are described in the scientific literature. They are characterized by the fact that mostly a small number of people are irradiated, but with relatively large doses that lead to serious health damage [2, 3].

From all that has been said so far, it is clear that the fight against radiological terrorism is a difficult and complex task, which is often beyond the power of a single country alone. In this regard, the IAEA is developing special plans to improve the protection of nuclear materials and the facilities where they are used or received. In them, the emphasis is focused on three main directions: prevention, control, and action plan [16].

3. Analysis of preceding radiological incidents

No case of radiological terrorism has been registered so far. Only a few unrealized threats are described. The expected consequences are based on the analysis of some

previous radiation incidents. In this way, the reasons for their occurrence, the health effects for the population, and medical insurance activities can be clarified, and a program for prevention and behavior in case of radiation terrorism can be developed. Emergency situations with sources most likely to be used for terrorist purposes containing long-lived radionuclides with relatively high radioactivity (^{137}Cs, ^{60}Co, ^{226}Ra, ^{192}Ir) have been analyzed, which will ensure a longer effect of impact on people and the environment – Goiania, Brazil [13, 14, 17], Jilin, China [18], Tammiku, Estonia [19], Lilo, Georgia [20], Istanbul Turkey [21], Yanango Peru [22], Samut Prakarn, Thailand [23] and others.

It is noteworthy that they all have common features – violation of preventive radiological protection measures, lack of elementary awareness of citizens about SIR, as well as, unfortunately, insufficient knowledge of the consequences of radiation and the clinical manifestations of radiation damage of a large part of the medical staff. The medical aspects are directed in four main directions: *dealing with ARS, local radiation injury (LRI) therapy, decontamination and decorporation, and last but not least, overcoming the psychological effects.*

4. Health consequences

The likely damages that can be caused by radiological terrorism are – mechanical and thermal trauma, deterministic and stochastic radiobiological effects, combined damages, and psychological effects.

Mechanical trauma can be subdivided into primary – injuries from the contact of the shock wave with the surface of the body (tympanic membrane rupture, lung damage, eye damage, damage to hollow abdominal organs), secondary – projectile injuries (penetrating and nonpenetrating injuries), tertiary injuries from the rejection of the body by the blast wave and its impact with surrounding partitions (penetrating and nonpenetrating injuries, and fractures), quaternary – other injuries caused by the blast (asphyxia, burns, toxic exposures, exacerbation of chronic diseases).

The severity of **thermal trauma** is determined by the area of the burned surface, the depth of impact, the anatomical area, the age, and the general condition of the organism. Dermal burns are divided into two degrees – superficial and deep. In the course of deep burns, four phases are distinguished – thermal shock, toxic infection, recovery, and late consequences. Deep dermal burns usually require surgical intervention and skin grafting.

Irradiation of biological structures causes two types of effects: **deterministic** and **stochastic** [24]. In Publication 103, the ICRP recommends using the descriptive term – damaging tissue or organ reactions for these effects, taking into account the fact that they are not determined solely by the radiation dose but can be modified under the influence of many biological modifiers (antioxidants, prostaglandins, cytokines, growth factors, stem cells, etc.) [25]. Deterministic effects are characterized by the presence of a threshold dose. The severity of the observed biological effect is proportional to the magnitude of the dose received above the threshold. Usually, irradiation of the human body with doses below 0.5 Gy does not lead to the appearance of deterministic effects. Irradiation at lower doses can mutate somatic or germ cells and initiate stochastic effects – cancer or hereditary effects. They usually appear after a long latent period. Their severity does not depend on the size of the received dose, which affects only the probability of their manifestation. Unlike deterministic ones, they are considered thresholdless, and the clinical picture is not

Degree	Dose (Gy)	Objective symptoms	Subjective symptoms
Mild	8–12	Minimal, transient erythema	Pruritus
Medium	12–20	Moderate erythema, edema, blisters	Slight pain
Severe	20–25	Marked erythema, edema, blisters, ulcers	Moderate persistent pain
Extremely severe	над 25	Severe erythema, edema, hemorrhagic blisters, deep ulcers, necrosis	Severe persistent pain

Table 1.
Cutaneous symptoms depending on the dose.

tied to the received dose. The linear nonthreshold model for the dose-effect relationship is a highly debatable and long-established dogma in radiobiology and radiation protection. According to him, each dose of absorbed ionizing radiation corresponds to a proportional biological effect. Despite its many uncertainties in the area of low radiation levels – doses below 0.2 Gy and dose rates below 0.1 Gy.h-1 – the ICRP officially makes it the basis of normalization of radiation effects on man and the human population yet in Publication 26 [26].

After external irradiation, two deterministic effects with different latent periods can appear – LRI and ARS. LRIs are significantly more common than whole-body ones. Involvement of a large area of the skin is part of a complex pathology, life-threatening at high doses, often called cutaneous radiation syndrome (CRS), which must be distinguished from LRI [27]. The pathophysiology is complex and not fully understood. Ionizing radiation damages multiple skin structures, including epidermal keratinocytes, dermal fibroblasts, skin vasculature, and hair follicles. Maturation, reproduction, and repopulation of cells are disturbed. Free radicals, DNA lesions, and an inflammatory response are generated. Immediately after irradiation, cytokine synthesis is initiated by skin cells (epidermal keratinocytes, dermal fibroblasts, and immunocompetent cells, including dermal dendritic cells, neutrophils, eosinophils, and lymphocytes) and continues as a cascade during all stages of development [28, 29]. There is no gold standard for clinical assessment of the severity of radiation-induced skin damage. The degrees of severity are: mild 8 – 12 Gy, medium severe 12 – 20 Gy, severe 20 – 25 Gy, and extremely severe degree above 25 Gy, the course of which shows pronounced phasicity (**Table 1**) [25, 27, 30–32].

Various diagnostic methods are used to assess the severity – serial color photography to analyze the evolution of clinical symptoms, echography, computed tomography and magnetic resonance imaging (MRT), assessment of blood flow (scintigraphy, Doppler echography), thermography, cytogenetic dosimetry [27, 31]. Therapy includes – analgesics, corticosteroids, and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, local or systemic antibiotics, antihistamines, pentoxifylline, methylxanthines, hyperbaric oxygen, and photobiomodulation [27, 30–34]. Studies with superoxide dismutase, down-regulating the expression of transforming growth factor-β by myofibroblasts, acting as an anti-inflammatory agent and antioxidant [35, 36] are promising. Mesenchymal stem cell therapy combined with surgical excision has shown significant success in severe radiation burns [37–39].

ARS is caused after whole-body irradiation or after irradiation of a significant volume of the body with highly penetrating ionizing radiation, as well as in case of massive contamination – external and/or internal. Dose threshold is around 1 Gy. ARS comprises a combination of clinical symptoms occurring phasically hours to

weeks after radiation. They are a manifestation of damage not only to important organs and in particular to those in which continuous and rapid cell replacement takes place but also to changes in the vascular system (in particular induced endothelial dysfunction) and the immune system, which leads to the development of uncontrolled systemic inflammatory response [40, 41]. ARS should be considered as a multi-organ dysfunction that can lead to multi-organ failure [42]. It is usually divided into three types depending on the absorbed dose and the organs mainly affected – **hematopoietic (HT-ARS)** at doses of 1 to 6 Gy, **gastrointestinal (GIT-ARS)** at doses of 6 to 20 Gy, and **neurovascular (NVT-ARS**), also called cerebrovascular at doses above 20 Gy [27, 43]. The hematopoietic, gastrointestinal, neurovascular, and skin systems are the four main critical systems to be analyzed in the European Association for Bone Marrow Transplantation (EBMT) approved single standardized procedure for the diagnosis and treatment of radiation accident victims, which is the basis of the METREPOL program (Medical Treatment Protocols for Radiation Accident Victims) proposed by Fliedner et al. [44]. The typical picture of **HT-ARS** includes several phases: prodromal with nonspecific symptoms starting a few hours after irradiation – mental agitation, headache, and dizziness, rigidity of the neck muscles, impaired consciousness, tachycardia, hypotension, anorexia, guessing, vomiting, sometimes diarrhea with an increase in body temperature; a latent phase of varying duration follows, inversely proportional to the dose; the height of the disease (critical phase) including – infections, bleeding, and gastrointestinal symptoms, expression of cellular deficiency in the hematopoietic system, and at higher doses also in the gastrointestinal tract; recovery phase. At extremely high doses, such phasing is not observed. **GIT-ARS** occurs as a result of the death of the stem cells of the small intestinal mucosa and disturbances in the intestinal microcirculation. Fluid and electrolyte loss, dehydration, acute renal failure, shock, hemorrhage, malabsorption, malnutrition, and infectious complications have been observed. Mortality is extremely high and usually occurs within two weeks [45]. **NVT-ARS** occurs due to a change in the permeability of the vessels based on the accumulation of toxic decay products and the release of cytokines into the circulation. The cell membranes of the neurons are also damaged, leading to electrochemical inactivation. Vomiting is observed in the first minutes after irradiation, respiratory distress, short-term loss of consciousness, fever, and prostration. Histologically, microvascular and cerebral edema was observed as a result of intracranial hypertension. Death occurs by the fifth day [46].

Diagnosis is mainly based on clinical (nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, fever, hypotension, tachycardia, tachypnea, neurological manifestations, hydration, skin lesions, etc.) and paraclinical signs (complete blood count with differential count; increased serum amylase); decreased concentration of serum citrulline as a biomarker of radiation-induced intestinal mucosal damage; elevated C-reactive protein (CRP) levels; elevated FMS-like tyrosine kinase 3 (FLT-3) ligand concentration. Particularly telling are changes in lymphocyte counts that can to be used as an effective prognostic criterion (**Table 2**) [27, 31, 47–51].

The most widely used methods for biological assessment of dose are based on radiation-induced chromosomal aberrations – cytogenetic analysis of dicentrics, translocations, micronuclei, and premature chromosome condensation. Dicentric analysis is considered the "gold standard" of biological dosimetry [52]. Treatment is generally aimed at supporting hematopoiesis, maintaining electrolyte balance, preventing or treating infectious and hemorrhagic complications, and applying symptomatic agents. It includes cytokines – granulocyte colony-stimulating

Absolute lymphocyte count per μL	Degree of severity of ARS	Survival prediction
700–1000	Mild	Good
400–700	Moderate	Likely
100–400	Severe	Possible with highly specialized treatment
<100	Extremely severe	Poor

Table 2.
Absolute lymphocyte count 48 h after total body irradiation.

factor (G-CSF) – filgrastim or granulocyte-macrophage colony-stimulating factor (GM-CSF) – sargramostim; antibiotic, antiviral, and antifungal agents; transfusion of blood components; antiemetic therapy - dopamine receptor (D2) antagonists and serotonin receptor (5-HT¬3) antagonists, diarrhea control - loperamide, vasotonics, anxiolytics, analgesics [53, 54]. The results of the application of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) and hematopoietic stem cell transplantation (HSCT) did not justify the initial optimistic expectations, mainly due to accompanying severe comorbidity [54–56]. HSCT may be considered in individuals with an absorbed dose of 7–10 Gy, no evidence of hematopoietic recovery, no severe trauma or burns, and a suitable donor [57]. With whole-body irradiation above 10 Gy, treatment is palliative, and survival is up to 6 months.

In the case of radiological terrorism, a special place is occupied by **combined radiation injury (CRI)** from a radiation factor and mechanical, thermal, and/or chemical trauma. This requires not only their in-depth scientific study but also familiarization of the medical staff with the main features of their course. In them, the lesions occur against the background of altered reactivity of the body. The lethality increases from 1.5 to 3 times compared to pure radiation exposure [58]. Early development of ARS and significant shortening of the latent phase was observed. This is important from a surgical point of view because it shortens the time for operative intervention [32]. A characteristic feature is that conventional trauma also causes lymphopenia, which makes it difficult to use this parameter for "biological dosimetry". Results may also be affected by cytogenetic techniques for dose estimation. A cascade of inflammatory and neurohormonal events is often activated that has systemic consequences leading to more severe disturbances of hemodynamic function. Hypoxia, which regularly accompanies ARS, predisposes to rapidly occurring and severe shock [59]. In this regard, severe mental trauma should not be neglected. Infection is a very common companion of CRI. An important feature in the course of combined injuries is the presence of frequent hemorrhages, which complicate the course of the disease. The reduced regenerative capacity of tissues damaged by mechanical or thermal trauma should not be ignored. As a result, wound healing is usually slow and accompanied by various complications [59, 60]. Treatment of CRI combines treatment measures required by all factors. The need for more rapid use of myeloid growth factors should be considered. An individualized approach is required according to the nature and severity of the CRI. Priority is given to life-saving actions and medical treatment of conventional injuries, which must be carried out as quickly as possible.

Contamination – external and internal, presents a radically different picture. Radioactive dust, liquids, or gases can enter the environment and from there contaminate the skin or enter the human body. In this case, the irradiated individual is in direct contact with the radiation sources and it continues until they are removed from

him. On the other hand, radioactive dust falling on the body can lead to the contamination of the medical personnel in contact with it or to their significant irradiation. Radionuclides that have entered the body can be excreted through the urine and fecal mass and thus lead to the contamination of the area and personnel. Contamination with radioactive materials is not much different from a bacterial infection, which is why the behavior of personnel in both cases is similar [27, 47].

4.1 External contamination

Life-saving actions are always a priority. Before undertaking decontamination procedures, it is desirable to carry out appropriate monitoring by a competent specialist, since the interpretation of the data obtained is not always elementary. In principle, when reading values more than twice the predetermined background level, the patient is considered contaminated. If the values are less than twice the background radiation level, it is assumed that the person is not contaminated to a medically significant degree [61, 62]. Patients' clothing should be removed immediately. Changing clothing and footwear typically reduces contamination by up to 90% [31]. All contaminated materials should be collected in labeled plastic bags to be transported very carefully. If a violation in the integrity of the skin is detected, the priority is the decontamination of the wound by washing with saline solution or water. Decontamination of the ear canal, nose, and mouth is done before decontamination of the body. The oral cavity is washed with lukewarm water, the teeth with a brush and toothpaste, and rinsed with 3% hydrogen peroxide; it is also recommended to gargle. The eyes are flushed with saline or distilled water using a pipette from medial to lateral to avoid contamination of the nasolacrimal duct. Ears – with lukewarm water using a syringe. Decontamination of healthy skin is done using water, neutral pH soap, or other detergents. For persistent contamination, abrasive soaps or chelating agents such as ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) can be carefully used. The water should be lukewarm, cleaning from the outside in with a soft brush or pads without rubbing [27, 47, 63].

4.2 Internal contamination

Once inside the body, radioactive substances become a source of internal radiation. The consequences of this radiation have many features in common with the external, but also have a number of specific features. An important problem is measuring the magnitude of the absorbed tissue dose, which is significantly more complicated than the determination of doses during external irradiation. Internal doses are calculated, not measured. Certain mathematical models are used for this purpose. Initially, internal contamination is established by monitoring biological samples. Final dose estimation is performed by excreta bioassay, a whole-body counter, and for some radionuclides a gamma camera [31, 64]. The nature of the damage to the body from the incorporated radioisotopes is largely determined by the manner of their distribution and the critical organs in which they accumulate. Usually, no early symptoms are observed, except when large amounts of highly radiotoxic isotopes such as ^{210}Po are ingested [65, 66]. Risk is mainly related to stochastic effects. Life-saving actions are also a priority here. The radiological risk to healthcare personnel is similar to the biological risk arising from ordinary medical practice [64].

The main goal of therapy is to reduce the risk of radiation-induced cancer by preventing or reducing the absorption of radionuclides into the blood and their deposition

Radionuclide	Decorporating medicine
Cesium, Thallium	Prussian blue
Cobalt, Plutonium, Iridium, Americium, Californium	DTPA
Strontium, Radium	Aluminum hydroxide, Calcium chloride, Calcium gluconate
Uranium	Sodium bicarbonate, dialysis
Iodine	Potassium iodide
Polonius	Dimercaprol

Table 3.
Specific decorporation therapy for internal contamination.

in critical organs or tissues, and increasing their excretion from the body. The identification of the isotope is critical to the decorporation. Therapeutic and preventive measures are divided into nonspecific and specific [62, 64]. **The nonspecific measures** are applied to all radioisotopes and aim at their mechanical separation – washing the nasopharynx and stomach, emetics, laxatives, enemas, alkalizing the stomach, washing wounds, and expectorants. The effectiveness of these measures is significantly reduced if they are delayed. It is optimal to start within the first hour after admission. There are different opinions about the start of the specific events. Some authors believe that specific therapy should be carried out only in victims with incorporation of activity exceeding 10 times the limit of annual admission [67]. Others recommend that it be started as early as possible due to the low toxicity and high efficiency of the preparations [68]. Specific treatment methods can be divided into several groups – **saturating the target organ** with a corresponding stable isotope, therefore, its incorporation of radioisotopes will be reduced (potassium iodide when incorporating ^{131}I); isotopic dilution to accelerate the elimination process of the radionuclide (hydration of the body with tritium); **displacement of the radioisotope** by administration of a nonradioactive element with a different atomic number (calcium gluconate with ^{90}Sr); **reduction and/or inhibition of radioisotope absorption** in the gastrointestinal tract – aluminum hydroxide with ^{90}Sr, ion exchange compounds (hexacyanoferrate, also called Prussian blue, with ^{137}Cs); **chelation** aiming at the formation with the incorporated radionuclides of soluble complexes that are easily separated from the kidneys – application of diethylenetriaminepentaacetic acid (DTPA) with ^{239}Ru. **Direct separation of radioisotopes** from blood by means of hemodialysis is a successfully applied method when incorporating large amounts of radionuclides. It is desirable to apply it in the first 4 hours. In rare cases, for inhaled insoluble particles (Ru), **bronchoalveolar lavage** can be performed. The specific means of treatment depend on the type of isotope (**Table 3**) [27, 31, 61, 64, 69].

5. Psychological effects

Psychological effects are much more challenging than radiological ones [2, 3, 70, 71]. The very important role of mass media should be emphasized here. Inaccurate, contradictory, or hyperbolized information heightens the psychological effects. After a radiological terrorist act, continuous information should be provided, providing the population with clear, concise, timely, and understandable instructions for behavior, which should be repeated many times and based on an internationally

approved manual for action in such a situation. Timely warning is one of the most important psychological aspects of dealing with an incident. This maintains trust in national institutions and reduces confusion and anxiety. Society builds a sense of control over the situation [72, 73].

Psychological effects are manifested through: stress, psychological distress, and changes in the ability to adequately assess risk, changes in individual and social behavior. Psychological distress can range from feelings of psychological discomfort to the degree of manifestation with clinical signs and symptoms. Changes in the affected person's attitude to their health can also occur. Even the smallest symptoms in such cases are perceived as manifestations of radiation damage. Many people are affected by Multiple Idiopathic Physical Symptoms (MIPS) and conduct unnecessarily extensive medical examinations accompanied by undue anxiety in the interpretation of the obtained results or in anticipation of the subsequent results [31, 74]. Psychological complications are characterized by a variety of psychopathological symptoms and syndromes. In the acute phase, effective shock reactions with polymorphic symptoms can be observed – stupor, substupor, fugiform reactions with disorders of sensory synthesis, depressive episodes, aphasia, abasia, pseudoparalysis, and delusional experiences. These symptoms fall under so-called severe stress reactions and adjustment disorders, which include acute stress reactions and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The list of reactions to acute stress disorder (ASD) that can be observed includes dynamic polymorphic symptomatology, confusion, narrowed field of clear consciousness, disruption of the receptive-representational sphere, disorientation, anxiety, hyperactivity, withdrawal, escape, depression, anger, despair, autonomic symptoms, but none of the symptoms predominated for long [75, 76]. True posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can occur with a latency period of no longer than 6 months. They are characterized by a feeling of re-experience, repeated reproduction of the event in memories (flashbacks), in dreams or nightmares, alienation, indifference, insensitivity, indifference, avoidance of actions, and situations reminiscent of the psychotrauma. Adjustment disorders, substance abuse, generalized anxiety disorders, and depression can also be seen. A pathological axis is often formed: "physical disability, mental stress, psychosomatic disorder" [75–78]. Besides these fundamental reactions, there are other important psychological problems that arise long after the accident – the so-called "radiation scar syndrome" or the "social stigma" phenomenon. After the incident in Goiania, a young woman whose brother died of ARS reported: "They started treating us like lepers." Local cemeteries refuse to bury the dead, hotels do not accept residents of Goiania, Brazilian airlines refuse to book passengers from this region, etc. [13, 14, 17].

Many people from different professions are involved in the preparation and implementation of rescue and emergency recovery work in case of radiological terrorism. They are also psychologically affected by ionizing radiation. Particularly important are the problems that arise among medical personnel: fear, anxiety, isolation of the team, insufficient knowledge, insufficient experience in interacting with experts, public figures, reporters, etc., lack of independence in actions [47, 79, 80].

A terrorist act cannot be predicted, but the psychological reaction to it can be mitigated by using various methods before, during, and after it. Reducing psychological consequences is a basic functional requirement that must be met in accordance with the disaster preparedness and response program. This requirement is applicable to all categories and must be fulfilled at all levels of action: site, municipality, district, and national [81]. After the accident, one of the main measures is related to the provision of medical assistance to persons who show real somatic symptoms or symptoms of

mental stress. In these cases, the role of not only mental health professionals but also general practitioners is extremely important. This requires general practitioners to have the necessary training in cases of radiological terrorism and radiation damage. In this way, they can determine the necessary approach to the injured – psychiatric or psychological treatment, medical consultation, specific treatment, etc. Periodic visits to the family doctor reassure the population. In addition, family doctors should monitor risk groups (children, pregnant women, the elderly, and the chronically ill) for a longer period of time. Long-term health care is needed for several reasons: to provide information about the severity of health problems, to identify radiation-induced health effects at an early stage, to predict the need for medical and psychological care, and to respond to unfounded fear or anxiety of people [27, 47, 82, 83].

Social support and training are a very important part of how to deal with the psychosocial consequences of a radiological terrorist act. Solving this problem requires the participation of a number of specialists, organizations, and institutions [47, 79, 80, 84]. Psychological support for rescuers and medical personnel should be based on continuous training. Many of the problems are related to the lack of knowledge about ionizing radiation and its effects on humans. Adequate training and practical training are the main elements for the psychological resilience of medical personnel involved in the elimination of the consequences of terrorism [27, 31, 47, 79, 80].

6. Medical provision

Medical provision of the population in case of radiological terrorism can be divided into three main directions: planning and preparation for action, providing first medical aid at the scene of the incident, and medical assistance outside the scene of the incident [2, 3, 32, 47, 80, 85]. Effective response requires making adequate decisions in a chaotic and emotionally charged environment. This can only be done through prior information on the execution of terrorist acts, planning of the events, and preparation of the teams, which are specific to the various departments, agencies, and other structures related to liquidation of the consequences. The development of an optimal emergency response system requires a preliminary analysis of available resources, forces, and means, and knowledge of the main health consequences that may occur in any particular situation [47, 81]. The basic requirements for medical preparedness to respond to radiological terrorism include assessment of possible terrorist acts according to local circumstances; training of medical professionals; creation of a base of instructions and algorithms for action in case of damage caused by ionizing radiation; provision of equipment for dosimetric control; provision of pharmaceutical products necessary for the treatment of persons with radiation injuries; provision of laboratories with the possibility of biodosimetric studies; determining the hospitals for the treatment of patients affected by the terrorist act; developing an effective crisis communication strategy [27, 47, 86, 87]. An important principle in building the organization of radiological assistance is that the created structure should be based on the existing health system as much as possible. Another essential principle is that the organization of radiological care should be primarily functional, especially as regards inpatient care facilities. Day-to-day peacetime needs practically do not require this kind of activity [2, 3, 27, 47, 80].

The main measures that must be included in the medical provision of the population are first aid to the victims at the scene of the accident, opening of a reception-sorting department with primary sorting of the injured according to predeveloped

criteria and action algorithm, and staged evacuation to provide qualified medical assistance; providing emergency medical assistance to all those in need, providing treatment for both radiation injuries and other injuries; conducting decontamination procedures; registration of all affected persons with subsequent analysis of the lesions and provision of long-term medical monitoring; provision of psychological assistance to victims, their families and members of emergency response teams; implementation by the health authorities of appropriate protective measures for the population; public awareness, advice, and behavioral recommendations. Each one of these measures must find a mandatory place in the medical insurance plans drawn up by the state [2, 3, 27, 31, 32, 47, 80, 88–90].

In order for medical assistance to be effective, it is necessary that the medical teams work in close cooperation with the forces involved in the rescue operations be guided by the rule that resuscitation takes place before decontamination – life-saving actions take priority as required under normal circumstances; taking measures to limit radiation doses for all victims and support partial decontamination; in the primary sorting, the victims should be divided into only two categories – absolutely urgent (with immediate vital danger and a high chance of survival) and relatively urgent (victims with minor injuries, in which deterioration is not expected) [91]; providing continuous medical assistance to the victims along the entire chain, from the source of defeat to the relevant medical facilities. Responders at the scene of the accident must observe several basic principles: the area of the radiation emergency should not be entered without an individual dosimeter and protective clothing; maximally short time for treating the injured; maximum distance from the radiation source; use of protective barriers. The successful approach to action takes into account three borders – green, yellow, and red, determined by the most easily measurable indicator – the power of the ambient equivalent dose in the relevant area is successful: green limit – about 0.1 μSv/h, which is around the natural radiation background and there is no danger; yellow limit – about 0.1 mSv/h, the reaction time without danger is several days; red limit – about 0.1 Sv/h, reaction time is only a few hours, the danger is great, and only life-saving actions should be taken [80].

When organizing radiological care, personnel training is of utmost importance. Many of the problems are related to the lack of knowledge about ionizing radiation and its effects on humans. The development of a system of practical training and assessment of the capabilities of emergency teams and medical specialists for action can be considered the most important component of preparedness for a medical response to radiological terrorism. Training should include five main areas: quantities and units; prevention, diagnosis, and therapy of radiation damage; decontamination and decorporation; overcoming psychological effects; and crisis communication. One of the important elements of this preparation is the training of medical students. The inclusion of the discipline "Disaster Medicine" in the regular medical education program is a real opportunity at the moment to improve the quality and quantity of the training of medical students in this important area of public health.

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Chapter 6

Some Aspects of Electronic Warfare in the Fight against Terrorism

Miroslav Terzić

Abstract

Terrorism as a phenomenon especially comes to the fore at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century when, most often, non-state subjects (various terrorist groups and individuals) using different types of weapons and military equipment, plan, organize and carry out terrorist operations, creating great effects (deadly effects, psychological effects, etc.) in the attacking object. The targets of attacks by terrorist groups (terrorist organizations) are numerous, ranging from state institutions to ordinary citizens. The evolution of terrorism conditioned the development of new methods of fighting terrorists, but also the improvement of existing methods of fighting terrorism. One of the ways of fighting terrorism includes the use of electronic warfare systems as part of the operational and combat support in the anti-terrorist operation. Earlier use of electronic warfare systems in the fight against terrorism included the individual use of electronic support assets. The reasons for such use of electronic warfare systems are in the fact that weapons, organization of terrorist cells and planning of terrorist acts were at such a level that it was not necessary to use army units and more complex systems for electronic warfare. The activities of terrorist organizations since the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century can be characterized as terrorist operations with military features. Terrorist operations with military features have influenced the use of military units in the fight against terrorists, in addition to the use of police units. The use of army units and police units in the fight against terrorists is unified through the process of preparing and executing a counter-terrorist operation. When planning an anti-terrorist operation using army and police forces, it is necessary, among other things, to plan adequate systems for electronic warfare that would provide operational and combat support to army and police forces. That is why it is very important to analyze certain electronic warfare systems that can provide operational and combat support in a counter-terrorist operation that has military characteristics. The contribution of this research is in the improvement of the conceptual approach to the use of electronic warfare systems in the fight against terrorism. Further research should be focused on creating a model of electronic warfare in a counter-terrorist operation.

Keywords: terrorism, combat, counter-terrorist operation, electronic warfare, military

1. Introduction

The civil war in Syria presented a favorable situation for the terrorist organization Islamic State—ISIL to occupy parts of the Syrian Arab Republic by applying appropriate combat tactics with the help of military weapons and equipment. The combat activities of ISIL in the territory of Syria, taking into account that a civil war was taking place in that area, are considered by some theorists as modern insurgency [1] because it is possible to show that a part of the population rebelled against their own state. In this case, the terrorist organization ISIL mobilized part of the population to fight against the official regime of the Syrian Arab Republic. The fight of ISIL in Syria manifested military characteristics through the organization of forces, the use of military weapons and equipment, the application of military tactics for the conquest of the city of Al Raqqa, etc.

Since the end of the twentieth century, terrorists have massively used modern communications, cyber proctors, explosive devices that can be activated remotely with the help of mobile phones, various types of drones and the like.

Modern communications, modern weaponry and improvised explosive devices used by terrorists for combat operations and operations in multiple domains represent a major challenge for counter-terrorist operation planning. In order to effectively respond to that challenge, in addition to the use of military and police combat teams, it is necessary to dimension forces for electronic warfare that would provide operational and combat support to other forces in the operation by acting in the electromagnetic spectrum.

In the study: "terrorist and insurgent unmanned aerial vehicles: use, potentials, and military implications" [2] describes various aspects of the use of drones by terrorist and insurgent forces. Three potential scenarios were analyzed and possible military implications and political responses were predicted based on those analyses. The military is required to develop capabilities that can adequately respond to a terrorist or insurgent threat. Military units should develop capabilities for combat operations and operations in the electromagnetic spectrum to respond to the terrorist use of drones.

Electronic warfare forces in a counter-terrorist operation in order to provide operational and combat support can carry out the following tasks: gathering intelligence about terrorists by monitoring open sources of information, discovering the intention of terrorist forces by monitoring their direct communications, discovering the location of terrorist forces by goniometering their communication devices, jamming their communications, by jamming improvised explosive devices, jamming their drones, etc.

The importance of this topic, from the theoretical aspect, is in the description of certain electronic warfare systems and the determination of the cause-and-effect relationship (causal relationship) between modern weapons and equipment used by terrorists and the development of electronic warfare systems. The importance of this topic, from a practical aspect, is in the selection of an adequate system for electronic warfare that would be used in a counter-terrorist operation.

2. Terrorist actions and operations

Terrorism is a phenomenon (phenomenon), which is often associated with irregular forces, whose main goal is the realization of political interests. Terrorist acts demonstrate the intent to cause significant psychological and/or physical effects on the relevant population through the use or threat of violence. Terrorist strategies are usually a long-term commitment to degrade the enemy's resilience in order to extract concessions from the enemy with whom the terrorists are in conflict [3].

The evolution of terrorism is followed by the following trends:

- Terrorism is becoming more extensive and stronger in intensity.
- Terrorists have developed new financial means, so they are less dependent on state sponsors.
- Terrorists innovate; exploit new technology, improvise commercial technology for military use;
- Terrorists analyze experiences and learn from each other;
- develop and practice successful tactics;
- create instruction manuals based on experience;
- terrorists do not respect the international law of war;
- terrorists justify their actions with doctrines and theories;
- For terrorists, the most important technology is direct communication with their multiple polika.

Larger terrorist organizations when planning larger operations have a functional organizational structure. In that structure, there are specialists for certain functions: recruitment, training, intelligence security, reconnaissance, planning of terrorist actions and operations, informational and psychological-propaganda action, logistics, finance, and social service.

Terrorist operations are usually planned in great detail with the goals of minimizing risk, achieving the highest probability of success, and achieving the widest possible publicity for their actions. Terrorists tend to avoid their adversary's strengths and concentrate on their weaknesses.

The planning of terrorist operations, in principle, can include the following phases: - selection of targets (choice of objects of action), – collection of intelligence data and monitoring of targets, – selection of a specific target (most often the object of action is selected, the destruction of which achieves the strongest effect), – determination (planning) target attack variants, target attack practice, target action, draw after target action, and success exploitation.

Terrorist operations are unique in that each is planned for a specific goal and effect. Terrorists usually reveal only as much of their resources and people as is absolutely necessary to accomplish the mission in order to avoid capture or destruction [4].

To act on the target, terrorists use specific equipment and various tactics. Some terrorist tactics are carried out as independent actions and some terrorist tactics are undertaken as part of other coordinated activities. Common types of terrorist tactics are: attack or ambush, capture, assassination, activation of weapons of mass destruction, hostage taking, sabotage, bombing, kidnapping, destruction of critical infrastructure facilities, etc.

At the end of the twentieth century and since the beginning of the twenty-first century, terrorists have massively used the Internet and other types of communication throughout the process of planning operations and to display terrorist tactics, and they can also project disinformation and propaganda to justify their goal.

On the Internet, terrorist violence, carried out on camera, can be broadcast directly over the Internet and without editing. The Internet also enables direct communication between the terrorist's public affairs department and various constituencies: recruiters, sympathizers, the wider Iraqi body, enemy states, and citizens who may disagree with their own government's policies. The bombing is broadcast directly to a wider audience with the help of cameras on drones (commercial and military) and weapons. Today's terrorists have websites, publish online magazines, explain their causes, discuss doctrine, and provide instructions for making explosives. They may use the same channels to secretly communicate with operatives through coded messages or, according to some reports, steganography [5, 6].

3. Electronic warfare in a counter-terrorist operation

In response to the preparation and execution of terrorist actions and terrorist operations with military features, police units and army units prepare and execute a counter-terrorist operation. Police units and army units that are planning a counter-terrorist operation, among other things, have electronic warfare capabilities. Electronic warfare capabilities in a counter-terrorist operation can be organized within an electronic warfare unit.

The principles of conducting an anti-terrorist operation include:

- continuous control and exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum (dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum),
- the organization of continuous reconnaissance of the actions and actions of terrorist forces,
- monitoring the composition of terrorist forces, their strength and the changes that occur in this regard, once established contact with a terrorist group must not be interrupted under any circumstances,
- creation and provision of conditions for quick maneuver and movement of units participating in the anti-terrorist operation,
- perform actions quickly and suddenly by applying various tricks in the paint without repeating actions and procedures,
- ensure safe and stable multi-channel telecommunications with all participants in the operation,
- choose the most suitable time and place of action, and carry out the attack from a circular base.

The combat organization of units that carry out an anti-terrorist operation, in principle, includes:

- command forces,
- forces for carrying out counter-terrorist operations,

- forces for general combat operations,
- fire support forces,
- forces in reserve,
- anti-terrorist security forces,
- forces for logistic support.

The execution of anti-terrorist actions, in principle, implies the following:

- bringing forces to the counter-terrorist operation zone,
- blockade of areas where terrorist forces are located,
- search of areas where terrorist forces are located,
- environment of terrorist forces,
- breaking up and destroying terrorist forces,
- securing the area of the performed actions,
- territory control,
- disengagement [7]

During the preparation and execution of the anti-terrorist operation, the electronic warfare unit would be organizationally connected to the command planning the counter-terrorist operation, and functionally it would be connected to the command and to other units in the counter-terrorist operation zone.

The electronic warfare unit is intended to provide operational support, combat support and protection to commands and units conducting counter-terrorist operations. Operational support is achieved by continuous search and monitoring of the electromagnetic spectrum, which detects, analyzes and monitors terrorist activities, and based on this, data processing is carried out and certain information about terrorists is obtained. Combat support is achieved by electronic jamming of command and control systems used by terrorist forces, at critical moments of counter-terrorist operations. The electronic warfare unit has the ability to jam remotely controlled exposure devices and unmanned aerial vehicles to protect forces conducting a counter-terrorist operation. Accordingly, an electronic warfare unit participating in a counter-terrorist operation consists of three functionally distinct components of electronic warfare assets.

The first component consists of means intended for determining the direction and direction of signal arrival (radio goniometers). Using COMINT/C-ESM booths, which are placed at a greater distance, it is possible to determine the macro location of the emitter. The COMINT/C-ESM cabins are interconnected in a radio reconnaissance system, which allows the approximate locations of currently active radio emitters to be displayed in each set, on a digital map, in real time. **Figure 1** shows the COMINT/C-ESM cabin manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz.

Figure 1.
Cabin for electronic reconnaissance [8].

COMINT/C-ESM systems are customized solutions for radio monitoring and radio location in the 10 kHz to 40 GHz frequency range. The systems are suitable for land-based, naval and airborne applications. Configurations range from small portable single-operator, mobile applications to complex semi-mobile or fixed monitoring stations with dedicated operator positions. These can be supported by remote subsystems through various kinds of wired or wireless communications [8].

In addition to the above, in the radio reconnaissance system operators have voice communication with each other. In addition to the radio reconnaissance kit, the R&S®MP007 Portable direction finding system, which is intended for determining the micro location of the radio transmitter, is also imported into the radio reconnaissance system. Determining the micro-location of the emitter is the determination of the exact location of the transmitting device, with very little possibility of error. Portable radio goniometers are connected to the radio reconnaissance system, so the exact location of the transmitter at the time of transmission can be seen on the digital map of each of the devices in that system. **Figure 2** shows the R&S®MP007 Portable direction finding system, and **Figure 3** shows the location of the signal source, which is the result of the use of three goniometers.

Portable goniometers, with an operator, are part of the units that destroy terrorist groups. An operator with a portable goniometer would move near the commander of the unit, enabling him to see the current state of active emitters, their location, as well as the change in position, thus providing combat support.

The second component consists of means intended for listening in on radio communications used by terrorists. In the counter-terrorist operation zone, terrorists

Figure 2.
R&S®MP007 portable direction finding system [9].



Figure 3.
The result of using three portable direction finding system on a digital map.

may use mobile phones, commercial telecommunications devices, and military telecommunications and navigation devices. In the area of the anti-terrorist operation, it is possible to temporarily evacuate a large part of the population and turn off the mobile phone signal. By shutting down cell phone signals, terrorists are forced to use commercial and military telecommunications devices. Then their monitoring and wiretapping of telecommunications was made easier.

By using COMINT systems, the complete radio communications of terrorist forces are intercepted, and in this way, important intelligence data can be obtained on the strength of terrorist forces, the distribution of their members within the group, as well as intentions to move or plans for action. The collected data is sent to the command that plans the counter-terrorist operation and thereby provides operational support.

The third component consists of means intended for jamming radio communications, jamming data transmission links, and jamming radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. High-output electronic jamming systems are used to jam terrorist communications from long distances, which are functionally linked to COMINT/C-ESM systems. They can only be used in the critical phases of the counter-terrorist operation and then provide combat support.

Forces intended to destroy terrorist groups are exposed to the effects of improvised explosive devices and reconnaissance and action from unmanned aerial vehicles. Therefore, vehicles with jammers would move with the units intended for the destruction of the terrorist group and be in functional connection with the goniometers. The operator on the jammer communicates with the operator on the portable goniometer, who in the event of a perceived threat (registration and goniometry of the signal that activates the explosive device or the registration of the signal that is controlled by the unmanned aerial vehicle or the signal that sends the image from the unmanned aerial vehicle), and after the approval of the supervisor of the radio reconnaissance system, requires the inclusion of a jammer. The inclusion of a jammer prevents terrorists from using radio communications, using data transmission links, using remotely controlled improvised explosive devices, and using remotely controlled drones.

Elements for electronic jamming of improvised explosive devices fulfil the function of protecting the forces of the units (combat teams) to which they were added [10]. Implementing electronic jamming of improvised explosive devices for the protection of forces that destroy a terrorist group is a very complex task because the effectiveness and efficiency of electronic jamming depends on several variables.

Theory and practice indicate the possibility of multiple types and concepts of jamming radio signals, from narrowband jamming to sweep jamming with different jamming signals. Three jamming techniques can be used to protect forces in a counter-terrorist operation, based on how the signal is generated:

- active,
- reactive,
- combined.

In active jamming, jamming sequences of a certain output power are generated at fixed frequencies and are continuously emitted over time in certain frequency ranges. This causes a relatively high energy consumption and the operating time is limited

and highly dependent on the capacity of the energy source. This way of working is efficient but not always effective, because it is necessary to know in advance the frequency of the signal that activates the RCIED. **Figure 4** shows the method of protecting a column of motor vehicles with an active jammer.

With this type of jamming, it is necessary to synchronize the electromagnetic activities in order to protect the jamming of one's own communications. Synchronization of electromagnetic activities is very important during the implementation of tasks in the phase of destroying a terrorist group.

In reactive jamming, the jammer generates and emits jamming signals only on frequencies that are assumed to be misused to activate the RCIED. **Figure 5** shows a reactive type radio jammer.

In the reactive jamming technique, jammers search the frequency spectrum, analyze it and, based on a defined detection threshold, generate jamming signals and with them jam possible threat signals (signals that activate the RCIED). From the aspect of energy saving and jammer operation time, this is a good solution, but there are a couple of drawbacks that should be paid attention to. Disadvantages are related to the use of decoys (false frequencies), interference response speed, frequency spectrum width, etc. Terrorists, for example, can deliberately use signals that have a higher power (false frequencies - decoy) so that the radio jammer will respond to them, while at the same time transmitting signals with reduced power that represent the real radio signal that activates the RCIED. That radio signal will not be detectable by the jammer. To cover a larger range of RCIED signal jamming, a larger number of jammers are used because they are, most often, narrowband.



Figure 4.
Active type radio jammer [11].



Figure 5.
Reactive type radio jammer [11].

Drone jamming elements can be part of the forces that are intended to destroy the terrorist group and the forces that provide fire support to the forces that destroy the terrorist group. For jamming drones, it is possible to use the advanced automatic RF tracking and observation solution (AARTOS), which is intended for the detection, tracking, identification and jamming of drones.

Advanced automatic RF tracking and observation solution (AARTOS) is one of the typical systems that was purposely developed and intended for combating drones in the electromagnetic spectrum [12]. The system consists of three parts: the antenna system, the processor part and the jamming part. This system can be stationary or mobile. The system itself is designed modularly so that modules such as optoelectronic part, radar, etc. can be upgraded. **Figure 6** shows the AARTOS anti-drone system.

Three parts of the AARTOS system can be seen in the picture: command post (processor part, in the middle), antenna array for detection and tracking (left), and antenna array for jamming (right). It can identify the type of drones it has detected, such as the DJI Phantom 4 and the like, which can be seen in **Figure 7**.

The jammer can be an independent part of the system or an integral part of the system. **Figure 8** shows the mobile/portable and transportable AARTOS CMS (Counter-Measure Solutions) jammers.

The mobile jammer has two antennas (omnidirectional and directional). It covers five frequency sub-bands and a total output power of 120 W. The effective jamming range is up to 2.5 km.

A large number of electronic warfare systems with different purposes are available for the fight against terrorism that has military characteristics at the tactical and operational level (anti-terrorist actions and anti-terrorist operations). Some electronic warfare systems are part of the police force (mobile phone monitoring systems,

Figure 6.
Anti drone system AARTOS [13].

anti-drone systems) and some systems are part of the army. It is of great importance to know the functioning of electronic warfare systems in different combat situations for the effective use of electronic warfare units.



Figure 7.
Anti-drone system AARTOS - identification of the type of drone [13].



Figure 8.
AARTOS CMS jammers [13].

4. Conclusions

The development of modern weapons and techniques that can easily be used by terrorists for military purposes requires the improvement of tactics, techniques and procedures in the fight against terrorists. The fight against terrorists is multifaceted and includes the national security system and cooperation at the regional and global level.

Army units and police units can be used to fight terrorism that has military characteristics. Army units and anti-terrorist police units plan an anti-terrorist operation so that all units are used effectively, efficiently and effectively.

Electronic warfare in the fight against terrorism is viewed through the use of an electronic warfare unit in a counter-terrorist operation. The Electronic Warfare Unit provides operational support, combat support and protection to forces conducting a counter-terrorism operation [14, 15].

In a counter-terrorist operation, it is possible to form an electronic warfare unit that would contain three functionally different components:

- component for radio-goniometry,
- component for electronic reconnaissance,
- component for electronic jamming.

The development of communication technology, the development of improvised explosive devices, the development of drones and readily available weapons that can be used by terrorists, represent a major challenge for electronic warfare in the fight against terrorism.

The development of artificial intelligence that can be used in communications (social networks, etc.), that can be used to control drones can represent a multiplier of combat power for terrorists and an even greater challenge for electronic warfare.

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Chapter 7

Distinguishing Partisan and Extremist Brains?: Research Paths toward Neural Signatures of Violent Radicalism

Adolf Tobeña

Abstract

Neuroimaging of political ideologies (left-wing vs. right-wing; conservatism vs. liberalism), unveiled brain systems for mediating the cognitive and affective inclinations of partisanship. Brain networks related to deliberation and cognitive control, as well as those processing subjective values and social norms, were mainly involved. Correlational links from normative people were corroborated by brain lesions and focal transcranial stimulation techniques. Neuroimaging studies with extremists ready to endorse violent actions are scarce and do not provide fully concordant maps with those coming from people with strong partisanship allegiances. The present review discusses the advances made in the description of the neural systems that mediate both ordinary partisanship (the "partisan brain"), and radicalized extremism prone to violence (the "extremist brain"), signaling concomitances and differences. Further advances might come from unveiling distinctive interactions between prefrontal cortex areas with other cortical and subcortical regions that may help to outline dedicated maps and modes of operation. Moreover, measuring the hardness of beliefs and the strength of value adscriptions together with cognitive flexibility/rigidity, aggressiveness, ambition, high-risk seeking and other individual traits rooted in psychobiological substrates appear indispensable to distinguish between partisanship alignments and violent extremism proneness.

Keywords: violent extremism, political partisanship, terrorism, neuroscience of politics, temperamental traits

1. Introduction

Terrorist attacks were a source of enormous apprehension during the inaugural years of the present century, in many Western societies. The sheer brutality and the number of casualties provoked by extremist violent actions at the heart of major conurbations and big capital cities justified citizen's worries and the concerted actions of States to try to prevent these attacks. For years, counter-terrorism measures deployed by armed forces, police branches, and intelligence agencies against extremist groups and networks

(mostly heralding versions of islamic *yihad*), were at the forefront of political scenarios. The living routines of common citizens were notoriously affected particularly when moving through airports, train stations, customs borders, and tourist hotspots. But after the defeat and dismantling of ISIS strongholds in the Middle East and the dispersal of Al-Quaida granular remnants away from the region, the threat of terrorism subdued to a large degree. The detailed data collected by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd), confirm a robust decrease in the number of terror attacks in Europe, North and South America, Middle East, and North Africa, as well as on the global Worldwide figures, during the last decade.

Improved methods of surveillance of extremist groups and the adoption of harsh military counter-terrorism tactics and prompt police-based procedures to coagulate attempts of further violent operations greatly enhanced the efforts of terrorism prevention. Efforts were perhaps helped by two external and unexpected events: 1. the eclosion of a catastrophic and long global pandemic (Covid-19), in January 2020 and 2. the eruption of a major European war, between Russia and Ucrania, which has been evolving since February 2022. Both events dramatically shifted the focus and priorities of the defensive measures taken by the States and the general worries of the citizenry.

The scholarly studies on terrorism flourished during the period that extremist actions attained peaks of lethality and captured the world's attention, but after two decades of intensive research on all kinds of socioeconomic roots, political facilitators, and psychological attributes and processes plausibly linked to the appearance of the phenomenon, no solid advances have been registered and no consensual positions have been reached on the issue [1–3].

In this essay I will depart from several assumptions that can be stated in a very simple way: 1. terror attacks are one of the typical tactics used in guerrilla wars or insurgencies; 2. perpetrators are ordinary combatants participating in these conflicts; 3. this applies both to commandos formed by a troupe of fighters and to "lone wolves" who appear to operate on their own; 4. behind these actions there can be clandestine groups operating through loosely connected links or tightly organized and well-trained armies that dominate a specific territory; and 5. these lethal operations always carry the signature of a highly advertised political ideology or a discernible doctrine heralding the goals of such combative coalitions. By keeping on these assumptions, the murderous attacks coming from either rampage shooters or individuals pretending to retribute personal grievances or to acquire high notoriety, can all be excluded from the present analysis. The lethal attacks coming from squads participating in rounds of fights among urban bands or from militias of criminal gangs are equally excluded. I am fully aware that this represents a simplification of the complex and changing varieties of terror attacks but it permits demarcating the phenomenon within the limits of political/doctrinal clashes while agreeing with the encompassing and computational descriptions of terrorism, insurgencies, and warfare [4–7].

2. The role of "ideology/doctrine" banners

Ideology-motivated missions are the usual envelop heralding the justifications of violent extremist groups that use terror attacks as a tactic to promote and advance their political goals. Political ideology is a set of common beliefs and attitudes that organize views on most social issues. In democracies, in addition to motivate regular voting behavior and structure preferences on a wide range of topics, ideology is behind all sorts of political activism that may include or not the use of violence.

Ideology is usually measured as variations on a unidimensional scale, with liberalism on the left and conservatism on the right. Liberalism promotes equality and social change, while conservatism highlights hierarchy, convention, and tradition. This left-right distinction is the primary way of describing political opinions, though political views cannot be neatly summarized by a single liberal-conservative axis. Libertarians are an obvious example of this misalignment, harboring 'liberal' views on social issues but 'conservative' views on economic policies. Many studies have converged upon two main dimensions of political ideology. These dual dimensions have repeatedly emerged despite the different labels used to name them [8, 9]. The first dimension, often designated as "*economic conservatism*" or "*social dominance*", predicts positions on issues like taxation, welfare programs, and government public investment. Economic conservatives view the world as a 'competitive jungle', in which dominance, inequality, and power imbalances are prevalent. The second dimension, often designated as "*social conservatism*", predicts postures on issues like traditional values on sex, education, criminal justice, patriotism, or national security. Social conservatives view the world as threatening, dangerous, and unpredictable. These two-dimensional vectors seem to capture underlying and important psychological phenomena [9].

Variation in political ideology is heritable [10–14], remains stable over long periods of time [15], and covaries with several basic physiological traits [16–22]. The two dimensions of ideology are observed across a wide range of cultures [23, 24]. This repetitive pattern of ideological variation across cultures, together with the heritable and mostly stable individual differences suggest that the two dimensions are at least partly grounded in biology. These findings challenged the traditional assumption that ideological variation must be considered the result of historically contingent social, cultural, and environmental factors [9]. Some evolutionary approaches have also derived important insights. This includes work linking social conservatism to negativity bias, disgust sensitivity [22], and adherence to social norms, as well as work linking economic conservatism to upper-body strength [25].

The motivational potency of ideology can be enormous to the point of governing the full spectrum of behavioral outputs of "devoted actors": dogmatic, fanatized, and highly committed individuals ready to enter into dangerous missions involving maximal risk or even sacrifice their lives [1, 3, 26, 27]. But there are highly variable degrees of "political devotion". For some people, these strong commitments refer to a readiness to participate in protests, demonstrations, campaigns, and other forms of conventional political activism, whereas for others it means to be ready for harsh fighting against police forces, for harming institutional symbols or buildings or to indulge even on terrorist lethal actions.

3. Sectarian partisanship

With the aim of warning about the dangers for the US democracy of the increasing affective distance between the two main political allegiances, Republicans and Democrats, that had occurred during recent decades, a group of political scientists and social psychologists advanced a definition for the notion of "political sectarianism", in a joint paper [28]. In their words:

> *"Political sectarianism consists of three core ingredients: othering - the tendency to view opposing partisans as essentially different or alien to oneself; aversion - the tendency to dislike and distrust opposing partisans; and moralization - the tendency to view opposing partisans as iniquitous. It is the confluence of these ingredients that*

> *makes sectarianism so corrosive in the political sphere. Viewing opposing partisans as different, or even as dislikable or immoral, may not be problematic in isolation. But when all three converge, political losses can feel like existential threats that must be averted whatever the cost" [28].*

The affective distance separating Democrats and Republicans partisanship carried an ostensible and symmetric aversion and a rising hostility and hate against partisan opponents. Sectarianism was a proper diagnosis for the US political landscape since politics had been reduced to an identity-based struggle against hated and depraved opponents, while shared values and policies on specific issues mattered much less than dominating foes. Three main ingredients had nourished the rise of sectarianism in the US: a widely encompassing and unified identity alignment, along the political allegiance; the persuasive and radicalizing action of both congenial partisan media and social networks; and an increase in the ideological polarization of cultural, economic, and political elites.

They summarized systematic findings showing that sectarianism stimulated political activism and that the surge of US sectarianism was accompanied by a rise in support for violent tactics in political struggles [28]. These trends culminated in the violent assault of the US Capitol Building, in Washington DC, on 6th of January 2021, by an angered mob of D. Trump supporters. They tried to overturn the results of the previous November election by stopping the session of formal nomination of J. Biden as the next President-elect.

Sectarianism or tribalism, however, is hardly a unique US phenomenon since it has been described in all places where political confrontations between highly aligned and entrenched factions grow in intensity to the point of the threshold of inflaming a violent civil conflict [29, 30].

4. Neural systems mediating partisanship and ideological extremism

4.1 Pioneer findings with partisans

The search for plausible neural correlates of political attitudes and beliefs took off when neuroimage studies established that traits related to political preferences (conservatism, individualism, egalitarianism, radicalism), could be linked to particular processing areas within the brain [16, 17, 31–35]. This was shown for ordinary people and the brain areas more informative were those related to deliberation and cognitive control tasks, and also those weighing affective attachments and subjective values in prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and some subcortical limbic regions. In a study with Vietnam war veterans, Cristofori et al. [36] investigated if traumatic brain lesions could have affected these ideology-linked attitudinal traits. Afflicted veterans were divided into three groups according to lesion location (ventromedial prefrontal cortex-vmPFC; dorsolateral prefrontal cortex-dlPFC and parietal cortex). The results indicated that vmPFC lesions, but not dlPFC ones, decreased radicalism scores. The differences were substantial when compared with veterans with parietal lesions and healthy controls: patients with vmPFC lesions judged radical opinions or behaviors as more acceptable. These findings underscored the role of the vmPFC in appropriately valuing political options and strengthened the notion that vmPFC is a nodal area for assessing many types of values.

In a subsequent study with Vietnam war veterans Zhong et al. [37] confirmed the relevance of both vmPFC and dlPFC brain regions in mediating extreme religious

ideas. They found that the areas of prefrontal cortex which are in charge of deliberation and cognitive control (dlPFC, preferently) were predictive of variations in religious fundamentalism. The role of cognitive flexibility was crucial: lower executive skills were accompanied by higher religious dogmatism. Concordant findings were obtained by Nam et al. [32, 33] investigating the links between neuroanatomy and ideological attitudes by comparing brain-lesioned patients with healthy controls. People with frontal lesions held more conservative (less liberal) beliefs than those with anterior temporal lobe lesions or no lesions. Higher damage in dlPFC was associated with enhanced social conservatism. Executive function measures did not predict, however, the relationship between frontal lesions and ideology. Preliminary studies applying focal transcranial electrical stimulation to dlPFC zones obtained transient increases in conservatism attitudes by augmenting the functionality of the region [38]. Overall these findings indicated that PFC areas play a relevant role in mediating political positions and in accentuating conservatism tendencies, in particular.

It is conceivable that the neural correlates primarily related to ideology positions should involve brain regions devoted to deliberation and cognitive flexibility, as they refer to different options on issues that may have important consequences for social organization and ordinary living. However, an Israelian study showed that detectable neural traces of partisanship appear at very early and automatic stages of brain processing [39]. They did fMRI scans of right-wing and left-wing participants watching several political videos just before the hotly contested 2019 elections in Israel. Behavioral results showed consistent differences between left-wing and right-wing participants when appraising and judging video content. Neuroimaging results revealed partisanship-dependent differences in both high-order cortical processing regions and early motor and somatosensory areas, although no such differences appeared while viewing neutral, non-political, videos. The political content was more potent in synchronizing participants with right-wing views, and this synchronization was observed already in primary visual and auditory cortices. These findings suggested that political polarization is not restricted to the functioning of high-order deliberative or affective brain systems, but rather emerges already at the early steps of processing in motor and sensory regions.

Other research has used similar approaches to detect neural synchrony between partisans while contemplating naturalistic political stimulus [40, 41]. They measured the brain activity of committed US partisans (liberal vs. conservative) as they watched video footage of a hot political debate. Although all participants viewed the same videos, brain responses distinguished between liberals and conservatives, reflecting differences in the subjective interpretation of the films. An increased neural synchrony was observed among these partisans on each side of the ideological divide: sharing strong partisan beliefs yielded polarized neural encoding of the debate at the time of perception. This polarized perception was exacerbated by a personality trait: intolerance of uncertainty. Participants less tolerant of uncertainty in daily life had more ideologically polarized brain responses than those who were able to deal with uncertainties in their customary routines and activities. This was observed on both sides of the ideological scenario and the neural signatures of these polarized perceptions predicted subsequent partisanship attitudes outside the laboratory, in agreement with other studies [42].

Bringing between-group economic competitive games to neuroimage sessions with concomitant scans, Yang et al. [43] found that within-group neural synchronization between the right dlPFC and the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) underlay

intergroup hostility, in young healthy people. During out-group financial attacks, especially, in-group commitment augmented within-group synchronization in both rdlPFC and rTPJ, and within-group rdlPFC synchronization positively correlated with intergroup hostility. The findings also suggested that within-group synchronized reduction in PFC activity might explain how in-group loyalties lead to collective hostility toward outsiders.

4.2 Studies with extremists

Functional neuroimaging studies with Islamic extremists have revealed that they deactivate neural networks associated with deliberation during decisions that involve a high (vs. low) willingness to fight and die for important in-group values [44, 45]. In a research carried out with young male extremists of Magrib origin living in Barcelona region (Spain), sacred values related to cherished Islamic beliefs were associated with increased neural activity in brain regions involved in norm compliance, particularly the left inferior frontal cortex [44]. In a further study with Muslim Pakistani young male radicals living in the same region and who had asserted support for Kashmir fighting groups linked to Al-Qaida, differential brain activities were found when expressing willingness to sacrifice for sacred values in contrast to non-sacred values [46]. Decisions about sacred values involved less activation of pre-frontal brain regions (dlPFC) associated with cognitive executive control. Their asserted willingness to fight and die for these values relied on brain activity within vmPFC areas that appraise subjective values and social rewards. High compared to a low willingness to fight and die was accompanied by a decreased recruitment of brain regions (dlPFC) linked to pondering costs during decision-making. Moreover, the data disclosed negative functional connectivity between these vmPFC and dlPFC regions when processing high versus low willingness to fight and die for an important cause [45]. Thus, rule-bound and quick thinking seems to prevail over deliberation during high-stake decisions involving sacred in-group values in these extremists.

The importance of vmPFC activation in these circumstances agrees well with changes in patterns of activation at this region detected, in ordinary people, while they approved images of politically violent protests in the US [47], and also with measures of imagined aggression [48]. Adjacent prefrontal cortex regions process how situational factors may shape attitudes toward deliberate killing. In laboratory simulations of warfare, ordinary individuals who went through fMRI scans while imagining carrying out unjustified acts of killing (shooting civilians), compared to justified killing (shooting enemy soldiers), showed increased activation in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) [49]. The same happened when unjustified shootings were imagined against characters of a Muslim outgroup [50]. In concert, higher activity was detected at OFC together with an enhanced coupling with the amygdala and insula, when individuals viewed harmful behaviors perpetrated by out-group members against in-group fellows [51].

An experiment with far-right voters in Spain and the United States [52] found that these partisans were more likely to share misinformation messages on their social networks than center-right voters, especially when the misinformation was related to sacred values (e.g., postures on immigration). A neuroimaging study with a subsample (N = 36) of these far-right Spanish voters, showed that they presented an increased activity in brain regions implicated in mentalizing tasks and norm compliance while inspecting posts carrying important values. The neural response associated with the intention to disseminate misinformation about protected values was

stronger in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the bilateral inferior frontal cortex, and precuneus. This pattern of activation overlapped with the neurofunctional signature of the "theory of mind". Posts with sacred content also elicited higher functional connectivity between some salience, frontoparietal, and default mode network nodes. These findings cohere with the global pattern of brain activations obtained with ordinary young US individuals (N = 78), from American, Chinese, and Iranian cultures, when they judged the content of real-life stories carrying protected (vs. nonprotected) values [53]. Moreover, In the Spanish study, those messages relevant to sacred (vs. nonsacred) values elicited neural activation in the orbital part of the inferior frontal gyrus rather than the medial zone of this region, in a similar way as obtained with Islamic extremists [52]. The left lateral zones of the orbitofrontal cortex have been described as an important neural spot for social norm compliance, which helps people respond appropriately to the threat of social punishment [54]. These results suggest that two ingredients of political devotion—sacred values and identity fusion with the group—may play a key role in misinformation sharing.

All these findings point toward the role that specified brain systems dedicated mostly to estimation of subjective values and cognitive flexibility/rigidity may play in mediating ideologically driven extremism. These studies opened valuable approaches but their findings should be considered as strictly preliminary for several reasons: procedures to estimate extremism (sacredness, identity fusion, social identity) are rather crude; they typically refer to expression of opinions or intentions, arguably a bit far from proneness to act violently; measures obtained came from restricted samples of some extremist brands; and they used behavioral and neurofunctional methodologies that do not necessarily cohere with other methods to detect plausible signatures for strong partisanship [39, 41, 43].

5. Toward neural signatures for proneness to violent extremism?

People with consistent partisan alignments and preferences are very common. Political extremists with unshakeable partisanship allegiances and heavy activism investments are much less common. And extremists ready to use any kind of violent methods or to indulge even in terror attacks to attain the goals of their combative groups are rather uncommon.

The gradations of intensity in political activism, including the strength of dedication and commitment to the objectives of the side for which they fight [1, 3, 26], must be behind many of these distinctive profiles. But to delimit the underlying psychological vectors of these differences so that they might help to disentangle neural signatures of "partisan brains" compared to "extremist brains", other operational mechanisms need to be unveiled that can explain such distinctions. Here I suggest some investigative approaches.

5.1 Include temperamental traits

Decety et al. [2] emphasized the need for further and more nuanced research to discern whether the activities and functional connectivities among regions of the prefrontal cortex and subcortical-limbic crucial zones will be able to capture individual differences in proneness to violent extremism. The sketch maps already outlined by the pioneering studies devoted to specify neural circuits mediating extremism, along with their associated molecular (neuromodulatory) cascades,

will help to ensure further advances if future explorations would include measures of temperament traits as well as of the different roles played by individuals in extremist groups [4, 5, 55, 56].

Predictably, antisociality/aggressiveness was pointed out as a crucial trait among precursors of violent extremism [2]. It is easy to agree that it seems mandatory to investigate how long-lived propensities to engage in violent and antisocial behavior interact with other trait characteristics measured both at behavioral and biological levels (from gene-based markers and neurohormonal mediators up to brain areas, circuits, and functional systems). Aggressiveness, and particularly, proneness to engage in pro-active, appetitive, or reward-motivated violence [57–59] will surely emerge as an individual component of combative extremism. Enquiries oriented on this line have a rich and solid body of neurobiological findings to depart from [60–62].

Moreover, a wide repertoire of neurobiological correlates has been established already for a range of temperament traits potentially linked to different clusters of individuals with proclivity to engage in violent extremism activities. Research on the biological underpinnings of dominance, risk-seeking, dogmatism, parochialism, dishonesty, machiavellianism, and other relevant traits has accrued a good amount of associations with extremism proneness, at different levels of neural analysis. Links that go from gene markers and neurohormones to brain subsystems [4, 5, 30, 47, 56, 63–66]. These interdependencies have already been used to improve the deployment of provisional but increasingly detailed depictions.

5.2 Beliefs strength

Firmly held beliefs are usually diagnostic of ideological extremism. People endorsing such kinds of beliefs fiercely resist admitting contradictory evidence. In an investigation about the neural systems involved in maintaining belief in the face of counterevidence, 40 young US liberals were presented with arguments that contradicted their strongly held political and non-political views [67]. Challenges to political beliefs produced increased activity in the default mode network (DMN): a set of interconnected brain regions associated with self-representation and disengagement from the external world. High belief resistance was accompanied by increased response in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and decreased activity in the orbitofrontal cortex. In addition, participants who changed their minds more showed less activity in the insula and the amygdala when evaluating counterevidence. Increased activation of the DMN during challenges to political beliefs is consistent with the notion that the DMN is recruited to ponder deeply held beliefs. A related fMRI study found that this network was noticeably activated when people read stories that appealed to values that were perceived as strongly held and non-negotiable ("protected values"), compared to reading similar stories devoid of such protected values [53].

One potential path to combine and reconcile these neural correlates of strong beliefs with those mediating partisanship and political extremism, as described before, should explore the processes associated with cognitive rigidity/flexibility. In this regard, focal stimulation procedures applied to specific brain sites showed that they can disrupt, to some degree, firmly held attitudes: "parochialism" [68], "dishonesty-deception" [69, 70], or "fairness-norm compliance" [71]. The transient neural interference induced by these techniques affects regions of the prefrontal cortex dedicated to evaluate options/decisions or DMN areas concerned with self-representation.

6. Conclusion

The decrease in the frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks in many regions of the world, in recent years, as recorded by a thorough global dataset (Global Terrorism Database (GTD: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd), has not been accompanied by a parallel decrease in the intensity of other forms of intergroup confrontation that sometimes resort to procedures similar to terrorist violence [72]. The wars between cartels in Mexico, for example, have seen tremendous increases in violent episodes, with an overwhelming escalation in the number of incidents and casualties that government police and military interventions failed to stop [73]. This difference in the chronological evolution and in the response to corrective interventions in conflicts grounded on political/doctrinal disputes, on the one hand, compared to those who have motivations aimed at dominating in forceful ways some commercial and financial niches, indicates that these are different phenomena.

On the other hand, surveys carried out on ex-combatants of the Colombian leftist guerrillas who signed up for reintegration programs promoted by the Government, compared with responses obtained from captured combatants, as well as with individuals who demobilized on their own and with others who changed sides and joined the paramilitary groups, it was found that those who joined guerrillas for ideological reasons were the least likely to desert or change sides [74]. These findings strengthen the notion that at the core of motivations inspiring people who join terrorist organizations with political/doctrinal purposes, individual peculiarities related to belief strength and loyalty investments must be crucial. That is a scarcely explored research area [75, 76] where potentially distinctive attributes of "partisan brains" *versus* "extremist brains" remain to be unveiled and could be singularly informative.

The descriptions summarized here of the neural systems mediating partisanship and ideological extremism have made it possible to delimit some of the regions and interrelationships, within the cerebral cortex, that seem relevant to sustain entrenched political beliefs and preferences. They disclosed relevant interactions with subcortical and limbic structures that mainly intervene in the affective valence of these attitudes. However, the plausible neural similarities and differences between ordinary partisanship alignments and sectarian and radicalized extremism have not been firmly established, and even less so are the psychobiological ingredients that may lead to crossing the threshold to enter and participate in violent terrorizing actions.

I have proposed paths to progress in this area that can lead to improved predictive adjustment and versatility regarding the psychological ingredients that may promote violent extremism. I have suggested that systematic profiling of individual differences rooted in certain temperamental traits can sophisticate an area of research that is crucial to understand the enactment of agonistic tactics such as terror attacks and the idiosyncratic characteristics of perpetrators involved. Refined and robust characterization of such individual attributes may allow these profiles to be incorporated into the tasks of preventing and counteracting the threatening resurgences of terrorist attacks. Always keeping in mind that political violent extremism usually arises in situations of intergroup conflict [6, 30, 77–79] and that the interactions and reciprocal influences between leaders and followers that form such kinds of competitive coalitions and combative groups [30, 80, 81], present complex dynamics that require nuanced dissections [82, 83].

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Section 2

The Global Counter Terrorism Strategy

Chapter 8

America and the Global War on Terrorism: Explaining the Past and Determining the Future

Amiara Solomon Amiara

Abstract

This chapter interrogates America's campaign in the fight against global terrorism. It examines why despite America's efforts to combat terrorism, some recalcitrant regimes and fundamental religious extremists have founded this campaign to the extent that it resulted to September 11 attacks on American states. It uses historical methodology to examine the impact of these attacks on America's past with a possibility of determining whether or not America would continue with the campaign. It further looks at the American peoples' mood, their reactions and expectations from the National government and in extension, the international community. It provides answers to the kinds of actions taken to stymie further terrorism as manifested in Bush's unilateral decision to take the war on global terrorism to Osama bin Laden and countries that supported him and his al Qaeda terrorist group.

Keywords: America, global war, terrorism, explaining the past, determining the future

1. Introduction

The complex and conflicting forces of state actors are what define the international strategic landscape of the twenty-first century. As each nation-state pursues a national interest that ensures the security of lives and property of its residents in the international community, these factors nearly made it difficult for inter-state contacts to be conducted. As a result, conflicts between states, which are brought on by ethnic, religious, and nationalistic differences and have become commonplace, as well as the nature and complexity of the international system concerning International terrorism, drug cartels, and threats from information-age technologies, according to Sarkesian et al. [1], are to blame for the unrest and make efforts to achieve world peace nearly impossible. In the years following September 11, 2001, the US prioritized the promotion of international security, peace, and order. According to Sarkisian et al. [1], there had previously been a general sense of optimism toward peace, but that optimism had been destroyed on September 11, 2001, by the terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent long fight against terrorism.

With the idea of a new concept of war being blended with globalization, economic expansion, homeland security, and a desire to uphold US principles peacefully, the United States' nuclear strategic doctrine has been directed to combat terrorism in

this framework. Therefore, rather than the immediate prospect of a large military conflict, the unexpected, unclear, and confused nature of the international arena has caused the US national security policies and priorities to become complex, frequently ambiguous, and even inconsistent after September 11.

To further the pursuit of and strengthen global peace, the US national security strategy after 9/11 has been focused on forging and maintaining an alliance of cooperation among the major countries of the globe. Given that all of the major powers are under threat from terrorism with weapons of mass destruction as well as from threats to the environment and public health, the concert is now feasible. Evera [2] believes that since maintaining this global peace is in everyone's best interest, all major states should work together to combat these challenges. Since everyone is at risk, no one will be tempted to argue that those issues just affect you, and not us, thus we will not offer assistance.

As a result, US national security policy since the years that proceeded September 11 has been directed toward combating global terrorism and pursuing global leadership by retaining the superiority of US armed forces. The US National Security Strategy of 2002 highlighted that the battle of the 20th century had left the world with just one viable paradigm for achieving national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise. The militarization of US foreign policy falls under this category, and resources are being gathered to fight any force that poses a danger to the country's interests. Meanwhile, Lodgaard [3], in his post 9/11 US stance emphasizes that the US strength as a nation-state is continued to be challenged by those who employ the strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism. By this, the US is committed to design new strategic policy model for combating all threats to global security. This shall form a hegemonic rule based on two standards- one for the hegemon and one for the subjects as the rule of law is based on two standards for all parties. Since the 9/11 terrorist attack, the United States withdrew from some international agreements and opted out of others, maximizing its flexibility of action. This was to really prepare the US in its resolve to fight terrorism all over the globe.

The US global war on terrorism was intensified after the 9/11 Osama bin Laden's attacks by al-Qaida terrorist group. The consequence of the attacks led to the adoption of new foreign policy posture called the 'Bush Doctrine' which implies that the US's post-9/11 foreign policy objectives place a strong emphasis on the country's promotion of freedom and liberty as instruments for ending global terrorism [4]. And to achieve this means every nation-state must join. By this, America made no distinction between the terrorists and countries that aid them. As a strategic plan to ending terrorism America founded the Department of National Homeland Security and built 'coalition of the willing' in its fight against the culprits of 9/11.

With the creation of Department of National Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, the governor of Pennsylvania, was chosen as the first director of the White House's Office of Homeland Security 11 days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The office was given the responsibility of managing and coordinating a comprehensive national strategy to protect the nation from terrorism and respond to any upcoming assaults. In collaboration with the counterintelligence and security centre, the office's role is to effectively guide and support the counterintelligence and security efforts of the American Intelligence Community. In other words, entities in the public and private sectors of the United States could be targeted by foreign enemies for intelligence gathering or an attack. For this reason, President Bush Jr. started the U.S. national security plan to defend the country from additional assaults. He also stated that the country must now decide between the route of confidence and the path of

fear. Contending that those who believe our challenges to be too enormous and fail to appreciate our chances are drawn to the path of fear (isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment). Hence, he opines that the issues have only become worse and the missed chances have made future generations less secure every time American leaders have chosen this course, history teaches [5].

In the light of this, the administration decided to follow the route of confidence, favoring leadership over isolationism and free and open markets over protectionism. Choosing to address problems when they arise rather than abandoning them for future generations is another option. As a result, Bush further insists that we should fight our adversaries abroad rather than wait for them to invade our nation. This means that America must be proactive rather than reactive to concerns that threaten American sovereignty. He said that instead of passively accepting the way things are, we should try to change the world for the better [5].

Against this background, many observers argue that America's response to the 9/11 terrorist assault was in keeping with the great heritage of American foreign policy in opposition to this premise. Since the American approach was idealistic about its national interest, yet practical about the means to attain them, we can also say that it was similar to the policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan. Thus, to continue down this road, America increased its military power to counter dangers and challenges before they could harm the American people and their shared interests. Therefore, it is in the best interests of Americans to preserve an unmatched military-a strength that is not based solely on the use of physical force but also on a thriving economy and democracy.

Consequently, the American national security strategy following 9/11 is supported by two pillars: The first pillar works to increase wealth through free and fair trade and sensible development policies while promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity. The second pillar of the strategy focuses on addressing contemporary challenges by guiding a growing community of democracies in the development of successful multinational initiatives to address pandemic diseases, the proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, human trafficking, and natural disasters that threaten humanity. To that end, the national security strategy of the administration openly pledge to "fight terrorists and tyrants" and "encourage free and open societies in every continent," and it successfully forge a global coalition to carry out the war on terrorism so as to guarantee open democracies.

2. US policy on terrorism

US pursuit of global peace and security has assumed the main focus of its foreign policy objective. However, foreign policy objectives occasioned by the polarity of national interest, the US hegemonic power and the effects of World War I and II, have consequently made the conduct of international relations almost difficult and has largely pitted one state against the other to the extent that global security threat in international system is encouraged. In other words, the US efforts to entrench peace through liberal democracy have been foundered by the emergence of violent extremism and terrorism hence, US policy on global terrorism has moved away from deterrence to aggressive nuclear attacks that manifested in the post 9/11 Bush's Doctrine [4].

The September 11 US attacks revealed that global terrorism has assumed a new dimension. Its attendant consequences lie on the US effort to stymie further attacks

and combat global terrorism. Since that devastating attack, the US has pursued a comprehensive foreign policy that addresses the complex challenge posed by global terrorism. In other words, the challenges led to the key components of US policy on war against terrorism. These include:

2.1 Military response and preventive strike

The US policy on global terrorism relates to its military measures toward preventing and responding to terrorist threats before they are executed. The post 9/11 US nuclear policy suggests a paradigm shift from the Cold War nuclear deterrence to preventive strike that emphasizes proactive action (s) against a perceived threat or enemy. The manifestation of the policy abound on the US led invasions in Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001 and the deployment of military forces dislodged and dismantled al Qaeda terrorist networks by disrupting their operations and eliminating their leaders. Accordingly, Bush [6] maintains that our military power will be directed to remove safe havens from terrorists and undermine their capacity to carry out attacks.

Indeed, the United States in achieving this, engaged in the training and equipping partner nations to build counterterrorism capabilities. For example, counterterrorism forum and bilateral military partnerships, sharing expertise in intelligence, surveillance, and special operations to enhance the capacity of allied nations were all measures adopted by the US to combat terrorism (**Figure 1**).

2.2 Socio-economic initiatives

Socio-economic programmes are another measures taking by the United States to combat global terrorism in international system. To address the root causes of terrorism, US policy on global terrorism has drifted from nuclear deterrence to preventive doctrine which requires that America must take actions that would prevent its attacks before they are executed. The policy however perceived as the US 21st century



Figure 1.
US counterterrorism measures and the deadliest terrorist groups.

policy on global terrorism becomes a vital foreign policy objective. By this, the US policy incorporates the socio-economic initiative to counter religious radicalism and extremism. As part of the measures to combat global terrorism, United States of America seeks to institutionalize the principle of democracy which will promote good governance, enhance economic development, and permit inclusive societies with the believe that it will create conditions that would reduce the appeal of terrorist ideologies by providing alternatives for vulnerable populations. By this, efforts such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Countering Violent Extremism Initiatives and USAID's development programme in vulnerable regions were all adopted to provide education, economic opportunities, and social services to at-risk communities. Thus, the initiatives target to address the underlying problems that terrorists often exploit and foster resilience against radicalization. Byman and Moller [7] assert that to combat terrorism, the George W. Bush and Obama administrations made significant efforts to crack down on finance for terrorism and support for the jihadist movement in general in Saudi Arabia and other affluent Gulf States.

Apart from the opportunities provided by the US to address economic hardship of the displaced persons, the diagram below shows that over 80 million people globally have been displaced forcefully. This makes these displaced persons susceptible to terrorism. What this implies is that, those displaced persons have the chances of exploiting the opportunity provided by terrorism and violent extremism to perpetuate global insecurity as this could negatively affect global economic cooperation, trade and investment (**Figures 2** and **3**).

2.3 Multilateral cooperation

Despite the US active engagement in multilateral forums and partnerships, US military partnership with NATO members has actually contributed to enhancing global counterterrorism efforts. The US supports and participates in international



Figure 2.
Retrogression in global economic violence.



Figure 3.
Terrorism and global security dimensions.

organizations such as NATO and the G7, to provide platforms for coordination, cooperation and the development of common strategies to combat terrorism. For example, in recent times, the United Nations missions have been the frequent target of terrorist attacks in such countries as Mali, however non-UN operations have fought against violent extremist groups in Afghanistan and Somalia. Given the prospect of UN peacekeeping operations in countries like Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Yemen which serve as the hotbeds for terrorism and violent extremism, multilateral cooperation has helped to halt global terrorism. Smit [8] maintains that the spread of terrorism and violent extremism in parts of Africa and the scope of peace operations such as the Global Collation against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and the Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (JF-G5S) are some of the common strategies for combating terrorism.

The effectiveness of multilateral cooperation manifested in the 'international coalition' adopted by US and its allies during the post 9/11 terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. The collaboration in doubt orchestrated the aggressive search for Osama bin Laden and hastened the removal of Saddam Hussein by America coalition forces.

2.4 Intelligence and information gathering

Information and intelligence were other measures that played a pivotal role in the US fight for global war on terror. In fact, the US policy emphasized the collection, analysis and sharing of intelligence among domestic and international partners. The intelligence community comprised of agencies such as the CIA, FBI and NSA that collaborated with the foreign counterparts to identify and disrupt terrorist networks during and after the September 11 attacks. The agencies were responsible in tracking their financiers to prevent potential attacks. Indeed, the USA Patriot Act though, enacted to response to the 9/11 attacks, emphasizes much in information sharing. To that extent, the Act granted the US law enforcement agencies an expanded power to gather intelligence, monitor communications and share information on terrorism. In this context, the US prioritizes information gathering and maintains that intelligence sharing should include covert operations all sectors of the world and to keep with the information management in other countries so as to conduct a full-scale assault on the terrorist network's financial infrastructure [9].

2.5 Diplomatic engagement

The US policy on global terrorism recognizes the importance of diplomatic engagement in addressing the underlying causes of terrorism and fostering international cooperation. Terrorism constitutes a global security threat and the US noting its dire consequences, actively engaged with other nations worldwide to promote counterterrorism cooperation by enhancing intelligence-sharing and strengthening the legal frameworks that would combat terrorist financing and recruitment.

Though during the September 11, the US strategically employed diplomatic pressure that isolated and sanctioned states that sponsor terrorism. In doing that, the US made no distinction between terrorists and countries that aid and provides havens for terrorism. According to Bush [6], our common enemies are not only the terrorists themselves; they include those countries that provide safe havens for them… Our enemies should choose the best path to follow-the path for unity or disunity. By leveraging its diplomatic influence, the US seeks to compel nations to cease supports for terrorist organization and to dismantle their infrastructure. For instance, the imposition of economic sanctions in Iran and North Korea reflected the US commitment to preventing state-sponsored terrorism.

3. The US nuclear deterrence policy

US nuclear deterrence policy refers to the strategic approach adopted by the United States to prevent potential adversaries from launching nuclear attacks against the American States. Its main components include the US nuclear triad, second-strike capability, flexible Responses and non-proliferation and arms control. Lodgaard [3] stresses that the new US deterrence replaces the pre-emptive doctrine of nuclear strategic policy. The goal of deterrence throughout the nuclear era was to prevent the use of nuclear delivery systems, including artillery systems, land-based aircraft, and air, sea, and land-based missiles with a variety of ranges. Therefore, the US nuclear triad consists of three delivery systems-including land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. This triad allows the US to retaliate with devastating force from multiple platforms by reducing the likelihood of a successful attack on nuclear forces.

Secondly, the second-strike capability allows the US to respond to a nuclear attack even after suffering a nuclear strike. This capability is crucial for deterrence, as it reassures potential adversaries that an attack on US forces would result in severe consequences. The third approach borders on the flexible responses that emphasize the need to tailor US response to a potential nuclear aggression, ranging from a proportional retaliation to a massive and overwhelming response. Importantly, the flexible response provides the US with options to calibrate its response based on the severity of the threats.

Finally, non-proliferation and arms control seek to actively prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by limiting the number of nuclear-armed states and reducing existing arsenals to further reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in the world.

4. Explaining the past and determining the future of US global war on terrorism

The uncertainty that characterizes the exact future of the United States' approach to global terrorism is difficult to predicate. This is because it is likely that the US will

continue to actively fight terrorism through myriad of approaches because of its experiences on terrorism. The approach ranges from the military operations, intelligence gathering, international cooperation and targeted counterterrorism efforts.

1	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	GHAZNI	DEATHS	466
	DATE	8/10/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
2	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	FARAH	DEATHS	330
	DATE	5/15/2018	GROUP	TALIBAN		
3	COUNTRY	PAKISTAN	CITY	DARENGARH	DEATHS	150
	DATE	7/13/2018	GROUP	KHORASAN CHAPTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE		
4	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	104
	DATE	1/27/2018	GROUP	TALIBAN		
5	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	DILA DISTRICT	DEATHS	77
	DATE	10/12/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
6	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	70
	DATE	4/22/2018	GROUP	KHORASAN CHAPTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE		
7	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	MUHMAND DARA DISTRICT	DEATHS	69
	DATE	9/11/18	GROUP	UNKNOWN		
8	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	DAY MIRDAD DISTRICT	DEATHS	62
	DATE	9/9/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
9	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	MAYWAND DISTRICT	DEATHS	61
	DATE	9/11/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
10	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	FARAH	DEATHS	61
	DATE	5/12/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
11	COUNTRY	NIGERIA	CITY	GWASKA	DEATHS	58
	DATE	5/5/18	GROUP	ATTRIBUTED TO 'FULANI EXTREMISTS'		
12	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	56
	DATE	11/20/2018	GROUP	KHORASAN CHAPTER OF THE ISLAMIC STATE		
13	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	SARI PUL	DEATHS	56
	DATE	9/10/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
14	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	CHORA DISTRICT	DEATHS	51
	DATE	8/3/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
15	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	PUR CHAMAN DISTRICT	DEATHS	51
	DATE	6/12/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
16	COUNTRY	SYRIA	CITY	ALBU KAMAL	DEATHS	51
	DATE	6/8/18	GROUP	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL)		
17	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	AZRA DISTRICT	DEATHS	50
	DATE	8/6/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
18	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	KABUL	DEATHS	47
	DATE	12/24/2018	GROUP	TALIBAN		
19	COUNTRY	AFGHANISTAN	CITY	OSHAN	DEATHS	46
	DATE	5/11/18	GROUP	TALIBAN		
20	COUNTRY	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	CITY	TAGBARA	DEATHS	44
	DATE	4/3/18	GROUP	ANTI-BALAKA MILITIA		

Figure 4.
Terrorist incidences, countries and casualties per cities.

By this, the United States has recently had several experiences with terrorism throughout its history. Notably among them was the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. During that time, a truck bomb which was detonated in the underground parking garage of the North Tower of World Trade Center in New York City had killed six people and injured over thousands people. The attack was perceived to be the first major terror attack against the US. In 2001, there were another deadly terrorist attacks that were carried out by a group of al Qaeda terrorists. The attacks were well coordinated and targeted at World Trade Center and Pentagon with nearly 3000 people killed. Carroll [10] opines that a total of 341 New York City Fire Department fire fighters, paramedics and civilian support staff that died from the post-9/11 illnesses were immortalized during the FDNY anniversary. Again, there was another historic terrorist experienced by Americans in Oklahoma City bombing of 1995. The attack was carried by a domestic terrorist named Timothy McVeigh who detonated a truck bomb outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. It killed almost 168 people with hundreds injured. Lewis [11] maintains that the Oklahoma City bombing allegedly heightened the public's awareness of and insecurity about domestic terrorism. Though, the underlying presumption suggested that if America could be stroke by terrorism, then there is no place and no one could be safe. In other words, the attack was considered as the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in US history.

More so, in 2013, two brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev detonated two pressure cooker bombs that killed 3 persons and injured almost 260 people with the finish line of the Boston Marathon. Their motive was believed to have been influenced by radical Islamic beliefs and giving the above experiences, the US has engaged in global war on terror since the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and has pursued an aggressive counterterrorism policy ever since. Over the years, US nuclear defense focus and strategies have evolved, with a shift toward more on precise and targeted operations, with an increased reliance on international partnerships and intelligence sharing.

Undoubtedly, the US future approach to global terrorism is influenced and determined by changes in geopolitical dynamics, advancements in technology and evolving nuclear threats to force US government's priorities and policies to change with a new administration. The spate of terrorism worldwide is alarming with every nation-state seeking to protect its sovereignty and national interest. So for US to combat terrorism, there must be effective communication strategies to deal with the ideologies and tactics of terrorists. Special attention should be giving to autocratic countries with radical regimes in the Middle East. This is because, countries like Afghanistan, Syria and Pakistan have dominated and ranked higher in global terrorist index. Below is most frequent terrorist organizations, countries occurred and the death tolls (**Figure 4**).

5. Conclusion

The fight against global terrorism has been the defining issue for the United States in recent decades. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US embarked on a mission to eradicate terrorism, its networks and prevent future acts of violence. Since then, the US has taken a multifaceted approach to combat terrorism. These approaches involve military interventions, diplomatic engagement, socio-economic initiatives, intelligence cooperation and international collaboration including non-proliferation and arms control.

In fact, the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 marked the beginning of military engagement in the US effort's effort on global terrorism especially in Asian regions, with a define objective to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove Taliban from power. In the preceding year, the expansion of these efforts was experienced in Iraq and Syria. By this, the US sought to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations including the ISIS. Importantly, the US achieved more significant successes fighting against global terrorism. The successes included weakening the al Qaeda terrorist group with its leadership decimated, killing of Osama bin Laden (the master minder of 9/11 terrorism) in the US with overt degrading of ISIS that was once controlling the vast territories in Middle East.

Again, apart from the said successes, there were other challenges that faced US on its global fighting against terrorism. The anti-America writers emphasize that the US military intervention resulted in unintended consequences including civilian casualties, destabilization of the region and the emergence of new extremist groups. Secondly, the US government has quickly faced scrutiny over the use of such controversial methods such as drone strikes, and the detention and interrogation of suspects. Against this backdrop, the US accepting to combat global terrorism should to:

1. prioritize diplomat efforts in order to address the root causes of terrorism. This would include working with international partners to tackle issues such as poverty, political instability and religious extremism that can contribute to the growth of terrorist ideologies. Strengthening international cooperation and intelligence sharing are another key components of US path to combating terrorism.

2. there should be efforts made by the US to counter the narratives and appeal of terrorist groups using effective communication strategies that would expose the true nature of terrorism and promote alternative narratives for peace, tolerance and inclusivity.

3. the US should re-evaluate its military engagements with a view to focusing on sustainable solutions. This will contribute to addressing global security threats, rather than relying on military force, a comprehensive approach that cut across economic development, institution building and support for local governments so as to ensure long-term stability in conflict-affected regions is attained.

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Chapter 9

From Somalia with Love: Unveiling Al-Shabaab's Recruitment Strategies, Power Projection, and the Somali Government's Countermeasures

Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah

Abstract

This chapter delves into the complexities of terrorism, focusing on the recruitment strategies and power projection of Al-Shabaab. It explores the multifaceted dynamics behind Al-Shabaab's recruitment, examining how the group exploits socio-economic grievances, religious beliefs, and clan dynamics to attract recruits. The implications of recruitment for Al-Shabaab's power projection are analyzed, highlighting its territorial control and ability to impose extremist ideologies. Additionally, the effectiveness of the Somali government's counterterrorism efforts is considered in light of the difficulties presented by scarce resources, unstable political conditions, and the influence of clan dynamics. The chapter underscores the need for comprehensive approaches encompassing military interventions, socio-economic development, good governance, and community resilience to counter Al-Shabaab's influence effectively. By providing nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to understanding the intricate dynamics of Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies. It informs policymakers and researchers in their efforts to combat terrorism and foster stability in the Horn of Africa.

Keywords: terrorism, Al-Shabaab, Somalia, recruitment strategies, countermeasures

1. Introduction

Although terrorism has emerged as one of the most pressing problems of our day, academics and policymakers are just starting to grasp how and why it operates. Much has been written and rewritten on the origins of terror, the motivations of terrorists, and counterterror responses. Jessica Stern has examined the grievances that give rise to terrorism and the networks, money, and operations that allow terrorist organizations to thrive [1]. Likewise, Alan Krueger, David Laitin, Jitka Maleckova, and Alberto Abadie, for example, have traced the effects of poverty, education, and political freedom on terrorist recruitment [2–4]. In Africa, literature on terrorism is rift with the

financing of terrorism on the continent, the impact of terrorism on national development, the link between terrorism and globalization [5–7], as well as the direct impact on state-building [8]. While there is still a great deal of uncertainty in academia as to how terrorists interact and gain popular or mass support, how their relationships are negotiated, as well as which motives are ultimately going to lead to them gaining acceptance or rejection with some sections or a large section of a population or its global supporters [9], what is lacking, however, is a clear understanding of the more significant strategic games terrorists, especially in the global south, adopt to interact with local scenes to recruit, how they employ the strategies to project power and respective governmental responses and its inherent challenges to counter the recruitment strategies of terror groups.

Moreover, even though much has been documented on how terrorists exploit and utilize the ideology of jihadism, or at least their militant zeal, to assert their own goals and objectives, no scholarship can claim to know the entirety of this ideology from a scholarly perspective. In the past four decades, Africa has arguably witnessed the most violent extremist attacks in the world. Terrorism in countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger, and Kenya, among others, linked to militant Islamist groups like Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Boko Haram, and Islamic State (IS) in West Africa Province, etc., has increased exponentially. The continent is reeling from a wave of violence that has claimed several lives in the last 10 years, displaced millions of people, targeted government officials and traditional leaders, closed thousands of schools, and severely restricted economic activities.

In the volatile and complex landscape of Somalia, which is the focus of this chapter, Al-Shabaab has emerged as a prominent militant group, posing significant security threats within Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa (HOA). The group has demonstrated remarkable proficiency in recruiting individuals from diverse backgrounds, exploiting grievances, religious beliefs, and socio-economic vulnerabilities. This chapter delves into the intricate dynamics of Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies and their implications for the group's power projection. It also examines the efforts undertaken by the Somali government to counter these recruitment strategies, shedding light on the challenges it faces in dismantling Al-Shabaab's influence. Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies have been critical to the group's success and longevity. Understanding how and why individuals are drawn into its ranks is essential in comprehending the extent of its power and reach. This chapter seeks to unravel the various tactics employed by Al-Shabaab to recruit new members, including exploiting socio-economic grievances, ideological indoctrination, and the manipulation of clan dynamics, among others. The influx of recruits bolsters the group's fighting force and enables it to expand its influence through increased territorial control and the execution of complex attacks. By analyzing these strategies, we gain insights into how recruitment feeds into Al-Shabaab's power projection and offers critical insights into the group's overall strategies, dynamics and mechanisms that sustain and expand the group's operational capabilities.

The projection of power by Al-Shabaab extends far beyond its military actions. The chapter also examines how recruitment plays a pivotal role in bolstering the group's influence, enabling it to establish control over territories, undermine governance structures, and impose its extremist ideology on local populations. The chapter examines Somalia as a case study and illuminates the linkages between recruitment strategies and Al-Shabaab's ability to project power within Somalia and the HOA. While Al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts have proved formidable, the Somali government has not remained passive in the face of this threat. Initiatives to counter

Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies have been implemented, encompassing a range of approaches, including security operations, community engagement, and rehabilitation programs for former fighters. However, these initiatives have been met with substantial challenges. This chapter critically assesses the effectiveness of the Somali government's initiatives, considering factors such as limited resources, political instability, and the pervasive influence of clan dynamics, which hinder comprehensive counterterrorism efforts. By exploring Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies, their implications for power projection, and the Somali government's response, this chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics in the HOA. It underscores the need for comprehensive and multifaceted approaches to addressing the recruitment challenge, emphasizing the importance of not only military interventions but also socio-economic development, good governance, and community resilience in countering the influence of Al-Shabaab.

Through a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the aforementioned thematic areas in this chapter, the chapter seeks to provide a nuanced perspective on the complex landscape of counterterrorism efforts in Somalia. By shedding light on these crucial aspects of Al-Shabaab, the chapter aims to inform policymakers, researchers, and practitioners involved in combating terrorism and fostering stability in the region to better understand the complexities of Al-Shabaab's recruitment drive and the broader implications for subregional security and stability. Furthermore, understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective counterterrorism strategies and promoting long-term peace and stability in the HOA. It shall also contribute to a better understanding of the ongoing struggle between the extremist group and the authorities seeking to restore stability and peace in Somalia. It further underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach that addresses the root causes of radicalization, strengthens governance structures, and enhances the capacity of local communities to resist the allure of extremism.

2. Somalia in perspective

In the HOA, Somalia holds a significant strategic position due to its location. The Gulf of Aden borders it to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, Ethiopia to the west, and Kenya to the southwest. This proximity to major maritime trade routes, such as the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, makes Somalia a crucial intersection for international shipping and trade. The persistent political instability and governance challenges in Somalia have had profound and wide-ranging consequences, both domestically and regionally. The collapse of the central government in 1991 marked a turning point in Somalia's history, leading to a prolonged period of statelessness and insecurity [10]. Following the overthrow of the central government, clan-based militias and warlords vying for control of the country's resources and resources led to Somalia becoming a fragmented and divided nation. This power vacuum created a breeding ground for violence and lawlessness as various factions competed for control over territories and resources. The absence of effective governance mechanisms and the rule of law allowed armed groups to flourish, further exacerbating the security situation. The proliferation of armed groups, including militias and terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab, emerged due to the governance vacuum. These groups took advantage of the weak state institutions and lack of security forces to assert their control over a large swath of the country and impose their versions of order. Al-Shabaab, in particular, capitalized on the power vacuum and exploited grievances,

ideological motivations, and local dynamics to establish itself as a significant security threat in Somalia and the HOA. The absence of effective governance structures also hindered the provision of essential services and development initiatives. Without a functioning government, essential services such as education, healthcare, and infrastructure development suffered, further exacerbating the challenges faced by the Somali population.

The lack of investment in human capital and economic development perpetuated cycles of poverty and limited opportunities for the Somali people. The consequences of Somalia's insecurities extend beyond its borders and have regional implications [11]. Armed groups, including Al-Shabaab, have posed security threats to neighboring countries, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia. Cross-border attacks, acts of terrorism, and recruiting of foreign fighters have heightened regional concerns and necessitated regional and international collaborative efforts to address the challenges. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), comprised of troops primarily from neighboring countries, has played a crucial role in supporting the Somali government's efforts to combat armed groups and restore stability [12, 13]. While the UN, along with other international partners, have facilitated political processes and provided humanitarian assistance to alleviate the Somali people's suffering, Somalia's path to stability and effective governance remains complex and arduous. The challenges of clan divisions, political fragmentation, weak institutions, corruption, and the influence of armed groups continue to hinder progress. Rebuilding state institutions, promoting inclusive governance, and strengthening the rule of law are essential components of long-term stability and security in Somalia.

Additionally, piracy off the coast of Somalia has been a significant challenge, further compounding the insecurities faced by the country [14, 15]. Somalia's long coastline stretching along the Indian Ocean and its strategic location near major shipping routes, such as the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, have made it a hotspot for pirate attacks on commercial vessels. The rise of piracy in the region has had detrimental effects on international maritime trade, leading to increased costs, disruptions to shipping routes, and concerns over maritime security [16, 17]. The activities of Somali pirates have resulted in significant economic losses for regional and international stakeholders. Shipping companies have been forced to increase insurance premiums and take costly precautionary measures to safeguard their vessels and crew. The hijacking and ransom demands associated with piracy have impacted the shipping industry and the global economy, as the cost of goods transported through these routes has increased. Furthermore, the presence of pirates has created a climate of fear and insecurity, deterring investments and tourism in the region. Moreover, the insecurities in Somalia have led to profound humanitarian crises. Widespread poverty, limited access to essential services, and the displacement of populations are prevalent issues stemming from prolonged conflict and instability. The breakdown of governance structures and the absence of effective state institutions have impeded development efforts and hindered the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education, and clean water.

Efforts to address the insecurities in Somalia have involved regional and international interventions to stabilize the country and counter the threats posed by extremist groups. One prominent intervention is the AMISOM, established in 2007 with the mandate to support the Somali government in restoring security and stability. AMISOM comprises troops primarily from neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi and has played a significant role in combating extremist groups like Al-Shabaab [18]. AMISOM's presence has helped to weaken

the influence of Al-Shabaab and create an enabling environment for the Somali government to extend its authority and governance structures across the country. The mission has conducted joint military operations with the Somali National Army, providing training, logistical support, and operational coordination to enhance the capacity of Somali security forces. AMISOM's efforts have contributed to the liberation of major towns and territories from Al-Shabaab's control, thereby creating space for stabilization and reconstruction. In addition to regional interventions, the UN has played a crucial role in addressing the insecurities in Somalia. The UN has facilitated political processes and peace negotiations, aiming to foster dialog and reconciliation among various Somali stakeholders [19]. These efforts have sought to establish inclusive governance structures, promote democratic practices, and address the root causes of the conflict. Additionally, the international community has generously donated humanitarian aid to lessen the suffering of the Somali population suffering from insecurities. Humanitarian organizations have delivered food aid, healthcare services, clean water, and shelter to those in need. These interventions have been critical in addressing the population's immediate humanitarian needs and mitigating the crisis's impact.

However, despite these efforts, addressing the insecurities in Somalia remains a complex and ongoing challenge. Political reconciliation among various Somali factions remains elusive, and establishing effective and accountable governance structures is still a work in progress. Security sector reform, including the professionalization and capacity-building of the Somali security forces, remains a priority to ensure long-term stability and counter the influence of armed groups. Economic development is another crucial aspect that requires attention. Creating sustainable livelihood opportunities, improving infrastructure, and promoting inclusive growth are essential to address the underlying socio-economic grievances contributing to insecurity. High unemployment levels, poverty, and limited access to essential services undermine stability and provide fertile ground for radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups. Challenges such as corruption, limited resources, and infrastructure deficits pose obstacles to the Somali government's comprehensively addressing insecurities. The absence of strong state institutions and the legacy of clan-based politics further complicate the process of building a stable and prosperous Somalia. Addressing the insecurities in Somalia requires a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach involving political reconciliation, institution building, security sector reform, economic development, and providing essential services [20]. Regional cooperation, supported by the international community, is crucial to achieving lasting peace and stability in Somalia. While progress has been made, sustained efforts are needed to overcome the challenges and create conditions for a peaceful and prosperous future for the Somali people and the broader HOA.

3. What do we know of Al-Shabaab?

Al-Shabaab, an Islamist extremist group, emerged in the early 2000s as an offshoot of Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU was a coalition of Sharia-based Islamic courts that aimed to establish a stable and Islamic governance system in Somalia. Al-Shabaab, which means "The Youth" or "The Youthful" in Arabic, initially functioned as the armed wing of the ICU [21], emphasizing the group's ability to attract and mobilize young individuals towards its cause. Initially, Al-Shabaab aimed to establish an IS in Somalia based on a strict interpretation of Sharia law.

However, the group has since evolved and expanded its objectives, seeking to project power beyond Somalia's borders. The group's origins can be traced back to the power vacuum created in Somalia following the collapse of the Said Barre regime in 1991. The ensuing political instability, clan conflicts, and absence of a functioning central government allowed various armed factions and extremist groups to flourish in the country. Al-Shabaab emerged to establish an IS in Somalia under strict Sharia law amidst this chaotic environment. Al-Shabaab comprising largely of youth, became an imminent threat to global intelligence services and Somalia's neighboring countries in 2006 when it successfully, with the blessing and support of ICU, expelled Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) from the country's capital and seat of government in Mogadishu [22, 23].

The country's seat of government was relocated to Baidoa, with Members of Parliament and the Cabinet relocating to Scandinavia and neighboring Kenya. Some to the Gulf States. Since splintering from its founding group the ICU in 2007, al-Shabaab has become synonymous with terror throughout the HOA and Eastern Africa and controls more territory than any other political entity in Somalia. On March 18, 2008, the US Department of State designated it a Foreign Terrorist Organization [24]. The primary aim of Al-Shabaab has been to overthrow the Somali government, which it considers to be illegitimate and lacking Islamic legitimacy. Al-Shabaab seeks to establish a fundamentalist Islamic regime based on its interpretation of Salafi-jihadist ideology. The group's leadership has expressed a desire to create an Islamic caliphate similar to the IS or the Taliban's regime in Afghanistan [25]. Al-Shabaab's objectives extend beyond Somalia's borders. It has aligned with transnational jihadist movements and has been associated with Al-Qaeda.

The group has waged a protracted insurgency against the federal government and AMISOM forces, aiming to overthrow the government and establish its version of an Islamist state [26, 27]. The group has employed various brutal tactics to achieve its objectives, causing immense suffering and hindering the country's efforts to stabilize and rebuild institutions. One of the primary tactics utilized by Al-Shabaab is suicide bombings, which have become a signature method of attack. Suicide bombers, often indoctrinated and coerced individuals, infiltrate crowded areas such as markets, checkpoints, and government buildings, detonating explosives strapped to their bodies. These bombings have resulted in significant casualties among civilians, government officials, security forces, and AMISOM troops, spreading fear and undermining public trust in state institutions. Al-Shabaab has also extensively used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) as a potent weapon. These attacks involve using vehicles laden with explosives, driven by suicide bombers, or remotely detonated to target high-profile locations or security installations. The group has targeted military bases, government facilities, and even hotels frequented by international actors, inflicting heavy casualties and causing substantial damage.

In addition to bombings, Al-Shabaab carries out targeted assassinations of government officials, military officers, community leaders, and individuals deemed to be collaborating with the government or AMISOM forces. These assassinations serve multiple purposes for the group, including instilling fear, eroding trust in state authorities, and discouraging potential supporters of the government. Assassinations often occur in public spaces, further spreading terror among the population. Armed assaults by Al-Shabaab fighters on military bases, police stations, and other security outposts are also common. The group utilizes its combat capabilities to overrun and seize control of strategic locations, thereby weakening the state's control and projecting its power. These assaults involve intense gun battles, resulting in casualties and

exacerbating the cycle of violence and instability. The consequences of Al-Shabaab's attacks in Somalia have been devastating. The civilian population bears the brunt of the violence, with numerous lives lost and communities uprooted due to insecurity. The attacks have disrupted economic activities, hindering development and exacerbating poverty. Moreover, the targeting of government officials and security forces undermines the functioning of state institutions, hindering efforts to establish effective governance, deliver public services, and maintain law and order.

Al-Shabaab has conducted a series of high-profile attacks in Kenya, exemplified by the Westgate Mall attack in 2013 and the Garissa University attack in 2015. These incidents were stark reminders of the group's ability to extend its reach outside the boundaries of Somalia. Kenya being actively involved in AMISOM and holding strategic importance in the region, Kenya has become a frequent target for Al-Shabaab's attacks. The attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab in Kenya serve multiple objectives. First and foremost, they aim to destabilize the country, creating an atmosphere of fear and insecurity that can undermine societal harmony and impede development. By targeting crowded public spaces like shopping malls and universities, the group seeks to sow terror among the population and generate a sense of vulnerability.

Furthermore, Al-Shabaab's attacks in Kenya fuel intercommunal tensions by exploiting existing fault lines within the society. The group often seeks to exploit religious, ethnic, or regional divisions to deepen conflicts and create discord. By exacerbating these tensions, Al-Shabaab hopes to weaken Kenya's resolve in its support for AMISOM and erode the country's unity. It is important to note that Al-Shabaab's influence, and attacks are not limited to Somalia and Kenya alone. The group has extended its reach to other countries in the HOA region, such as Uganda and Ethiopia. These attacks are primarily retaliatory in nature, as both Uganda and Ethiopia have contributed troops to AMISOM. Al-Shabaab aims to punish these countries for their involvement in counterinsurgency operations and deter them from further participation. The regional activities of Al-Shabaab underscore the group's broader agenda of spreading its extremist ideology and disrupting regional stability. The group seeks to demonstrate its reach, influence, and ability to challenge regional security efforts by conducting attacks in multiple countries. Al-Shabaab aims to create an environment of fear and insecurity across the HOA, thereby undermining peace, development, and cooperation efforts.

4. Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies

Like many extremist groups, Al-Shabaab adopts many strategies to recruit fighters into its ranks. These tactics are referred to as "pull factor", "driver", "enabler," and "strategy." They come in tangible or intangible reward systems, including but not limited to financial benefits, personal empowerment, or protections contextualized within the individual's religious, economic, and social needs. Among the key strategies employed by Al-Shabaab to sustain its influence and recruitment efforts is a comprehensive social embedding approach within the daily lives of ordinary Somalis. This strategy extends to those residing in Somalia and Nairobi's central business district, particularly in East Leigh, a significant economic and community centre for displaced Somalis. The root of terrorism lies not only in individual terrorists but also in the contextual factors that shape their actions and the larger society in which they operate [28]. In the case of Al-Shabaab, Somalia's status as one of the world's poorest countries and a failed state plays a significant role. Widespread poverty and limited economic

opportunities make any means of earning a livelihood attractive, even if it involves joining a terrorist organization. Al-Shabaab has implemented a system that provides its militants with real wages. Al-Shabaab is estimated to pay fighters and low-ranking officers monthly salaries ranging from $60 to $200 (ibid). It is important to note that these figures are estimates but reflect the organization's practice of compensating its combat forces.

Additionally, Al-Shabaab employs many well-paid civilians who perform various administrative and specialized tasks alongside the combat forces. The group also recruits teenagers who may not fully integrate into the organization. Young men in Kenya refer to al-Shabaab as a "business," and the local Somali population views membership as a means of support. Individuals are offered between US$1000 (£640) and US$650 to join al-Shabaab [29]. According to a young Somali individual, the advantages of joining al-Shabaab can be summed up as follows: "Simply carrying a gun and patrolling the streets was an effortless task compared to labour-intensive jobs like construction work" [30]. This perception stems from the belief that possessing a firearm enables them to provide for their well-being and support their families. These individuals carry out activities such as targeting adults, extorting business owners, or gathering intelligence on behalf of the group, and they receive financial compensation for their participation in jihadist operations. By understanding Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategy within the context of Somalia, it becomes evident that the organization exploits socio-economic factors, such as poverty and limited opportunities, to attract individuals seeking economic relief and stability. Al-Shabaab's provision of financial incentives and employment opportunities, combined with its ability to embed itself within local communities, contribute to its recruitment efforts and the perpetuation of its activities.

The group provides advantages to everyone within it ranks, even suicide bombers. Before suicide bombers undertake bombing attacks, they are given large sums of money. Afterwards, al-Shabaab fighters return to their families to mourn with them and present them with another sum of money (the number is never specified, but it is generally several thousands of dollars). As pointed out earlier, in East Leigh in Nairobi, Kenya, Al-Shabaab has gained goodwill with many people and businesses in that commercial district. In addition to the propaganda videos the East Leigh studios create for al-Shabaab, several other stores also sell them. Most businesses there are believed to be owned or operated by al-Shabaab, enabling al-Shabaab to spread awareness of their cause and strengthen their status within the community [31]. The question that begs for an answer is if Somalia had a stable economy and peace, would Al- Shabaab's economic incentive programs have been as successful as they are now? It is also imperative to remember that al-Shabaab emerged in the 21st century in a country and within a subregion plagued by poverty and insecurity for nearly 50 years.

Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategy also heavily relies on religious radicalism to garner support, both domestically and among the Somali diaspora. In Somali society, adopting a devout Islamic lifestyle has proven to be an effective method of Islamic radicalization, both in the past and present [32]. Prior to the formation of Al-Shabaab, the tumultuous period of the 1990s and the early 2000s, characterized by chaos and violence, created a chaotic environment in which many former members of militias were either compelled or enticed to embrace an extremist doctrine of Islam known as "Wahhabism." This ideology, today, provides a framework that justifies violence and militant jihad. Some of these radicalized fighters, including Somalis holding foreign passports, who are not overtly affiliated with Al-Shabaab, travel to Somalia to fight for Islam and seek martyrdom as "Mujahideen" or those engaged in jihad. Al-Shabaab capitalizes on the aspirations of these individuals by offering them the opportunity to

fulfill their desires and aspirations to fight for their religious beliefs. The group sends them to the conflict's front lines against the Kenyan and Somali government forces. By providing a platform for these radicalized individuals to participate in armed jihad, Al-Shabaab positions itself as a champion of Islam, frames the fight as a holy war, and appeals to the religious zeal of recruits, who see joining the group as a means of serving a higher purpose, and further attract individuals who are driven by religious fervor and a desire to defend and propagate their extremist interpretation of Islam.

This religious radicalization serves as a potent recruitment tool for Al-Shabaab. It exploits Somali society's deeply ingrained religious beliefs and values, tapping into a sense of duty and righteousness among potential recruits [33]. The group offers them a sense of belonging and purpose, enabling them to channel their religious fervor into violent action. It is important to note that while religious radicalism plays a significant role in Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategy, other factors are also at play, such as socio-political grievances and lack of economic opportunities. However, the group's ability to exploit religious ideologies and provide a platform for individuals to express their radicalized beliefs is a crucial component of its recruitment efforts. Understanding the power of religious radicalization in shaping Al-Shabaab's recruitment dynamics is crucial. By addressing the underlying factors that contribute to the susceptibility of individuals to extremist ideologies, such as socio-political grievances and lack of economic opportunities mentioned above, it becomes possible to counter the appeal of such groups and prevent the recruitment and radicalization of individuals in the first place. Copious efforts should focus on promoting religious tolerance, education, and socio-economic development to undermine the conditions that foster religious radicalization and support for extremist organizations like Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab also places a significant amount of emphasis on using various online platforms to communicate with and recruit young people outside the group's immediate vicinity. It media group is known as "al-Kata'ib. Foundation." It also employs the Twitter account @HSMPress to provide the group's version of events, motivate recruits, and establish an alternative narrative; where the mainstream media might report losses, al-Shabaab records victories [34, 35]. Citing a case in point of the potency of social media to Al-Shabaab's operations, in 2009, for example the group released an online video entitled "At Your Service, oh Osama," targeted at recruiting members and sympathizers of al-Qaeda. The video featured footage of Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda at the time. The video praised bin Laden and called on Muslims to join the fight against the West. The video's release was part of Al-Shabaab's efforts to recruit new members and expand its influence beyond Somalia. Social media has allowed the group to reach a wider audience and recruit new members. However, it has also made it easier for authorities to track and monitor the group's activities [36, 37]. As a result of al-Shabaab's online visibility, about 43 out of the 85-member executive council of al-Shabaab are foreigners [33]. Millat Ibrahim is the name of the online magazine that al-Shabaab publishes. Its purpose is to disseminate the al-Tawhid wal-Jihad ideology. The website of al-Shabaab is used to disseminate jihadist sermons, images and videos of attacks, chat rooms, discussion boards, and in some cases, guides on various military strategies or bombing operations. Al-Shabaab has successfully recruited hundreds of foreign fighters from countries and regions such as Sweden, Australia, the United Kingdom, the US, South Asia, and the Middle East through online media [26, 38].

Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategy also capitalizes on its confrontation of Somalia's longstanding socio-political status quo, which has resulted in widespread disillusionment among various segments of Somali society. Somalia has been embroiled in

internal conflicts for over four decades, with senior statesmen and "old guards" who were once key players in the early stages of the conflict now struggling to find lasting solutions. Despite the recognition and legitimacy bestowed upon these senior leaders by the global community and a significant portion of the population, their inability to end the conflict in its initial years has led to a bleak future for the younger generation. Somali youth grapple with a profound identity crisis as they were raised to respect their clans, but these clans have shattered their hopes for a better future. The younger population harbors deep animosity towards the old political leaders, whom they have followed for years but perceive as having failed to improve their circumstances. This resentment is compounded by economic dissatisfaction among young adults who have graduated from tertiary institutions in Mogadishu but struggle to secure employment in their respective fields. This economic frustration contributes to the existing political resentment within the country.

Al-Shabaab exploits this prevailing disillusionment and discontentment among the Somali youth. The group offers an alternative narrative that promises change, empowerment, and a means to rectify the grievances faced by the younger generation [39]. By presenting itself as a force capable of challenging the established political order and addressing the failures of the old guard, Al-Shabaab appeals to the frustrations and aspirations of disillusioned youth. Through its recruitment strategy, Al-Shabaab offers a sense of purpose, belonging, and the prospect of actively reshaping the future of Somalia. By tapping into the deep-seated grievances and frustrations of the younger generation, the group attracts recruits from various walks of life who seek a radical departure from the existing socio-political landscape. Simply put, Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategy takes advantage of the disillusionment and animosity that Somali youth feel towards the established political leadership and their inability to resolve longstanding conflicts. By positioning itself as a catalyst for change and offering an outlet for grievances, the group appeals to the aspirations and frustrations of the younger generation. Al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts exploit the prevailing socio-political circumstances and economic dissatisfaction to attract recruits seeking a radical shift in Somalia's trajectory.

The group offers a new way to be a part of something larger than one's immediate surroundings and a potential that may open doors to a more expansive world than the one the previous generation established. Its religious ideology obliterates any historical debates about Fiqh and shari'a, allowing youth to believe that their interpretation of Islam is correct and that they can therefore confront whoever, including religious leaders and political elites, whose actions and inactions derail their progress and the development of the state. As Roy [40] explained, the Salafi approach enable believers to break themselves off from their local setting and seek a less parochial environment. Al-Shabaab, by this, provides an alternative for these issues, and it also empowers its recruits as soon as they endorse its ideology. By this, the group provides another avenue to globalization and a way for the youth to exercise their faith in whatever situation. Ultimately, as the group confronts the generational statuesque, they directly confront the senior political leaders, politicians, and tribal elders who have controlled and dominated the Somali political space for many years.

5. How Al-Shabaab employs recruitment strategies to enhance its power projection: a critical analysis

Al-Shabaab's strategy of becoming socially embedded in the daily lives of ordinary Somalis is a critical component of the group's power projection within and outside

Somalia. By offering incentives to recruits and old militants, Al-Shabaab is able to maintain and expand its operational capacity, allowing it to control vast swathes of territory in Somalia and carry out attacks both within the country and beyond its borders. The group's control over various economic activities in Somalia, such as the taxation of goods and services, the control of trade routes, and the exploitation of natural resources, makes it possible to offer incentives to recruits and veteran militants. By leveraging these economic activities, Al-Shabaab is able to generate revenue that it can use to fund its operations and provide incentives to its members. At the same time, by becoming socially embedded in the daily lives of ordinary Somalis, Al-Shabaab is able to gain high levels of popular support and acceptance. This support is crucial to the group's ability to maintain its operational capacity and expand its influence, as it allows Al-Shabaab to recruit new members, raise funds, and conduct attacks with the support of local communities.

Also, religious radicalism has long been critical to Al-Shabaab's power projection in Somalia. The group uses a radical interpretation of Islam as the basis for its ideology, and it has been successful in using this ideology to attract recruits and gain popular support among many Somalis. One of the key ways that Al-Shabaab uses religious radicalism is by presenting itself as the true defender of Islam in the country. The group argues that the Somali government is a Western-backed, secular regime that opposes Islamic values and practices. Al-Shabaab portrays itself as the only group that can protect Somalis from the corrupt and oppressive government and the influence of Western powers. The group also uses religious radicalism to justify its violent attacks against civilians and government targets. The group argues that it is engaged in a holy war against the enemies of Islam and that violence is necessary to defend the faith and defeat those who seek to destroy it. By framing its violence in religious terms, Al-Shabaab has been able to rally support among Somalis who feel the group is fighting for their interests and faith. In addition to its use of religious rhetoric, Al-Shabaab has also established a strict interpretation of Islamic law in the areas under its control.

The group has enforced its interpretation of Sharia law through the use of courts and other judicial bodies, and it has punished those who violate its rules with harsh penalties, including amputations, floggings, and executions. By enforcing its strict interpretation of Islamic law, Al-Shabaab has been able to present itself as a legitimate Islamic authority in the areas under its control. Al-Shabaab's use of religious radicalism as a tool for power projection in Somalia has been successful in helping the group gain popular support and expand its influence both within and outside Somalia. It has allowed it to form alliances with other international extremist groups as earlier noted, including al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. These alliances have helped provide the group with funding, training, and other resources necessary for its survival and expansion. However, it is essential to note that the group's violence and harsh interpretation of Islamic law have also led to widespread condemnation from other Muslim groups and the international community.

Al-Shabaab's confrontation with Somalia's age-old socio-political status quo is crucial for its power projection in the country. The group has long sought to establish a new Islamic social and political order in Somalia, and this vision serves as a rallying cry for its supporters and potential recruits. By positioning itself as a champion of traditional Islamic values, Al-Shabaab is able to appeal to those who are dissatisfied with the country's current political system and feel disenfranchised by the government's perceived corruption and ineffectiveness. The goal of Al-Shabaab is to replace Somalia's current secular government with an Islamic one based on Sharia law. The group seeks to discredit the Somali government by portraying it as corrupt and

un-Islamic. This narrative has resonated with many Somalis disillusioned with the state's inability to provide essential services and security. The group often presents itself as the defender of the Somali people against foreign influence, including Western intervention and African Union troops. It portrays itself as the only force that can restore order, justice, and stability in the country, arguing that the existing socio-political order in Somalia is corrupt, unjust, and illegitimate. The group accuses the government of being controlled by foreign powers and, therefore, not representing the interests of the Somali people.

Al-Shabaab also employs other tactics to project power, including targeted assassinations of government officials and attacks on government installations, which have weakened the state's ability to govern effectively. The group has also sought to create an alternative governance system, with its courts, schools, and social services, providing a sense of order and stability in controlled areas. In addition, Al-Shabaab has targeted traditional leaders, such as clan elders, who have played a significant role in Somali society for centuries. By undermining the authority of these traditional leaders, the group has sought to weaken Somali society's social fabric, allowing it to gain greater control over local communities. Besides exploiting clan divisions and grievances, the group employs violence and intimidation to impose its socio-political agenda in areas under its control. The group enforces a strict interpretation of Islamic law and imposes its justice system, punishing those who violate its rules with harsh penalties, including amputations, floggings, and executions. Al-Shabaab's use of violence and intimidation to impose its socio-political order creates a sense of fear and insecurity among the population, making it difficult for the central government to exert its authority in these areas.

6. Somali government's counter initiatives to Al-Shabaab recruitment strategies

The Somali government recognizes that promoting good governance is crucial to countering Al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts. Through the government's quest to establish an effective governance structure, provide essential services to the population, and ensure the rule of law, the government aims to address the underlying grievances and vulnerabilities that make individuals susceptible to Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies. However, several challenges hinder the successful implementation of this strategy. One of the primary challenges is the limited capacity and resources of the Somali government [41]. Rebuilding institutions and establishing good governance practices in a country that has experienced decades of conflict and instability is daunting. The government faces significant challenges in terms of human and financial resources and technical expertise. Insufficient funding and a lack of trained personnel hinder the government's ability to effectively implement governance reforms and provide essential services to the population [42]. Corruption and patronage networks pose another significant obstacle. Widespread corruption erodes public trust in the government and undermines its legitimacy. Al-Shabaab exploits this perception of corruption and inefficiency to present itself as an alternative authority that can deliver justice and services. Overcoming corruption and building transparent institutions is crucial to countering Al-Shabaab's narrative and gaining the trust of the Somali people.

The security situation is another major challenge. Al-Shabaab's continued presence and attacks disrupt governance efforts and impede the government's ability to extend

its authority and provide services in certain regions. The lack of security creates an environment where Al-Shabaab can operate and recruit more easily, undermining the government's efforts to promote good governance and stability. Furthermore, Somali society's clan dynamics and power struggles complicate governance efforts [43, 44]. Clan affiliations play a significant role in politics and decision-making processes, which hinder the establishment of inclusive and representative governance structures. Overcoming these divisions and building a unified government representing all Somali citizens' interests is complex and delicate. Also, the government's ability to deliver tangible improvements in the lives of the Somali people is crucial for countering Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies. Economic development, job creation, and basic services are essential in addressing the socio-economic grievances that make individuals vulnerable to recruitment. However, limited resources and competing priorities make it challenging for the government to meet the expectations and urgent needs of the population. While promoting good governance is a crucial strategy to counter Al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts, the Somali government faces several challenges in its implementation. The key hurdles are addressing corruption, building institutional capacity, navigating clan dynamics, and ensuring security. Overcoming these challenges requires sustained commitment from the government, coordinated international support, and a comprehensive approach that integrates security, development, and governance initiatives.

Another cardinal strategy explored by the Somali government to counter Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies includes the government's effort to promote economic development and job creation for the Somali youth [39]. By addressing the economic grievances and socio-economic factors contributing to vulnerability and marginalization, the government aims to undermine Al-Shabaab's recruitment efforts and offer viable alternatives to stop potential recruits from joining the extremist group. This involves implementing policies and programs that foster an enabling environment for business development, stimulate economic growth, attract investment, generate employment opportunities, and empower individuals, particularly the youth. By creating a conducive business environment, supporting entrepreneurship with business training, access to microfinance, the provision of start-up capital, and investing in key sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure, and trade, the government aims to encourage entrepreneurship and self-employment and address the root causes of economic grievances that Al-Shabaab exploits for recruitment purposes. Another aspect of the government's strategy is to invest in infrastructure development and essential services. This includes improving access to education, healthcare, water, and electricity, particularly in rural areas more susceptible to Al-Shabaab's influence. By investing in infrastructure, the government aims to improve living conditions, enhance social well-being, and create an environment that discourages individuals from joining extremist groups out of desperation or a lack of opportunities.

However, there are significant challenges to implementing this strategy. One of the major obstacles is the need for more resources and infrastructure in Somalia. Decades of conflict and instability have severely damaged the country's economy and infrastructure, making it difficult to attract investment, create jobs, and provide adequate services. The lack of basic infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and water supply, hinders economic development and hampers the government's efforts to provide sustainable economic opportunities. Another challenge is the prevalence of clan-based patronage networks and corruption. These practices create barriers to fair economic opportunities, as access to resources and opportunities may be limited to certain clans or individuals with political connections. Overcoming these

challenges requires concerted efforts to promote transparency, accountability, and meritocracy in economic development initiatives. Addressing corruption and ensuring a level playing field for all individuals and businesses is crucial for the strategy's success. The security situation in Somalia also poses a significant challenge to providing economic opportunities. Al-Shabaab's continued presence and attacks disrupt economic activities and instil fear among potential investors and entrepreneurs. The government needs to prioritize security and stability to create an enabling environment for economic growth. This requires strengthening security forces, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and cooperating with regional and international partners to counter the threat of terrorism. It is important to emphasize that addressing the root causes of economic marginalization and inequality is a complex task that requires a multi-faceted approach. It should address issues such as poverty, unequal distribution of resources, lack of access to education and skills training, and social exclusion. The Somali government needs to design comprehensive programs that focus on poverty alleviation, vocational training, education, and social welfare to ensure that economic opportunities are accessible to all segments of society.

The prospect of investing heavily in education and promoting youth empowerment programs is another important initiative the Somali administration has been exploring to counter Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies [45]. It is the conviction of the Somali government that if it can provide the youth with access to quality education and create opportunities to develop their skills, the government will be able to empower young people, provide them with alternative pathways for personal growth, social integration, development, enhance their prospects for a better future, and reduce their vulnerability to extremist ideologies. Like most governments across the globe, the Somali government acknowledges that education plays a vital role in shaping the minds of young people and providing them with the necessary skills and knowledge for a brighter future. The government has been focusing on improving access to quality education, rebuilding schools, training teachers, and developing curriculum frameworks that promote critical thinking, tolerance, and civic engagement. By strengthening the education system, the government aims to equip young individuals with the tools they need to pursue meaningful opportunities and resist the allure of extremist ideologies.

Furthermore, promoting youth empowerment programs is integral to the government's strategy. These programs aim to engage young people in constructive activities, enhance their leadership skills, and provide them with personal and professional development opportunities. Youth empowerment initiatives include entrepreneurship training, vocational skills development, mentorship programs, sports and arts activities, and community engagement projects [46]. By involving young individuals in positive endeavors, the government seeks to empower them to become active participants in society, fostering a sense of belonging and purpose that counters the appeal of joining extremist groups like Al-Shabaab.

Similar to the government's strategies discussed above, there are challenges in implementing this strategy too. Al-Shabaab's presence and continued attacks disrupt educational activities and threaten teachers, students, and educational infrastructure. The government needs to ensure the safety and security of educational institutions to create a conducive environment for learning and youth engagement. Secondly, resource constraints and limited funding for education and youth programs hinder the government's efforts. Somalia faces significant economic challenges, and allocating sufficient resources to education and youth empowerment can take time and

effort. The government must mobilize domestic and international support to secure the necessary funding for education infrastructure, teacher training, and youth programs. Another challenge is the need for a comprehensive approach to address the underlying factors that make young people susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups. These factors include poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, and lack of opportunities. The government must collaborate with various stakeholders, including civil society organizations, community leaders, and international partners, to design holistic programs that address these socioeconomic issues and provide comprehensive support for youth empowerment. Overcoming challenges related to security, resource constraints, and comprehensive intervention is essential to maximize the impact of education and promote youth empowerment programs as a strategy to create a more inclusive and prosperous future for Somalia.

7. Conclusion

The complex recruitment dynamics and power projection of extremist groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia require a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to countering them. Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies have been crucial to the group's resilience and expansion. The group has attracted individuals from diverse backgrounds by exploiting socio-economic grievances, ideological indoctrination, and clan dynamics. Understanding these recruitment tactics provides valuable insights into Al-Shabaab's power projection capabilities and operational mechanisms. Additionally, the group's influence extends beyond military actions, with recruitment enabling territorial control and the imposition of its extremist ideology. The Somali government has not been passive in countering Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies. It has implemented initiatives encompassing security operations, community engagement, and rehabilitation programs for former fighters. However, numerous challenges, including limited resources, political instability, and clan dynamics, have hindered the effectiveness of these efforts. Overcoming these challenges necessitates adopting holistic and diverse strategies that address not only military interventions but also socio-economic development, good governance, and community resilience.

By delving into the intricacies of Al-Shabaab's recruitment strategies, power projection, and the Somali government's response, this chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics in the HOA. It highlights the need for comprehensive approaches that tackle the root causes of radicalization, strengthen governance structures, and empower local communities to resist extremism. Such an understanding is vital for developing effective counterterrorism strategies and promoting long-term peace and stability in Somalia and the HOA. This chapter aims to inform policymakers, researchers, and practitioners involved in combating terrorism and fostering regional stability. By shedding light on the recruitment drive of Al-Shabaab and its broader implications for subregional security, it provides valuable insights for addressing the ongoing struggle between extremist groups and the authorities seeking to restore peace and stability. It underscores the importance of a comprehensive approach that addresses the underlying factors driving radicalization and builds the capacity of local communities. Through such efforts, long-term peace and stability can be achieved in Somalia and similar contexts worldwide.

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Chapter 10

Global War on Terrorism in Mali

Jean Berlie and Manuel Benard

Abstract

The early war on global terrorism had a significant impact on Mali in the 1980s. The French-led Operation Barkhane aimed to eradicate terrorism in the country, especially in the North. However, in February 2022 despite some military achievements, President Macron decided to withdraw French forces from Mali. This war has left Mali grappling with ongoing concerns and internal instability, which allowed the Wagner group to consolidate its grip in the security sector under its leader Prigozhin, who seemed to return to Russia.

Keywords: Islam, Mali, security Sufism, Tuareg, war on terrorism

1. Introduction

The French Operation Barkhane (2014–2022) was let to eliminate of terrorism in Mali. In 2018, Prigozhin and its Wagner mercenaries expanded their presence in Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Central Africa and Mali. This article tries to understand the war of terror in Mali. Starting on 23–24 March 2019, several massacres were committed by armed groups in Mopti, central Mali.

The term 'Global War on Terror' was used internationally for the first time by President George Bush in September 2001. Its relation to the Malian situation or its spread to one of the poorest sub-Saharan countries is an indication of persistent security threats with several tension zones worldwide. It is appropriate, also, to define the present situation in West Africa, particularly in Mali.

In Mali as of 2023, the total population is 23.3 million and 10.3 million Malians are less than 14 years old; Mali has poor rating in terms of the Human Development Index, it is one of the poorest countries in the world, and ranks low in terms of health, income and education, and development in general and, in particular, made minimal advancement in efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. In Mali, 48% of the population is less than 15 years old and only 54% of them go to school; in the north from Gao to Timbuktu, the majority of the schools are run by religious clerics who teach the Quran to the local youth.

The origin of the war on terror in Africa and in particular in West Africa and Mali started slowly after the death of Muammar Gaddafi on 20 October 2011 (see **Figure 1** below).

In Mali, the war on terror was a nightmare for France. It started with NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad). In mid-2023, France had to reinvent its relationship in Africa, with China developing things like the global Belt

Figure 1.
Sahel, west and central Africa map.

and Road Initiative at the same time, and Russia taking advantage of an increasingly strained relation between Mali and its former staunchest ally in its war against terrorism.

2. War of terror and events in Mali

Azawad includes NE Mali, Southern Algeria, Burkina Faso and Niger. The problem is to judge the role of terror in the 1980s and at present. But before the crisis in 2012, Mali was considered in Africa as a 'model of democracy and respect of plurality' ([1] p. 7). The Azawad region includes in particular Tuareg and Arab people.

In particular in 2016, violence in Mali was not relegated only to Timbuktu but in the region of Mopti and in the central region of Macina—limited by Ségou in the West and Ténenkou in the East—where the 'men on motorcycles,' mostly Peuls, and Bambara—who were animist—were jihadists. Hamadoun Koufa is 'preaching jihad' and on 4 May 2015, men from Hamdallay used explosives to demolish the mausoleum of Sékou Amadou [2].

The war of terror cannot stop for the moment in Mali, Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso. Fortunately for them, the last two countries share their knowledge of the jihadist movements [3, 4]. The death toll in Moura in May 2022 was between 300 and 400 according to conservative estimates, with most of the victims being depicted as civilians.

Long ago, France knew the importance of Timbuktu to reduce violence, so it is not a surprise that French president Hollande and Malian president Dioncounda Traoré visited Timbuktu in 2013 and it was very emotional for the president of Mali.

Prigozhin and Wagner forces may help also Mali to reduce the problem of violence in Africa, but they will take huge amount of money as compensation. Early July 2023, Yevgeny Prigozhin was said to be in Belarus, but we do not know if he will return to

Africa. To survive, after recovering 10 billion rubles (U$111 million) in St. Petersburg, he seems to have no time to travel. The war in Ukraine continues in early July 2023 and Prigozhin is said to be in Russia. Prigozhin is particularly interested in the importance of Syama mine in Kadiolo Cercle, Sikasso Region in Mali (mindat.org). According to Global Data, Mali is the world's eighteenth-largest producer of gold in 2023, with output down by 3.83% in 2021. Over the 5 years to 2021, production from Mali increased by a CAGR (Compound Annual Growth Rate) of 7% and is expected to drop by a CAGR of 1.06% between 2022 and 2026.

2.1 Why conflict and violence in Mali?

The conflicts between nomads and pastoralists – Bambara and Peul communities – have deep historical roots in Mali. Historically, these groups have competed for resources such as land and water, leading to periodic tensions and conflicts. However, in recent years, these conflicts have taken a new dimension due to the influence of radical Islam and the activities of extremist groups in the region.

Nomadic groups, such as the Tuareg and Arab people, have traditionally relied on livestock herding as their primary means of subsistence. Pastoralists, on the other hand, are settled farmers who depend on agriculture. The competition for land and water resources between these groups has often led to clashes and violence. The proliferation of weapons and the increased presence of extremist groups have further escalated these tensions, turning them into security threats.

Resolving the tensions between nomads and pastoralists, Bambaras and Peuls, requires a multi-faceted approach. Additionally, the violence resulting from these tensions displaces populations, disrupts livelihoods and exacerbates humanitarian crises.

It necessitates addressing the root causes of the conflicts, such as competition over resources, and implementing inclusive policies that promote equitable access to land and water. Furthermore, efforts should focus on fostering dialog and reconciliation among communities.

Religious issues and particularly radical Islam and leadership play an important role in Mali.

The problem is to judge the role of terror in the 1980s and in the present.

The second Russia–Africa Summit took place in St. Petersburg's Expo Forum from 27 to 28 July 2023, with leaders from the majority of African countries expected to attend. The Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum will take place alongside: 'it will provide a platform for business meetings and includes a program of more than 30 panel sessions and thematic events' (African Business, 3 July 2023).

'Jihad can't be seen only by the naked eye; this collective mobilization in favor of the jihadists must bring the government to reconsider its relationship with the governed people.' Is this a new socio-political sort of revendication? ([1], p. 87).

Religious issues and particularly radical Islam and leadership play an important role in Mali.

In 2023, the president of Ivory Coast, Alassane Ouattara, is forced to compose with his neighbors in Mali (interim President Assimi Goita), in Guinea, Conakry (interim President Mamady Doumbouya), and in Burkina Faso (President Ibrahim Traoré).

All the violent social movements in Africa are not influenced by Islamists, and for example, the Burkina Faso popular uprising on 30–31October 2014 does not seem to have been stoked by jihadist activists. The intermediary period between the end of the Compaoré regime seems to reflect only a new regime with profound social aspiration [5].

In 2008, only 54% of the children were attending school, and deprived northern regions such as Timbuktu benefitted from Islamic schools in the absence of social and education infrastructure. Mali is classified as the 178th country among 182 by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and is characterized by extreme, widespread chronic poverty. According to the UNDP, there are some hopes. The Bandiagara region is now witnessing a significant return of displaced individuals, with 74,400 people recorded as having returned in April 2023, doubling the number of returning people from the previous year. It is hoped that peace will return again with peaceful elections being re-planned in 2024. To understand Mali better, it is important to study other countries of West Africa.

The law in Burkina Faso is well defined concerning religious liberty in public services. It concerns, in particular, wearing the veil, which is allowed by the law (article 33). Article 49 in Burkina Faso allows the right to participate in a confessional association. But terrorist Islamism still exists in the country ([6], p. 129).

3. Sufism is important in Mali

The centrality of Sufism in the propagation of Islam in precolonial and later, without necessarily resorting to Jihad, is important in Mali.

Brahma Mustapha [7] demonstrated the popularity of Sufism, its resistance to colonization and the simplicity of the Muslim faith advocated by Sufism in relation to institutional and scriptural Islam. There is only one son who succeeds to the All, that too due to the strong resemblance and hierarchical organization of the family of Sufi called Zaouias, without resorting to Jihad.

For example, the *Risāla al-Ghallāwiyya* de Sīdī Muḥammad b. Mukhtār al-Kuntī (died in 1241/1828) gives the history of the dynastic nomad from the beginning. Ould Cheikh is quoted in Jeppie and Bachir Diagne in 2008 (pp. 232–233), and Bāy gave a copy to lieutenant Maurice Cortier in September 1909: The *Kitāb al-Qal'id wa l-Talā'id* is a famous hagiography of the father and mother of the same Sīdī Muḥammad b. Mukhtār with many manuscripts in the 'Bibliothèque Nationale' of Paris.

4. Russia and Mali

On 26 June 2023 – concerning Wagener – Sergueï Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared nothing is changed (Jeune Afrique). Few days later, the UN Security Council was ready to leave Mali with a force constituted by West African Countries, amounting to 13,000 soldiers before the end of the year 2023. It is terrible information, and nobody knows if Wagner mercenaries will be able to bring back security. According to Brussels Agency Politico, Fidèle Gouandjika, a minister and special adviser to CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, told AFP his country had signed a defense deal with Russia, but Wagner aid comes always at a cost which could be impressive. West African countries have no money, and if Prigozhin provides troops, it will cost a lot to Mali.

We do not know yet how the question of Islamic war of terror can be solved in 2023, in particular in Mali and Burkina Faso. On 19 July 2023, Reuters using Russian sources quoted from Guy Faulconbridge who said that... it is not the end and it will cost a lot to African countries.

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5. Epilogue

In 2013, in central Mali, poorer Peuls, in particular in Macina, made a social revolt against Bambaras, who practice animism, but the main reason was economic and politico-social. The government has to reconsider the real needs of rural communities and their protection against plundering, in particular, in regions where the police or 'gendarmery' forces are less present.

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Chapter 11

Securing Cities in the Global War on Terrorism: The Case of Oslo

Sissel Haugdal Jore and Stian Lid

Abstract

In the global war on terrorism, cities worldwide have implemented a multiplicity of urban counterterrorism measures to protect buildings, public spaces, and citizens against terrorism. Since few previous studies have examined the historical development of urban counterterrorism measures in a concrete city, we examine the development of urban counterterrorism measures in Norway's capital Oslo from 1993 to 2023. This chapter contributes with knowledge of the exogenous and endogenous factors that influence implementation of urban counterterrorism. Five different periods of urban counterterrorism are identified, which are associated with different potential targets and different forms of attack modus. During each period, new layers of urban security measures have been added while those already implemented persist. The conclusion is that there is a dissonance between the aims and realities of urban counterterrorism measures that impact the security and freedom of citizens. Future research should further investigate the impacts of urban counterterrorism on cities.

Keywords: cities, urban counterterrorism, security, freedom, war on terrorism

1. Introduction

Guaranteeing security from terrorism in cities has become a worldwide challenge, and securing cities and their citizens against terrorist attacks has become an essential part of the global war on terrorism. Over the last two decades, cities worldwide have implemented a multiplicity of security measures to protect buildings, urban public spaces, and citizens against terrorist attacks. Scholars have referred to this as "the insecure global city," which refers to the local responses to the global threat of terrorism [1–3]. The urban security regime in cities worldwide is not without challenges. Urban counterterrorism measures are not just directed at potential terrorists. They impact citizens and thus, these counterterrorism measures have broader implications than counterterrorism measures that are directed towards potential terrorists because they affect not only possible terrorists but also the citizens and the cities themselves [4].

During the more than 20 years since the onset of the war on terrorism, the threat from terrorism and their modus operandi has comprised different potential terrorist groups and perpetrators using diverse forms of weapons when targeting cities. This causes a major problem for those responsible for securing cities; the threat of terrorism to a city is not static and consequently, counterterrorism measures must change accordingly. Several scholars have examined the relationship between the change in

modus operandi and counterterrorism measures, and the effects that counterterrorism measures have on the city [see for example Refs. [2, 3, 5–8]]. Moreover, some researchers have studied how specific terrorist attacks lead to urban counterterrorism measures [1, 8–15]. These scholars demonstrate that there is a relationship between terrorist motivation, weapons, and target selection and that terrorist attacks often lead to counterterrorism measures, although this relationship is complicated. However, these studies focus on the character of terrorism or a specific event and not on how the terrorist attacks, the threat of terrorism, and associated counterterrorism measures have changed over time in a concrete city. In this book chapter, we want to fill this research gap by further expanding on this research through the prism of a concrete city, the Norwegian capital of Oslo. In this chapter, we examine the following:

- the development of urban counterterrorism from the 1990s to the present in Oslo
- factors that have influenced the policymaking of urban counterterrorism
- and finally, the dissonance between the aim and realities of urban counterterrorism measures.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we elaborate on the theoretical foundation of urban counterterrorism measures. Second, we describe the Norwegian capital Oslo as our case and the data used in this book chapter. Third, we examine the development of urban counterterrorism from the 1990s to the present in Oslo, by analysing five periods of urban security measures in Oslo. Lastly, we discuss the dissonance between the aim and realities of urban counterterrorism measures that impact the security and freedom of the citizens.

2. Theorising urban counterterrorism measures

For decades, scholars and practitioners have defined and discussed the concept of terrorism and how the concept of terrorism by nature is a highly controversial concept and phenomenon [16]. By definition, terrorism is a form of political violence that focuses on politics, which by its very nature is about rivalling powers and morality [17–19]. Seen from this perspective, how society understands the phenomenon of terrorism, what concepts are used to talk about prevention, and what measures are considered legitimate vary over time and space. This means that a society's perception of the phenomenon is not just dependent on an actual threat but, to a large degree, dependent on the perception of terrorism as a threat and the policy responses to it [20]. As such, counterterrorism measures are never neutral, they are always culturally, historically, and socially contingent.

Although the concept of terrorism has received massive scholarly attention, the same cannot be said about the term "counterterrorism" where conceptual work beside from a few exceptions [see for example Refs. [9, 21–27]] has been almost absent. Renard [25] claims that little research has been conducted on counterterrorism to determine its evolving contours and to better understand counterterrorism and the drivers behind these measures. According to Renard, counterterrorism measures should be seen as a form of public policy stemming from complex policy-making environments influenced by exogenous and endogenous factors. Exogenous factors are usually outside the realm of public policy actors such as an event, for example a

terrorist attack or a threat. Endogenous factors are variables, such as ideas, interests, and institutions that consistently influence the information available to policymakers [28]. From this perspective, counterterrorism measures, in general, including urban counterterrorism measures, are influenced by several factors such as actual terrorist attacks and the perception of threats in addition to societal factors such as values, norms and beliefs, along with institutional factors such as formal and informal rules, routines, cultures, and resources.

The aim of this chapter is not specifically to investigate the public policy of counterterrorism but to examine the connection between urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo and the perception of modus operandi of those who are deemed potential terrorists, and the implication of such measures for the citizens and the city. In our analyses, we build on the understanding of counterterrorism as policy and decision-making, particularly the relevance of events (terrorist attacks and perceived threats) and discourses on terrorism. As illustrated in other studies, urban counterterrorism measures are often implemented as a reaction to a specific attack or a perceived threat [2–4, 8, 11, 29–35], but the variations of implemented urban security measures across countries also indicate the relevance of national or local values, beliefs and norms [27, 36].

Urban counterterrorism measures fall under the category of counterterrorism measures often referred to as "homeland security" [22, 24, 26]. The category of homeland security regards terrorism as a manageable threat that can be mitigated by enhancing society's ability to withstand, delay, or respond to a terrorist threat. This is typically done through enhanced emergency preparedness, critical infrastructure protection, or securing high-profile targets and public places [22]. Homeland security measures build on "Situational crime prevention theory," which is a preventive strategy attempting to reduce the opportunities or incentives to carry out crimes or terrorism by changing the physical environment, for example by making it more difficult to carry out terrorist attacks by utilising locks, fences, bollards, etc., or increasing the chance of being discovered by the police, security guards or ordinary people [37–39]. Situational crime prevention theories assume that crime is created by the opportunities that exist in the physical environment and how potential offenders perceive this environment. Consequently, criminals or terrorists are considered rational actors who will make a rational decision about whether to commit an offence determined by situational contingencies and constraints [7, 40–42]. The popularity of situational crime prevention theory is probably related to the inherent promises that terrorist attacks can be prevented, and that some measures can have immediate and measurable effects. Measures can be effective when the measures are in correspondence with a potential terrorist group's target selection and when they align with the modus operandi in which they are designed to protect [43, 44]. For instance, securing a parliament with fences, bollards, and other access control measures might reduce the opportunities for terrorists to attack the specific parliament with bombs, vehicles and vehicle-borne explosives but will not protect the same building from drones, suicide bombers, firearms or knives.

Situational prevention measures also have significant limitations and side effects. Firstly, situational prevention measures cannot independently solve the problem of security in the city, since the measures are designed to prevent specific actions against specific targets, and do not affect terrorists' general motivations. These measures will not necessarily cause perpetrators to refrain from other types of acts of terrorism against other targets [33, 43]. The displacement effect of target selection is one of the core criticisms against this type of prevention, although the extent of the displacement

effect is disputed [40]. Critics claim that since target hardening makes it more difficult to attack some types of targets, terrorists will aim their attacks at less protected "soft" targets since terrorists have shown considerable creativity in reassessing targets and methods influenced by situational conditions [40, 41, 45]. Hemmingsby's [45] analysis of militant Islamists' choice of targets and methods shows that these perpetrators primarily direct the attacks at public spaces and public transport, while well-protected targets, such as public buildings, are avoided. Accordingly, this change is partly caused by the extensive security measures of public buildings [45].

Second, situational prevention measures always require troublesome trade-offs [11, 33]. They affect the physical landscape, including streets, squares, libraries, shopping malls and buildings, and they entail values discrepancies regarding aesthetics, legal and ethical issues, environmental considerations, safety, convenience, cost and social inclusion. To what extent these passive security measures benefit the aims of either openness or security is rarely evident because it is hard to prove the effectiveness of such measures [33]. If preventive counterterrorism measures in a city are effective, nothing happens, the city is safe and not the scene of a terrorist attack which makes it impossible to tell whether this is because of the security measures or whether there never exited a threat in the first place.

Lastly, such measures have been criticised for bearing unnecessary costs for a low probability event based on worst-scenario planning, and they change the urban landscape to a more hostile environment [2, 3, 13, 14, 29, 46, 47]. The limitations of the urban counterterrorism measures based on situational crime prevention theory illustrate the complexity of protecting a city from terrorism, and the aim of this chapter is to investigate how terrorist attacks and the perception of the modus operandi have entailed different layers of urban counterterrorism measures in the city of Oslo despite the shortcoming of such measures.

3. Case and data

Oslo is the capital of Norway. Since 2011 it has been the location of three terrorist attacks. The first attack took place in 2011 when Oslo experienced one of the largest right-wing terrorist attacks in the Western world. On 22 July 2011, Anders Bering Breivik parked a van in front of the main government building in Oslo, housing the Prime Minister's office. A few minutes later, a 950-kilo fertiliser-based bomb exploded, causing massive material damage and immediately killing eight individuals. Later that day, 69 people, mainly adolescents, were executed on the Island of Utøya by the same perpetrator [48].

The second attack occurred on 10 August 2019 at the Al-Noor Islamic Centre Mosque in Bærum, about 20 kilometres west of Oslo. The perpetrator, Philip Manshaus, shot and killed his adopted stepsister at their home before he drove to the mosque and shot his way through the glass door before opening fire. He was subdued by three worshippers and turned over to the police and as a result, there were no casualties at the mosque [49].

The third terrorist attack in Oslo was a mass shooting in the city centre of Oslo on 25 June 2022. Two people were killed. The target is assumed to be the Oslo LGBTQ pride event. The Police arrested Zaniar Matapour, a Norwegian citizen from Iran. Police are treating the incident as an act of Islamist terrorism. According to the police, Matapour had been radicalised into Islamic extremism. However, he also had a history of violence and mental health issues [50].

The empirical data in this book chapter is based on are built on several empirical sources. The empirical data consists of media articles, official documents, research publications and interviews, including 10 interviews in 2018 with representatives from the municipality of Oslo, Oslo Police District and other stakeholders about urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo. One of the authors of this book chapter has previously engaged in several projects regarding the security of the Government Quarter [11, 51, 52] and the Norwegian understanding and conceptualisation of terrorism and counterterrorism [16, 20, 22, 53–57], which this book chapter is also based on. In the data analysis, we examined the development of urban counterterrorism from 9/11 to the present in Oslo. However, to understand how the event of 9/11 and the war on terrorism influenced urban counterterrorism, we also describe how terrorism and counterterrorism were perceived before this attack. The empirical data covers the period of 1993–2022. The data were analysed by looking for descriptions of the perceived dominated threat, which security measures the threat legitimated, and the description and argumentation behind the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo. The analysis focused especially on how exogenous factors such as the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and the three terrorist attacks in Oslo in 2011, 2019 and 2022 influenced urban security. The data analysis led to the identification of five periods of urban counterterrorism measures that entail different threats of terrorism, including different forms of modus operandi, which led to various urban security measures.

4. Analysis: five periods of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo

We have identified five periods of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo. For each of these periods, we first describe the perceived dominated threat at the time, which security measures the threat legitimates before we describe how this has affected urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo.

4.1 The pre 9/11 approach to urban counterterrorism: reluctance

9/11 was not the starting point for discussions on counterterrorism in Norway or other countries. To understand the impact of this event and the global war on terrorism has had on urban counterterrorism we start with a description of how terrorism and urban counterterrorism were perceived before 9/11.

Before 9/11, terrorism was primarily presented as a political problem in countries other than Norway. The terrorist threat against Norway was neither a topic in the media nor an issue that concerned authorities or scholars [22, 53]. Acts of terrorism were understood as a form of communicating political messages [20], and it was portrayed not as an extraordinary threat but more as an ordinary criminal activity that could be handled with dialogue, international cooperation and within the ordinary legal framework.

If terrorism was discussed as a threat to Norway, it was often related to big events where foreigners who could be a target for political assassination were present such as the extradition of the Nobel Peace Prize or foreign state visits. Counterarguments against why Norway would be considered a legitimate terrorist target existed in the media, in research and official documents in the 1990s; it was claimed that Norwegian society was geographically remote, homogeneous, inclusive and transparent: all factors that made Norway less of a probable target for terrorism [22, 53].

Before 9/11, urban counterterrorism measures in the city of Oslo were not an issue that the media, the public or civil servants were concerned with. There was almost no interest in protecting entire systems or sectors from terrorism, nor was the focus on specific objects in Oslo that could be a target of terrorism. Urban counterterrorism measures in this time period were primarily temporary and related to specific events aimed at protecting a potential target of political assassination such as bodyguarding, metal detectors, fences, bulletproof windows and surveillance of possible perpetrators [57]. It was rarely described what these measures were to the public since these measures were part of a classified regime. At the time, there was an underlying scepticism against counterterrorism measures in general. This scepticism is important to keep in mind to understand the effects of 9/11 and the following war on terrorism and its associated urban counterterrorism regime.

4.2 9/11–22/7: al Qaida and Islamic terrorism: international compliance

The 9/11 attack marked the start of the perception of a developing terrorist presence that could affect the security of cities as safe places. The assumption was that Norway would be vulnerable to terrorism if adequate counterterrorism measures were not implemented.

The attacks on 9/11 led to an enormous increase in attention to the topic of terrorism and counterterrorism measures in Norway, as in most countries worldwide. Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had attacked the United States and this terrorist network was described as a threat against all democratic societies, including Norway. Consequently, Norwegian security was no longer related to specific characteristics of Norway and was now intertwined with the US and the West's security. The media, research and Norwegian authorities now had a clear picture of potential perpetrators. The terrorism threat description was narrowed down to almost exclusively including Islamic terrorism, and it was the motivation, target selection and potential weapons from these perpetrators that were in focus.

Terrorists were described as religious extremists and the focus was on mass-causality terrorism either as turning aircraft into weapons like the scenario in the US on 9/11, or suicide bombers like the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. There was also an international concern that Al Qaida was attempting to obtain weapons of mass destruction such as biological or nuclear weapons. However, the official authorities mostly described the risk level of terrorism in Norway as low in the first years after 9/11, and some questioned whether Norwegian targets really were potential targets for Islamic terrorists. Key objects deemed to be terrorist targets were primarily oil and gas installations, governmental buildings, foreign embassies in Norway and aviation and shipping.

9/11 led to a change in the aviation and harbour security regimes internationally and in Norway. It is undoubtedly this security regime that led to the most drastic change in the urban landscape in Oslo after 9/11. Since the airport in Oslo is located outside the city centre, the aviation security regime implemented in the aftermath of 9/11 did not have any direct consequences for the urban landscape of Oslo. However, Oslo is a city located at the sea with multiple harbours and ports in central Oslo. In the years following 9/11, Oslo implemented the international ISPS code which closed off areas to the public to protect cruise traffic and other vessels from terrorism which drastically changed the urban landscape of the seaside of Oslo. Measures that were implemented were security checks of people and goods, fences and surveillance. The argument behind these measures was not necessarily a heightened threat to

Norwegian security, but that Norway needed to comply with international regulations because the terrorism threat had become international.

The American embassy was regarded as a potential terrorist target because 9/11 and other worldwide terrorist attacks against American targets had demonstrated that terrorists were willing and able to attack American targets abroad. The embassy's central location in downtown Oslo caused extensive debates about its heavy perimeter and security regime that was implemented after 9/11 and whether central downtown Oslo was the optimal location for such a high-profile terrorist target. Consequently, it was primarily American or foreign targets and high-profile terrorist targets that were considered potential terrorist targets in the first years following 9/11. At the time, foreign targets were deemed more likely targets than Norwegian ones.

Before 9/11, terrorist attacks in other European countries never prompted discussions on whether Norway had the necessary security. This changed with the subsequent terrorist attacks against mass transportation systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 carried out by Al Qaida affiliated groups. These events triggered concerns as to whether Norway had the necessary means to deal with similar attacks against the mass transportation system. Moreover, the anthrax attacks in the USA led to the Norwegian authorities' purchase of protection and cleaning equipment to deal with chemical weapons. This also caused a swing in the media's focus on the possibility of terrorists using CBRN weapons. There was a general expectation that Norway should have the necessary emergency resources to handle a terrorist attack, including attacks using weapons of mass destruction which was also discussed in relation to the security of public transportation in Oslo. Moreover, the focus was predominantly on emergency preparedness, surveillance and detection systems.

The urban counterterrorism measures implemented in Oslo in the decade following 9/11 were primarily related to compliance with international regulations such as within aviation and harbour security or threats to foreign targets, such as the American embassy [55]. Undoubtedly, urban counterterrorism measures were disputed at the time generating massive debates in the media on whether these measures were necessary in a low-risk city as Oslo. These debates and the scepticism as to whether Norwegian targets were potential terrorist targets existed until the terrorist attack in 2011, and few other objects or public spaces were protected with visible physical security measures, even though some objects or public spaces were recognised as possible targets for terrorism. For example, the Government Quarter was mentioned as a possible target in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Two months after 9/11, security personnel in the Government Quarter started the process of evaluating the security measures and emergency plans for the area because they considered the current security regime unsatisfactory and outdated [48]. Despite this assessment by the security professionals working in the Government Quarter, these measures had yet to be implemented when the terrorist attack took place on 22 July 2011. Except for the closing of the public streets, these discussions were primarily kept within the security community and did not reach the public before 22 July 2011.

The closing of the streets outside the prime minister's office followed ordinary procedures for regulation and led to media debates around the necessity of closing the streets because of a potential terrorist threat. The newspaper Aftenposten, which had its main office in the Norwegian Government Quarter, wrote in 2007 that:

> *Closing the street (Grubbegata) because of a terrorist threat is both hysterical and hypothetical and a mindset we should be spared from [58].*

This quote illustrates that, although terrorism was considered a potential threat, for many people in Norway, the idea that terrorism could happen in Norway attacking a Norwegian target was still distant. Urban counterterrorism measures were a controversial and disputed topic, framed within the dichotomous value dilemma of freedom versus security, where freedom was frequently considered more important than security.

4.3 22/7 – ISIL; islamic and right-wing terrorism: protection of government and ministries

Breivik's twin attack remains the deadliest far-right terrorist attack in the Western world since the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995. As such, the 22 July 2011 terrorist attack on Utøya triggered massive media coverage and was a shock to Norway. In stark contrast to the Islamic-inspired terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, which linked local terrorist attacks to international terrorism and its political motivations on a global scale, the Norwegian media portrayed the incident as a sole event conducted by a single perpetrator which meant that the event primarily was analysed on the individual level and not on a political, societal or international level [59]. The official threat assessments were no longer exclusively focused on Islamic terrorism. They now also described right-wing terrorism as a threat [59]. The modus operandi in focus was the car bomb and the shooting that had taken place during the 22/7 attack and how Norway could avoid this attack from happening again.

The attack on Utøya and the Government Quarter triggered massive discussions about whether the attack could have been prevented, and a commission was appointed to investigate this matter. In 2012, this commission [48] concluded that the attack could have been avoided, among other things through the permanent closing of the streets close to the prime minister's office to traffic, the integration of bollards, etc. Underpinning the conclusion of this commission was a strong belief that physical security measures could have prevented the attack, not considering that physical security measures could have led to a displacement effect. According to the commission, if preparedness plans developed in the years after 9/11 had been implemented, they would have been enough to thwart the attack [48].

The 22 July attack had proved that Norway could also be a target for terrorists. However, despite the acknowledgement that terrorism could happen in Norway and that there was a necessity for some sort of homeland security regime, urban security measures in the Government Quarter were still a disputed topic. Since the bomb attack, the Government Quarter reconstruction process and its security regime have been the target of massive and continuous criticism from many different actors. This criticism has been directed at the demolition of buildings, the architectural features, the costs and the decision to gather all ministries except the Ministry of Defence in one location and of the perimeter around the Government Quarter.

Despite continuous reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures, there is no doubt that the 22 July attack drastically changed the urban landscape of Oslo. In the direct aftermath of the attack, several of the ministries had to move their location elsewhere in Oslo because their offices had been destroyed in the blast. These ministries were secured by physical security measures, first protected by temporary little aesthetic measures, and then later replaced with more decorative security measures at different locations in Oslo. Moreover, numerous temporary physical security measures were placed in and around the Government Quarter immediately

after the bomb. The decision made by the Stoltenberg Government in 2012 to rebuild the Government Quarter in the dense city centre with a necessary level of security also meant that physical security would be a permanent feature of the Government Quarter and the city of Oslo. Located in the middle of the dense city centre of Oslo, the Government Quarter consists of multiple buildings, hosting ministries, the prime minister's office, local businesses, media houses, the supreme court, political parties, and two churches. It is also a part of the city centre through which ordinary traffic and people pass. Subsequently, the implementation of urban security measures at this location affected not only people working in the government and ministries but also the public and those whose jobs were located within the Norwegian Government Quarter. In 2018, it was estimated that the 75-metre standoff security distance from the buildings in the Government Quarter would have consequences for 340 private businesses, with 5500 employees located within the perimeter of the security zone of the Government Quarter. The security zone in and around the Government Quarter consists of multiple layers of security measures, such as surveillance cameras, bollards, control stations, security guards and probably artificial intelligence such as car sign recognition technology [51]. All measures are reactive measures aimed at preventing a similar attack from happening again.

For those who claimed that these urban counterterrorism measures constituted a hostile environment and a surveillance regime, these arguments were met by the authorities and security personnel as an old-fashioned view of urban security. In Norway, integrated security measures have broad support among architects, security consultants and public actors [60]. The idea was that by redesigning counterterrorism measures into practical or artistic features. These measures would not be perceived by the public as counterterrorism measures [61]. Consequently, urban security measures could be multifunctional and provide added value to the urban landscape. This idea is exemplified by a municipal employee who not only described urban counterterrorism measures as aesthetic but as serving a multifunctional purpose:

> *We aim to use proactive measures that also have other types of functions built into them. To the extent that we are going to set up security measures, it should not be just a security measure. There will be a bench, there will be a large granite-type flower box in which you can plant trees, there will be a type of standing table.*

This approach to counterterrorism is an attempt to converge hard counterterrorism measures into softer and public acceptable measures. The multifunction of the measures hides the fact that they are counterterrorism measures, which illustrates that there remains scepticism about the homeland security approach in Norway, even for a government quarter that has been the scene of a devastating terrorist attack. Consequently, the dichotomous value challenge of freedom versus security that has been strong in the Norwegian public media debate is still present.

In the time after 2011, counterterrorism went from being a centralised responsibility to a local activity where municipalities and private companies played a crucial part. Both national, municipal and private owners were now concerned with securing their own buildings based on risk assessment. This caused an enormous focus on risk assessment tools and an increase in local actors' responsibility to implement local protective measures [16, 62, 63]. This led to several uncoordinated security measures around different buildings and streets in Oslo. This tendency was further increased during the next period of the ISIL threat.

4.4 ISIL: protecting of crowded locations

With the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the threat of terrorist attacks significantly increased, new threats emerged and some specific types of modus operandi intensified [45, 64].

ISIL announced its caliphate in June 2014 and formally ended the caliphate's claim to any territory in 2019. ISIL's threat to the West was different than the threat posed by al-Qaida. While al-Qaida committed much of its resources to the global war on terrorism and to organise major operations in the West, ISIL's main ambition was to establish a caliphate in Iraq and the Levant. ISIL called for sympathiser attacks triggering so-called "individual jihad" operations by unaffiliated sympathisers in the West [65]. Sympathiser attacks belonged to the lower end of the spectrum of organisational involvement where the attacker expressed ideological support for the group, leaving the target selection and the modus operandi to those in the front line. The consequence for the West was an extensive increase in terrorist attacks committed by sympathisers selecting a variety of targets by using different modus operandi. The attacks were primarily directed against soft targets and crowded places [45]. Explosives and firearms were used in mass casualties attacks targeting public transport, nightlife, concerts and media houses among others in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in Nice, Barcelona, London, München and Stockholm in 2016 and 2017 proved the lethal potential of large vehicles assaulting pedestrians [45]. The use of simple weapons such as vehicles or knives required little preparation. The broad selection and adjustment of targets in addition to the variations of modus operandi challenged urban security strategies. The extensive variety of modus operandi and target selection created an almost infinite need for protection in the city, at least in crowded places.

This wave of ISIL-supported terrorist attacks in Europe, especially the modus operandi of using vehicles to overrun pedestrians and the use of firearms towards crowded places, also triggered the question of new counterterrorism measures in Oslo. Urban counterterrorism measures were implemented in crowded streets and places in the form of physical barriers, aiming to prevent the use of vehicle attacks. Oslo Municipality, as owner of the streets in the city, deployed physical barriers at the main shopping street, Karl Johans gate. The municipality first implemented concrete pipes as temporary barriers, which were replaced by flower pots some months later. In addition, some shopping malls also deployed physical barriers outside their entrances.

In addition to the physical barriers, an important measure to encounter the modus operandi from ISIL was to strengthen the police's emergency response by arming the police. In Norway, the police are generally unarmed, but the Ministry of Justice can approve temporary arming in exceptional cases. The threat from ISIL sympathisers was deemed exceptional, and the Ministry repeatedly approved temporary arming of the police. Arming the police was argued as a measure to strengthen the police response capability, particularly against low-tech attacks with firearms and bladed weapons independently of the location in the city.

In contrast to previous, events that were considered high risk were protected by extensive security measures, often with a combination of physical security efforts and strengthened police emergency response. The most visible example was the Norwegian National Day children's parade in Oslo, usually attended by around 30,000 pupils. Due to the threat posed by ISIL, the 2017 parade was for the first time heavily protected by security measures. Streets were blocked by physical barriers, mainly buses or police vehicles, and by a high number of armed police officers. From being a

children's parade with limited visible security measures, the parade was now heavily protected by armed police, police vehicles, trucks and buses.

The implementation of these extensive security measures illustrated an increased acceptance of urban counterterrorism measures during the ISIL period. However, the debate for each of these measures demonstrated that the legacy of the Norwegian reluctance to urban counterterrorism was still vibrant. Although the police were more frequently temporarily armed, the Norwegian police were still generally unarmed. Oslo municipality deployed the physical barriers at the main shopping street as late as November 2018. This was more than a year after the attack in Barcelona, Stockholm and London, and more than 2 years after the attacks in Berlin and Nice. It was first in 2018, Oslo Municipality established a working group of employees from several municipal agencies to assess counterterrorism measures in Oslo city. Interviews with these employees demonstrate the perceived reluctance of the Norwegian population against counterterrorism measures:

> *The danger is that we get far too many measures. If we implement bollards all over the city, granite blocks, more guards and police in the cities, and the police are armed at all times. We get ICCT surveillance and someone who constantly monitors video screens. Is that the kind of society we actually want? I don't think we want that.*

The statement of this municipal employee represents an extensive opinion among those interviewed employees in the municipality and in the police, which was aligned with the criticism in the public debate. The employees' scepticism was also related to the uncertainty of the actual effectiveness of the measures:

> *When we start talking about permanent security of the entire urban area, how extensive should this be? Yes, we secure Karl Johans gate, but what about adjacent streets that are almost the same size? Are you then moving the risk elsewhere? This is terribly difficult. […] In addition, there is the dilemma that the threats are constantly changing. Now, the threats are big white vans and trucks. A few years ago, there were men with machetes and knives. Next time it's drone attacks we must protect ourselves against, or it's white powder, or something chemical or something biological (Employee at Oslo Municipality).*

The displacement effect of measures and the continuous change of type of targets and modus operandi caused doubt among employees about the effect of the security measures, and whether such security measures could be legitimised. This reduced the willingness to implement physical measures although the threat was significant. Moreover, municipal employees emphasised the limited knowledge on whether physical barriers in cities increased or decreased citizens feeling of safety [31, 33, 66, 67]. Additionally, they experienced limited knowledge regarding the effects of urban counterterrorism which reduced the legitimacy of the measures. The municipalities' strategy was to seek closer partnership with the police, aiming for the police's support for their decisions on implementing security measures [42]. Finally, securing streets and public areas entailed obstacles for various demands in Oslo, for instance, the need to deliver goods to shops, bars and restaurants, as well as the rescue vehicles' requirements of access to streets and areas. These practical challenges of implementing physical measures limited the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures.

The comprehensive and diverse threat posed by ISIL resulted in new layers of invasive security measures in Oslo city. The arming of the police, the physical

barriers at shopping streets and in front of shopping malls, as well as the extensive security protection of vulnerable events, were each one a considerable new security measure, and together a substantial extension of invasive counterterrorism measures in Oslo city. This illustrated at least a manifestation of the increased acceptance of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo after 22/7. Conversely, the maintenance of the police as generally unarmed, and the slow and limited deployment of physical security barriers in the streets of Oslo illustrated the persistent reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures.

4.5 The Bærum mosque attack and the pride shooting; further strengthening of implemented measures

With the fall of ISIL, the number of terrorist attacks and the threat to the West was reduced [64]. The dissolvent of ISIL's "caliphate" had a strong symbolic power and limited the terrorist organisation's appeal, which also reduced the organisation's influence on sympathisers in Europe. However, the number of right-wing terrorist attacks in the West increased in 2018, and in the national threat assessment from 2020, the Police Security Serviced assessed the terrorist threat posed by extreme Islamists and right-wing extremism as equal describing potential weapons for both groups as vehicles, firearms, and simple improvised explosives [68]. Despite the use of similar weapons, the potential targets were different. Accordingly, extreme Islamists could attack ideological opponents or individuals insulting Islam, uniformed police or military personnel, or crowded places. Right-wing terrorist attacks could be directed at Muslims or non-Western immigrants, dignitaries, politicians, Jews or the LGBTQ+ community. This complexity of potential target selection and modus operandi posed a significant challenge to urban security which was confirmed in the two terrorist attacks in Oslo.

In August 2019, a 21-year-old Norwegian right-wing extremist shot and killed his adopted stepsister at their home before he attacked a local mosque in Bærum, a suburb of Oslo. In June 2022, a 40-year-old Norwegian-Iranian extreme Islamist conducted a mass shooting directed at the bars of LGBTQ+ communities at the Pride festival. In both cases, the perpetrators were assaulted by civilians. The public debate as well as the appointed evaluation commissions in the aftermath of the attacks focused on the police's inability to prevent the attacks by discovering the radicalised perpetrators beforehand and whether the emergency response had been adequate. Security measures were also debated afterwards, and some mosques implemented fences, surveillance and other security measures. The LGBTQ+ community wanted physical barriers to prevent vehicles from driving in the street where the attacked LGBTQ bars were located, but due to public transport, the tram rails passing the street, the need for delivery of goods to bars and shops, and emergency vehicles need to drive through the street, physical barriers were not considered feasible. The municipality has only traffic signs forbidding driving in the street [69, 70]. This illustrates the usual practice of securing the target of the previous attack, as well as the challenges of the practicalities of urban counterterrorism.

In the post-ISIL period, Oslo municipality and the established working group continued assessing the dominating modus operandi from the ISIL-period; vehicles overrunning pedestrians. Although some crowded streets or places were identified as vulnerable, the reduction of the threat posed by ISIL and the uncertainties of the effects of physical barriers prevented the deployment of several physical barriers to protect specific streets or urban places in the city. In this period, few new

counterterrorism measures were installed in Oslo, except the securing of the Royal Castle with bollards which was finished in 2023, and the ongoing reconstruction of the Government Quarter which still causes debates regarding the current and future security regime.

5. Discussion

Over the last two decades, the city of Oslo has implemented a multiplicity of urban counterterrorism measures to protect buildings, public spaces, and citizens against potential terrorist attacks. The analysis shows that the five identified periods of urban counterterrorism are associated with various dominant terrorism threats, different potential targets, and diverse forms of attack modus in addition to an increased acceptance of urban counterterrorism measures. Each period has led to different types of urban counterterrorism measures, and in total increased the number of locations protected against terrorism. The first period up to 9/11 was dominated by the reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures. The second period after 9/11 was characterised by the protection of foreign and international regulated sectors. In the third period after 22/7, the focus was on protecting ministries and the Government Quarter. The fourth period was dominated by the terrorism threat of ISIL which led to the protection of urban crowded places and the strengthening of the emergency response, and the fifth period reinforced these ongoing trends. While the threat has changed and evolved, new layers of urban security measures have been added while those already implemented endure. This means that an increased number of locations in Oslo have become the site of urban counterterrorism measures.

The analysis clearly illustrates that urban counterterrorism measures are initiated and implemented reactively after terrorist attacks in Norway or other countries relevant to Norwegian security to protect the targets of the previous attack, or when the terrorist threat is perceived as extraordinary and the measures are a direct response to a specific threat, that is the use of vehicles overrunning pedestrians. This demonstrates that exogenous factors, factors usually outside the realm of public policy actors such as an event, are important aspects for when to implement urban counterterrorism measures. However, as highlighted by Renard [28] complex policy-making environments are influenced not only by exogenous factors but also by endogenous factors. The case of Oslo illustrates how endogenous factors such as a country's history, traditions and values are important for urban counterterrorism policy. This is clearly visible in the scepticism to urban counterterrorism that has been present in all time periods, even for the urban counterterrorism measures that were implemented in the Norwegian Government Quarter after the attack in 2011. Despite the massive implementation of urban measures, civil servants and security experts emphasised the uncertainty of the effectiveness of the security measures. They argued that the risk-reducing effects of the measures were low and only protected the city of Oslo from terrorism to a specific target and a specific modus operandi. Moreover, they were also concerned about the other negative side-effects of such measures, for example how they limited the citizens' freedom to use the city, increased the polarisation between citizen groups and could lead to fear or a hostile environment. The acknowledgement of the limitation of the implemented security measures was also evident in the public discourse. The reluctance to security measures was also visible in the ongoing debate of arming the police, in which the police, are still only temporarily armed on extraordinary occasions.

The implementation of a multiplicity of urban counterterrorism measures in the city of Oslo over the last decades indicates an increased recognition of the necessity for urban counterterrorism measures. However, many of the measures were implemented late. This shows that the historical reluctance to urban counterterrorism measures still is present and that the Norwegian traditions and values to such security measures are still dominated by a caution against implementing physical security measures in the urban landscape.

Moreover, the case of Oslo illustrates a dissonance between goal and reality in urban counterterrorism. Endogenous factors such as ideas and interests do not only influence whether security measures should be implemented or not, but also institutions' preferences on how to implement urban counterterrorism measures. In Oslo, the continuous reluctance to implement urban counterterrorism measures seems to have derived some specific preferences on how to implement such measures if they should be used. As previously described, it is an aim to use *integrated security measures*. By using benches, trees, water mirrors and hilly terrains, counterterrorism measures are redesigned into practical or artistic features. Instead of being perceived by the public as counterterrorism measures, these measures thus become a positive element in the urban landscape [61]. The integrated security approach is included in the international strategy of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) [39] and is not unique to Oslo. However, as previously described many actors in Oslo emphasised that the physical measures should have an *added value* to the urban landscape by being multifunctional. The ambition is for the security measures to make a positive contribution to the urban environment beyond increasing safety, for example an esthetical bench or water mirror. This principle of using integrated security design is included in Oslo Municipality's guide to safeguarding streets and places in the city "Oslo Center - Street Use and Ground Protection" (2014). These principles are linked to the municipalities' overall ambitions to create a pleasant and inviting vibrant city that people want to use.

The third goal is to use a holistic approach, which is explained by municipal security personnel as:

> *With a holistic approach, I mean that we have done some work and evaluated several different threats and assessed security in a larger area and not just an object or street. We have looked at several possible measures.*

A holistic approach consists of three elements: assessing various types of threats, assessing the security of larger areas of the city and not just one street or object, and assessing the use of alternative measures. A holistic approach includes assessing various types of terrorist threats in a larger area of the city consisting of different protected streets, places, and buildings in the city. Integrated security measures are an essential part of this holistic approach. The holistic approach has the ambition of maximising the preventive effect of the implemented measures and reducing the potential negative side-effects of the security measures.

Although the actors have three goals for the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures, *holistic approach, integrated security measures,* and *added value*, the case of Oslo clearly illustrates the numerous challenges to achieve these objectives. Integrated security measures and added value require in many cases long-term spatial planning. The possibilities for designing integrated security measures with added values are strengthened by already assessing the security needs in the planning and design of urban spaces. However, in many cases, long-term spatial planning is often

difficult due to the already existence of buildings and urban spaces. Also, as our analysis has illustrated, there already exist several urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo that have been implemented in accordance with previous periods of counterterrorism. Thus, there is no possibility to start from the beginning in a holistic planning process. Moreover, integrated security measures require a combination of knowledge about security measures and urban planning, which is limited in most municipalities in Norway.

A holistic approach with the use of integrated security measures also requires far greater holistic thinking and cooperation between various national, municipal and private actors than what has been seen to date. An important factor is the main principle within urban counterterrorism that the owner of the object or a function is responsible for their own security measures [71]. The city consists of fragmented ownership relationships, and there are different regulations for various objects. The ISPS code regulates port and maritime security. The Security Act regulates functions that are defined as national security interests or basic national functions [72]. The Planning and Building Act [73] regulates all other non-critical objects. For this type of object, it is the municipality, through its role as planning authority, which decides whether object owners can implement physical security measures. This means that there is no single regulatory authority with the mandate and permission to coordinate the implementation of security measures in the city. In Oslo, the reality is that national, municipal and private owners have been concerned with securing their own buildings or spaces based on separated and limited budgets. The city's fragmented ownership and responsibility, different regulations and separate and limited budgets have led to a lack of holistic thinking about urban counterterrorism. This explains some of the dissonance between ambitions and realities in urban counterterrorism and that urban counterterrorism measures have been implemented despite the reluctance of many actors.

The consequences of this are several clusters of counterterrorism measures that mainly secure individual objects but to a lesser extent the city and its citizens. In Oslo, this is visualised by how certain objects such as the castle, the parliament and the main shopping street, are secured by physical measures, instead of securing larger parts of the city. The effect of such individual security measures is presumably more limited. In addition, there is a danger that several less integrated individual measures will lead to limitations in citizens' accessibility to urban spaces and a weakening of the citizens' perceived security. In the long term, it may reduce the democratic function of public space as an arena for social representation and cohesion.

6. Conclusion

Securing cities and their citizens against terrorist attacks is an essential element in the global war on terrorism. Over the last two decades, the city of Oslo has implemented an array of security measures to protect buildings, urban public spaces and citizens against possible terrorist attacks. There is a clear connection between the perceived changes in modus operandi of terrorism and the implementation of urban counterterrorism. Our analysis has demonstrated that implementation of urban counterterrorism measures is influenced by both exogenous factors such as terrorism threats and attacks and endogenous factors such as culture, values and historical discourses. 9/11 had a great impact on urban security measures in Norway. However, other events and threats regarded as relevant to Norwegian security have also had major impacts on the implementation of urban counterterrorism measures in Oslo.

Urban security measures have gone from being something that was almost absent before 9/11, to the protection of foreign and internationally regulated sectors after 9/11 and the threat of Islamic terrorism, to protect local objects, ministries and the Government Quarter after 22/7, and to secure urban crowded placed after other European and neighbouring countries had been attacked by ISIL. The analysis clearly illustrates that urban counterterrorism measures are reactively initiated and implemented after terrorist attacks deemed relevant to Norwegian security. The perception of the threat and the associated modus operandi have paved the way for different layers of urban counterterrorism measures that are not being removed when new urban security measures are added. Consequently, an increased number of locations have become the site of protective measures. The conclusion of this study is that there is a dissonance between the aim and realities of urban counterterrorism measures that influence the security and freedom of citizens. Future research should investigate the impacts of urban counterterrorism in other cities to assess the impact of exogenous and endogenous factors behind the implementation of urban counterterrorism.

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Chapter 12

Formation of New Approaches to the Fight against Terrorism and Separatism in the Context of Increasing International Tension on the Eurasian Continent

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Abstract

The chapter will consider the main problems of modern terrorist threats in Europe and Asia. As part of the analysis of the European anti-terrorism policy, special attention will be paid to legislation in the field of digital counter terrorism, as well as specific policy measures of the European Union states to overcome the problem of terrorism. In addition, the possibility of effectively confronting the Central Asian countries with terrorist and separate threats, which are traditional for the region, will be considered. At the same time, regional trends in the formation of a new anti-terrorist policy, in the conditions of international tension, as well as the policy of the new Afghan government and its place in the system of ensuring the stability of the region will be outlined.

Keywords: European Union, Central Asia, Russia, terrorism, jihadism

1. Introduction

The increase in the activity and diversity of modern terrorism is a serious problem that is crucial for ensuring stable and secure state development. Eurasia is the largest continent in the world and is often the target of terrorist attacks. In this context, the activities of major organizations in ensuring counterterrorism security become particularly important. Studying and analyzing the methods and institutional foundations of counterterrorism activities will allow for a better analysis of existing programs and the development of more advanced methods to combat terrorist devices in the future.

Accordingly, this work will examine the activities of Eurasian states in regulating the issue of terrorism and its derivatives through normative and instrumental means. The main features of regional regulation will be analyzed, as well as the factors that may influence the further development of the situation. Eurasia, in this work, is understood to include the continent encompassing the territory of modern Europe,

Russia, Central Asia, and partially China. Other parts of Asia, such as South or Southeast Asia, which are formally located on the Eurasian continent, are excluded from this list because their counterterrorism systems differ significantly on a purely regional level, and comparing the abovementioned parts of the continent can provide a clearer and more systematic analysis.

Broadly, this research can be divided into two parts: Eastern and Western. The Western part refers to the system of sociopolitical and legal norms with a clear system of control and a unified hierarchy, within which the EU member states regulate their counterterrorism activities. The western part of Eurasia in its development involves an analysis of the activities of the EU as a common exponent of pan-European political unity. At the same time, the Eastern part refers to several interconnected but independent structures that regulate the structure of counterterrorism activities on the territory of Russia, Central Asian states, and China. It is worth noting that the mutual influence of these structures and large states forms a unique environment for countering terrorism. Within this environment, its own system of "checks and balances" is being formed, which outlines not only the general contours of counterterrorism policy in the region but also the system of interstate interaction.

2. West Eurasia

European legislation concerning counterterrorism activities began to develop in the 1990s, but it was not until the twenty-first century that the system reached its peak. The catalyst for this development was the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States. It is worth noting that the entire system of normative and legal regulation in this area, like many others within the EU, has its specific characteristics. These include a focus on international law as the preferred approach, harmonization of legislation among all member states of the organization, the establishment of special collective bodies to prevent terrorist threats, and the specificity of national-level regulation of terrorism issues.

After September 11 and the issuance of the UN resolution on September 28 aimed at creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the European Council adopted several resolutions concerning the prevention of terrorism on European territory. In 2002, the EU developed the Strategy (Plan) for Counter-Terrorism Activities. This plan became the institutional foundation for the organization's counterterrorism activities, as it outlined the key measures to combat terrorism, defined the concept of "terrorism" itself, and laid the foundations for harmonizing the laws of member states regarding this phenomenon. Following a series of terrorist attacks in 2014–2015, the EU adopted a new counterterrorism strategy. This strategy primarily focused on strengthening surveillance of users' personal data, such as the creation of a biometric database for passports, the establishment of a special law enforcement network, enhanced control of terrorist activities on the internet, and the retention of telephone call records for up to 6 months, among other measures. These steps were crucial in enhancing the EU's protection against terrorist attacks.

In the same year, the European Council adopted a directive aimed at combating money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which complemented the Common Position of the European Council No. 2001/931/CFSP, regulating the funding of terrorism. The 2005 directive further normalized the system established by the 2001 Position by creating two lists for the financing of foreign terrorists and terrorists on EU territory, making the work of special services more complex.

Subsequently, there was gradual modernization and harmonization of European counterterrorism law.

After the terrorist attacks in 2015–2016, systemic documents aimed at adopting more coordinated measures to combat terrorism were introduced. However, the documents adopted during this period had limited impact, as they largely reiterated previous agreements.

With the onset of the migration crisis in the EU from 2014 to 2019, the risk of terrorist acts also increased due to the arrival of many individuals from impoverished African and Middle Eastern countries. Considering this issue, the European Commission prepared a special document in April 2015—the European Security Agenda. Within this Agenda, decisions were made to implement criminal law and criminal procedural tools to combat terrorism, including a revision of Framework Decision No. 2002/475/JHA [1]. In December of the same year, the Commission prepared a draft directive on counterterrorism, which was approved on March 15, 2017. The main goal of Directive No. 2017/541 [2] was to align EU legislation on terrorism with international legal norms and adapt it to new challenges and realities [3]. This Directive also regulates the activities of EU citizens traveling abroad to engage in terrorism, the protection of victims of terrorist acts, and additional criminal liability for financing terrorism.

The terrorist attacks after the start of the migration crisis significantly worsened the situation for European domestic tourism. Many tourist centers in Europe, such as France, Belgium, and other countries, suffered greatly from ISIS and similar organizations. Tourists are often targeted by terrorists because it leads to media coverage and the spread of information about the attack [4].

Europol also carries out additional measures to counter terrorism. Its goal is to facilitate cooperation and coordination among EU member states on issues related to illegal drug trafficking, migration, terrorism, and international crime. While this organization is not analogous to the FBI, Europol currently performs extensive information and analytical functions and provides support in conducting investigations. A similar function is performed by Eurojust, but in the legal and regulatory domain.

In 2015, work in the digital sphere also intensified. A group for information sharing on the internet was created to reduce the level and consequences of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda online. In this area, the EU faced significant technological challenges. It was difficult to cover the entire internet space, and the rapid growth of technology added to the complexity. Tracking direct propaganda among young people on the internet was also challenging, as it was often difficult to machine-distinguish between extreme political views and terrorism propaganda. The EU was unable to establish a unified approach in this direction. However, by 2020, an Anti-Terrorism Plan was developed, which aimed at countering radicalization online, conducting cultural work with various segments of the population, and protecting residents from the consequences of terrorist acts. Additionally, after a meeting with major technology companies in 2019 following the Christchurch tragedy, an agreement was reached to regulate extremist content on the platforms of these companies, which helped to better control the online environment.

In recent years, there has been significant collaboration between special law enforcement agencies and digital platform representatives and digital service providers, including operators of major online platforms (including social networks). Europol has taken a leading role in coordinating the activities of online platforms and national authorities of EU member states through its Internet Referral Unit and the EU Internet Forum, which includes representatives of key companies (YouTube/

Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter). The coordination with the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, which brings together the same private sector entities and the EU, along with 29 other countries and the United Nations, has significantly reduced jihadist propaganda [5]. The primary tool is a database of hashtags that records identified terrorist materials and provides cross-platform blocking.

A similar project within the EU itself is the Regulation on removing terrorist content from the Internet. The regulation allows for better control of terrorist activity and timely removal from the Internet. Nevertheless, difficulties still exist in removing information hosted on the territory of another EU country. Another challenge is the upcoming deployment of 5G technologies. Given the need for internet segmentation and increased user anonymity due to encryption when using 5G, Europol and national control agencies may find themselves in a situation where it will be impossible for them to track terrorists. To address this issue, some politicians want to require providers to collect unencrypted user data as a mandatory measure, but this approach faces various human rights issues regarding privacy [6].

It is important to note that at the national level, a series of laws and regulations are also enacted to expand or refine the pan-European directives related to counterterrorism. For example, in Germany in 2021, the Law on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crimes was passed, amending several laws and requiring major companies involved in social media to report suspected illegal content to the authorities. On September 22, a law was enacted to protect politicians under threat and individuals targeted due to their national, racial, religious/ethnic origin, ideology, disability, or sexual orientation. In July, the German parliament passed a law to enhance surveillance capabilities by the domestic intelligence service. The increased use of encrypted communication poses challenges to targeted surveillance. In March, the parliament passed the Foreign Intelligence Act, which regulates and enhances oversight of Germany's foreign intelligence service [7]. Considering the specific architecture of security in Germany, it is worth noting the strong limitations of its security services due to the strict separation of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, which hampers cooperation, and restrictions on collecting personal data of German citizens.

In 2021, France also enacted a series of important laws to control terrorist activities. Given the high level of jihadist terrorist threat, on August 24, France adopted the "Respect for the Principles of the Republic" law, also known as the "Anti-Separatism" law, aimed at dispelling concerns that radical Islamists have created parallel societies that instill ideas contrary to French values. This law aims for the gradual integration of Islamic migrants into French society and combating the formation of a "parallel society," which is a problem for the country. On July 30, the Law on Combating Terrorism and Espionage was enacted, which allows for more effective measures to control suspects of terrorism, including conducting searches and closing "suspicious" religious institutions that promote radical Islam [8]. At the same time, a special armed contingent of 7000 people remains in the country as part of Operation "Sentinel," which is aimed at promptly responding to terrorist threats.

In these countries, a significant part of European counterterrorism policy is based on the British "Prevent" strategy, which has become the basis for similar pan-European and national programs. The foundation of this program is to prevent the "cultivation of radical views through education and full employment." In this system, there are special educators who regularly work with children and adults and constantly regulate their understanding that terrorism is a dangerous and destructive phenomenon [9].

It is also worth noting the several peculiarities of European terrorism. First and foremost, according to Europol and Statista Research Department, religious terrorism poses the greatest threat [10]. In 2019 alone, about 436 cases of terrorist attacks were recorded in the EU. For comparison, the second-largest number of attacks comes from left-wing and anarchist organizations, with 111 incidents for the same year. Although the global COVID-19 pandemic led to a significant decrease in terrorist acts (only 260 cases of terrorist acts were recorded in 2021), this is only temporary. According to Europol's data, the most complex situation with religious (jihadist) terrorism exists in France. This country experiences the highest number of terrorist attacks each year [11]. The situation is also challenging in Germany. These countries are targeted by terrorism due to the difficulty of adapting a large number of migrants to European conditions, resulting in cultural conflicts, a high prevalence of radical Islamic ideologies, and more.

There is also a relative isolation of other terrorist movements. While religious terrorism is widespread in many EU countries due to increased migration flows, the second-largest movement (left-wing radical) is generally confined to Italy, partially Greece and Spain, and separate terrorism in Spain, France, and Ireland, but to a much lesser extent. From this, it can be concluded that religious terrorism is currently the main problem for Europe. Although many politicians understand this issue, effective solutions have not yet been proposed. Educational work with youth and regulating propaganda on the internet remains the common practice, but considering the entrenched Islamic communities, especially in France and Germany, control over such areas is physically challenging. In 2016, within the European Parliament, a proposal was made to "instill European values" in Muslim imams, but this proposal was immediately rejected because it implied the imposition of one's culture and a violation of human freedom of choice, as well as the practical impossibility of secular authorities legally controlling the activities of religious figures. Thus, the EU still retains the prerogative of using traditional methods to influence the prevention of religious terrorism.

Moreover, the primary source of radicalization, which serves as the foundation for terrorism and extremism in Europe, remains largely unexamined, according to several studies [12]. Significant knowledge gaps persist regarding effective platforms for dialog within society in several EU member states, preventing the effective implementation of preventive measures against terrorism. At the same time, a relatively high level of bureaucratization exists not only within the EU as an organization, as previously discussed, but also at the national level. This weakens police control over suspicious activities and contributes to the corresponding increase in terrorist acts.

Currently, an important part of the EU's counterterrorism strategy is the Strategic Agenda for 2019–2024. The key feature of the Agenda, adopted by the European Council in June 2019, is the protection of societies from threats aimed at the information that the European administration operates on. In its conclusions, the European Council called on "EU institutions together with member states to work on measures to enhance resilience and improve the EU's security culture against cyber and hybrid threats from beyond the EU, as well as to better protect the EU's information and communication networks and its decision-making processes from malicious activities of all kinds." In addition, as part of the fight against cyberterrorism in 2020, a new Cybersecurity Strategy was formulated. The EU Cybersecurity Strategy is a key component of the "Shaping Europe's Digital Future" plan, the formation of a European security platform, and the EU Security Union Strategy. This position leads to the

improvement of collective resilience of European states to cyber threats and ensures that all citizens and businesses can fully utilize secure and reliable services and digital tools. The Cybersecurity Strategy also allows the EU to strengthen its leadership in shaping international legal norms and standards in cyberspace and enhance cooperation with partners worldwide to promote a global, open, stable, and secure cyberspace based on the rule of law, fundamental human rights, and democratic values. The Strategy emphasizes the need for further development of digital sovereignty in the context of increasing competition in the provision of digital services and technologies on the global stage. The document contains prerequisites for the formation of a pan-European "cyber shield" based on the creation of AI and self-learning algorithms that will anticipate hacker attacks on critical information infrastructure, as well as the integration of national cyber incident response teams into a single network (Joint Cyber Unit).

3. East Eurasia

The Eastern space of counterterrorism security has several distinctive features that significantly differentiate it from the European space. First and foremost, segmentation should be noted. Unlike the well-structured and hierarchical security space within the EU, Eurasian security structures are formed in parallel by different states and organizations. Many states can simultaneously be part of several similar organizations with similar goals and maintain a relatively stable course in countering terrorism, as seen, for example, within the framework of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union). The second important characteristic of the region is the influence of major states. Countries like Russia and China possess significant resources and influence to establish necessary security structures, primarily based on their own interests, while taking into account the international policies of other states.

When considering specific international actors that influence the security system and counterterrorism efforts in Eurasia, it is essential to discuss both organizations and individual states. From a regional and international structure perspective, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) stand out as the most prominent global actors in implementing counterterrorism strategies. At the same time, countries such as Russia, which often leads counterterrorism initiatives in the aforementioned organizations; China, which has its interests in Central Asia; and to some extent Kazakhstan, which possesses both experience in regulating counterterrorism activities and significant resources for development in this direction should be noted.

It is necessary to primarily examine counterterrorism organizations, as they represent the aspirations of the largest number of states simultaneously. In particular, the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) should be considered since this organization has the most developed legal framework and practical experience in regulating such illegal activities. In the early twenty-first century, precisely in 2001, the SCO Convention established a clear definition of "terrorism," which implied acts related to intimidating the population and creating a danger to human life and health, causing significant property damage or ecological disasters, or other severe consequences to achieve political, religious, ideological, and other goals by

influencing the decisions of authorities or international organizations. This provision became fundamental for the entire development of the Eastern part of Eurasia and the formation of subsequent legislative acts.

Furthermore, this provision was confirmed and supplemented in the 2009 SCO Convention against Terrorism. A significant step toward directly combating terrorism was the establishment of the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) of the SCO in 2002, which was intended to coordinate the actions of member states in countering terrorism. With its inception, a regular practice of adopting a three-year action plan was initiated, which proved to be successful in subsequent years. The organization of regular counterterrorism exercises, starting from 2006, created effective practical mechanisms for countering terrorist acts. In 2017, within the SCO, a convention dedicated exclusively to combating extremism was developed and adopted—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism. This Convention, on the one hand, maintains continuity with the two aforementioned acts and introduces new elements into the mechanism of countering extremism. On the other hand, compared to the 2001 Convention, the 2017 Convention: (a) expands the notion of "extremism," which includes "ideology and practice aimed at resolving political, social, racial, national, and religious conflicts through violent and other unconstitutional actions" and (b) introduces a new concept of extremist act: it includes acts specified in paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism of June 15, 2001, as well as such actions as "organizing armed rebellion and participating in it for extremist purposes" and so forth [13].

In 2017, within the framework of the SCO, a convention was developed and adopted exclusively dedicated to the fight against extremism—the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention on Countering Extremism. This Convention, on the one hand, maintains the continuity of the two acts we analyzed and introduces new elements into the mechanism of countering extremism, on the other hand, in particular, in comparison with the 2001 Convention. The 2017 Convention: (a) expanded the concept of "extremism,": it refers to "ideology and practice aimed at resolving political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts through violent and other unconstitutional actions" and (b) introduced a new concept of an extremist act: it included the acts provided for in subparagraph 3 of paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism of June 15, 2001, as well as such acts as "organizing an armed rebellion and participating in it in extremist purposes, etc".

In recent years, there has also been a clear increase in the activity of Islamic radicals in Kazakhstan, which was previously considered a much safer state in this regard than Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The Islamist organization "Soldiers of the Caliphate" took responsibility for the terrorist attacks that were carried out on the territory of Kazakhstan, for example, in 2012 (in large cities, including the regional centers of Aktobe, Atyrau, Astana, Almaty, and Taraz). As it turned out in 2017, it was founded by a citizen of Tajikistan D. Znaliev together with two citizens of Kazakhstan on the territory of Pakistan in the free tribe zone of North Waziristan and included people from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Arab countries. At the beginning of 2017, D. Znaliev was caught on the territory of Afghanistan and extradited to Kazakhstan, where a trial took place. As a result, D. Znaliev was found guilty of "creating and leading a terrorist group, financing terrorist activities, as well as repeatedly committing actions that create a danger of death, causing significant property damage in order to violate

public safety, intimidate the population" and was sentenced to prison imprisonment for a period of 20 years.

In 2020, during the global coronavirus pandemic, the SCO's activities were significantly limited but did not cease. It is worth highlighting the participation of the SCO RATS Executive Committee in the virtual Counter-Terrorism Week organized within the framework of the UN [14]. In this context, the Executive Committee noted the increasing number of migrants who left the territories of SCO member states to participate in combat actions in Syria and Iraq as volunteers for the "Islamic State."

Makengo and Xue, in their analysis of the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), point out that this organization is primarily built on the basis of equal cooperation and the potential for real development in various spheres of interaction [15]. In this context, the cooperation between Pakistan and India, which became members of the organization in 2017, becomes an influential factor in maintaining regional stability against terrorist threats. However, the previously mentioned change of government in Afghanistan, as well as unsuccessful attempts by the United States to neutralize the Taliban in Afghanistan, led to an increase in the number of terrorist incidents in Pakistan by almost two times in 2021 [16]. This also activated other Islamist groups in Central Asia. Guvvadi M., who conducts research on counterterrorism activities in New Delhi, largely agrees with Makengo and Xue regarding the necessity of the SCO for maintaining security in East Eurasia. Furthermore, the researcher specifies that the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is essential as a tool for coordinated actions in the region and for terrorism control [17]. In this context, it is worth noting that Iran's accession to the SCO may contribute to the development of a common concept of peaceful Islamic integration and counter-radicalization, given that most member states have a significant Muslim population. The creation of a concept for harmonious Islamic development could be used for negotiations with the new Afghan leadership and its integration into the global community.

There has been a clear trend of increasing influence of the SCO as a counterterrorism organization in recent years. When comparing the ability of the SCO and NATO to counter terrorist threats, several features stand out. First and foremost is the more comprehensive approach of SCO member states to the criminalization of terrorism. Unlike NATO, which includes a large portion of European states and is oriented toward ensuring the security and stability of the region, the SCO takes a stricter approach to allowing third countries to participate in its military exercises and operations. In this regard, NATO's counterterrorism operations appear more open to support from the international community and their subsequent deepening. As noted by Sadik and Ispir [18], the SCO has a more centralized structure in counterterrorism due to the existence of RATS and an existing network of informal agreements between member states. In this context, the SCO outperforms both NATO and the EU. Despite all of the above, it should be understood that cooperation between counterterrorism structures is currently impossible. This is justified by both the absence of historical precedents for such negotiations and the political tension between organization members. Unfortunately, this factor can pose a problem in ensuring counterterrorism security in Eurasia.

In turn, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) began actively developing its counterterrorism structures somewhat earlier. The key international act of the CIS in the field of counterterrorism is the Agreement on Cooperation of Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, dated June 4, 1999, which defines the ways of cooperation among competent authorities.

Among them, one can highlight information exchange, the execution of incoming requests for operational-search measures, the provision of information and analytical support in assessing the state of the system for the physical protection of objects of increased technological and environmental risk, the development and implementation of measures to improve this system, and so on. In 2000, the organization established the Anti-Terrorism Center. It is important to emphasize the Concept of Cooperation of Security Agencies and Special Services in the Sphere of Information Counteraction to Terrorism and Other Manifestations of Extremism from 2009. This Concept serves as the basis for all CIS countries in terms of data exchange on cyberterrorism, sharing databases, and so forth [19]. However, the Concept has certain shortcomings. The most significant one is the weak conceptual framework for counterterrorism activities. Unlike SCO documents, which provide a clear definition of both ordinary terrorism and cyberterrorism, the CIS Concept lacks the second notion, which complicates data exchange. Several agreements and established rules within the CIS, according to Tarasov and Solodukhina [20], are specifically aimed at protecting strategically important infrastructure of member states of the organization, such as power plants, banks, and other structures. However, it is important to note that the legislative framework of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center does not include the concept of "strategic infrastructure." In 2018, the CIS expanded the agreement on cooperation in the field of cyber security and counterterrorism and introduced several new requirements regarding personal data protection, as well as the possibility of criminalizing a range of crimes committed in the digital environment, including the production and distribution of malicious software; destruction, blocking, modification, or copying of information; unauthorized access to legally protected computer information; and so on [21]. Within the organization, joint military exercises are regularly conducted; however, these exercises were suspended with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the nature of interaction between states in the context of counterterrorism has changed. In particular, issues related to information and analytical support have become more prominent during this period. This problem has prompted national states and organizations to accelerate the modernization of their special units and centers for combating terrorism and crime. An important systemic tool in countering terrorism propaganda in the digital space has been the prevention of unverified information in social networks, attempts to artificially create panic, or incitement of citizens to engage in specific forms of behavior and the establishment of social tension. The global situation that emerged due to the pandemic revealed a latent digital layer of activity of international terrorist and extremist organizations deployed on the Internet. The CIS Anti-Terrorism Center began paying more attention to working with young people, specifically countering extremist ideology through propaganda, which marked significant progress in the organization's development. Overall, it should be noted that the CIS developed more slowly compared to the SCO, but this can be explained by the differences in the development directions of the two organizations. At the same time, the modern legal framework of the organization is at a significant level, and all member states have a well-developed regulatory framework for managing emergency situations related to terrorism.

The CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) is also one of the main structures ensuring stability and counterterrorism resilience. Within the organization, there is a special unit dedicated to counterterrorism (the Working Group of Experts on Combating Terrorism and Illegal Migration). The CSTO has a series of agreements aimed at harmonizing the legislation of member countries in the field of information

and analytical work, countering terrorist technologies, ensuring national security, and more. In particular, in 2015, Recommendations for improving the legislation of CSTO member states in the field of countering technological terrorism were adopted, which also applied to the CSTO, leading to the development of response systems to terrorist acts among the member states of the organization. The most effective tool for ensuring security has been the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces of the CSTO (established by the decision of the CSTO Collective Security Council on February 4, 2009), the status of which still needs to be aligned with the provisions of Russian laws. However, the experience of using these forces has shown that one of the tasks that all states share is countering terrorism [22]. Within the framework of the CSTO's Collective Security Strategy until 2025, several prospective development directions have been identified, including the fight against manifestations of "hybrid wars" in the context of counterterrorism, combating religious extremism, systemic analysis, forecasting of terrorist activity using the most advanced technologies, and more [23]. Special attention is paid within the organization to enhancing security in the neighboring countries of Afghanistan since a significant number of religious extremists and terrorists originate from this country, along with increased drug trafficking. The most effective tool for regulating terrorist activities within the CSTO is the conduct of special operations. In terms of information, there is the "PROXY" protocol aimed at countering cyberterrorism, as well as the antidrug operation "Kanal." Additionally, the organization conducts monitoring, analytical, and other counterterrorism operations, similar to the activities of the CIS and SCO. At the same time, the CSTO responds promptly to emerging security issues in its member states. For instance, during the anti-government protests in Kazakhstan in 2020, when mass unrest involving the use of weapons occurred in the country's capital, the peacekeeping forces of the organization successfully quelled the rebellion, demonstrating the effectiveness and mobility of the CSTO's military structures. When examining the activities of regional organizations in countering terrorism, it is worth noting the peculiarities of a country-level approach to the problem. Russia actively develops its institutional base for countering terrorism. In particular, the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, the Information Security Concept from 2016, and several other regulatory documents establish the legal framework for monitoring terrorist activities. Considering Russia's state structure, it is important to note that there are different levels of counterterrorism efforts, including federal and local levels. Within this strategy, Russia ensures a nationwide doctrinal level of countering terrorism, developed in the National Operations Center and the Federal Operations Headquarters, which then pass instructions to local self-government bodies, which regulate these plans in accordance with their specific circumstances.

Since 2016, the activities of Russian counterterrorism agencies have been primarily focused on digital activity and cyberterrorism. To prevent this type of activity, various activities are carried out: preventive (analysis, counter-propaganda, identifying and closing channels for financing terrorism, identifying possible centers of terrorism dissemination, etc.), counterterrorism operations, and regular exercises. Special attention should also be paid to Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation No. 250 of May 1, 2022, "On Additional Measures to Ensure the Information Security of the Russian Federation" [24]. This decree places additional responsibilities on the leaders of state bodies and state-forming enterprises (organizations) to ensure the information security of their respective institutions. Criteria are established to classify an enterprise or organization as a subject of critical information infrastructure. This

decree also imposes specific obligations on Russian representatives for protecting critical information infrastructure. Nevertheless, there are still many shortcomings in Russian legislation concerning cyberterrorism and the protection of victims of terrorist attacks. It is also worth noting that the removal of dangerous, extremist, and terrorist content from the Russian internet segment is the responsibility of Roskomnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media). In the fight against terrorism, the organization strives to ban certain anonymizing programs. For example, in 2022, thanks to Roskomnadzor's lawsuit, a number of VPN services were blocked. In 2023, it became known that the organization is developing a system that will automatically block anonymizer services that allow creating virtual phone numbers without real confirmation, which can be used by terrorists. It is important to mention that according to Russian law, all digital data of users must be stored in Russia and retained by the service provider for reporting and providing this information to the Investigative Committee upon a special request.

It is worth noting that Russia is the most vulnerable country to terrorist attacks in East Eurasia. Ryazanov and Okhrimenko [25] consider that the average frequency of terrorist acts in Russia, from the collapse of the USSR to 2014, was three or more times higher than in other former socialist countries. This is due to the complex internal situation, the Chechen war, the challenging situation in Ingushetia, and more. It is also related to the loss of "Soviet identity," as many former residents sought self-identification within radical political and religious movements.

Russia also actively tries to enhance the combat readiness of Central Asian states against the terrorist threat. Through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Russian military bases are established, and joint training and education programs are conducted. In Kyrgyzstan, there is the Russian military airbase "Kant," the 954th test base for anti-submarine warfare; the 338th Navy communication node "Marevo;" and a seismic station. Discussions are underway to open a second Russian military base. In Tajikistan, there is the 201st Russian military base, the Optoelectronic Complex "Okno" ("Nurek") for space monitoring, and a group of Russian Border Troops. Kazakhstan hosts several Russian military facilities, including the Sary-Shagan state testing range, a range for strategic air defense and missile defense systems, and more.

China's counterterrorism strategy has specific characteristics. Since China is a member of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), it has the opportunity to influence its development. Within its sphere of influence, China has introduced the concept of combating the "three evils": terrorism, extremism, and separatism. It is essential to highlight the issues of separatism and extremism, as China actively uses these positions to its advantage. In the western Xinjiang-Uyghur region, there is a significant Muslim population dissatisfied with their status and seeking greater autonomy. China often resorts to harsh coercive measures and the use of force against them, citing the provisions of the SCO Charter, making its actions legally justifiable. Moreover, until the early twenty-first century, China did not seek to extend its influence beyond Central Asia and its territory, as indicated by the relatively limited contacts in these directions, except for regular support for UN anti-terrorist conventions. However, this situation changed since 2015 when China allowed the use of its regular army (PLA) and the People's Armed Police (PAP) outside national borders as part of anti-terrorist missions. This has led to an increased influence of Chinese counterterrorism forces in Eurasia as a whole and in Central and Greater East Asia in

particular. Additionally, in March 2019, China's State Council issued a document regulating China's use of measures against terrorists in the Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region. The new document confirms China's readiness to combat terrorism based on the rule of law and the use of preventive measures, a focus on sharing experiences, and participation in international cooperation.

Russia and China have a unique level of interaction. In the context of their cooperation, a Joint Statement was signed between the two countries in 2004, which solidified their collaboration in the fight against international terrorism. This includes constant contact between their respective counterterrorism units, preventing illegal border crossings, joint efforts to counter terrorist activities, and more.

China's engagement with other states is not limited to Russia. China also pursues the construction of military bases in Central Asian countries to stabilize the region. Until 2020, there was active implementation of the project to build military facilities in Afghanistan. This collaboration with Kabul was initiated primarily to enhance the fight against terrorism. However, after the change of power in Afghanistan, this cooperation was scaled down, but negotiations between the parties continued to stabilize the situation. Additionally, China regularly conducts joint counterterrorism exercises with Central Asian countries, as well as Russia, which strengthens China's role as a major regional fighter against terrorism. Moreover, in 2016, the Chinese government successfully initiated the creation of a multilateral mechanism among China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in the field of counterterrorism. This group regularly conducted joint exercises, exchanged intelligence, and held special theoretical courses to maintain cooperation among its members. However, this cooperation was partially curtailed due to the change of power in Afghanistan in 2021.

Special attention is given to the issue of Afghanistan. Considering that Afghanistan is one of the major sources of terrorism for Central Asian countries and Russia, the change of power in Kabul, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops, among other factors, have significantly influenced the shifting priorities of Russia and China in terms of countering terrorism. It is worth noting that although the Taliban, which assumed power in Afghanistan, is considered a terrorist organization, according to Russian legislation, Russia has had contacts with this group since 2015, which was related to the deterioration of relations with the United States during that period. However, Russia's initial response to the change of power in Afghanistan in 2021 was to enhance counterterrorism measures in all post-Soviet countries [26]. In this situation, Russia and China are approaching the Afghan issue from a "passive" perspective. They are monitoring and ensuring the security of the adjacent borders of their states but have no plans to deploy a military contingent. As a result, their relations with the United States and some European countries, which aim to eliminate the Taliban threat, have become more strained. According to Chinese experts, Moscow and Beijing should encourage the Taliban to pursue a clear policy, supported by the international community, in countering several terrorist movements, including ISIS, as well as other organizations like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Party of Turkestan (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), and more [27]. It is worth noting that Russian–Chinese cooperation is built not only on bilateral efforts to localize the problem but also within the framework of the SCO and CSTO. Multilateral formats and regular communication among all parties are the foundation for resolving the complex situation. However, Russia and China have different views on the Taliban, which can complicate further cooperation between the two countries. The worsening international situation in 2022 (the Ukrainian conflict, complications in

Nagorno-Karabakh, and unrest in Kazakhstan) are additional factors that contribute to the stagnation in resolving the Afghan problem and, at the same time, lead to an increase in terrorist activity.

4. Conclusions

Summing up the results of the work, it is worth drawing several conclusions. Firstly, it is worth noting that the active phase of development of legislation on countering terrorism both in the West and in the East of Eurasia began with the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. The large-scale disaster stimulated the efforts of states in the field of harmonization of legislation in the field of terrorism and also accelerated the adoption of clearer regulations at the external level. It is worth noting that in many respects, the phenomenon of the syndrome itself has remained largely the same as at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The main threat to all of Eurasia is religious, exclusively jihadist terrorism. At the same time, the risks of left-wing radical and anarchist terrorist acts are also sufficiently minimized, as evidenced by the relevant statistics. In addition, unlike the beginning of the twenty-first century, cyberterrorism is now much more dangerous, affecting a larger audience and can spread much more widely than through classical media.

Secondly, there is a big difference in the process of building an anti-terrorist security system in relation to the eastern and western parts of Eurasia. The western part, united by a single political and economic structure (European Union), has a more strict hierarchy. Systematization and progressive, targeted nature of development and relative unity of development legislation in the economic sphere have been implemented. At the same time, such a structure has a number of disadvantages, the main one being the slowness and difficulty of forming a fully coordinated scheme. Considering that European legislation is focused only on drawing up general regulations for anti-terrorism activities, the economic state is also further implementing the adopted recommendations, extending the procedure for introducing amendments and applying common rules for all EU members. In addition, even despite the fact that the level of harmonization of national legislation in the anti-terrorist sphere is relatively high, there are still economic legal conflicts in regulating the lower regions. In particular, the area of digital control and practice maintenance remain relatively underdeveloped. Cyberterrorism, in recent years, has been increasingly controlled through the creation of members of counter-terrorism associations of EU states, and also affects the interaction of the intelligence services of these states, but new technologies, in particular 5G technology, may complicate these processes to a lesser extent. At the same time, the loose multiculturalism policy that underlies the EU makes it very difficult for states to proactively reach out to open parts of society. In general, the problem of internal atomization is typical for the most affluent states of Europe (Germany, France), as a result of which the transition of ethnic and geographical regions to international power is weakly observed.

The eastern part of Eurasia relies on a multilateral approach in the fight against terrorism. This part of Eurasia is characterized by the creation of several international organizations with free functionality, which develop on the basis of national interests. At the same time, countries have a significant influence on all anti-terrorism activities in this direction in Russia. The harmonization of national legislation is often carried out in several stages. At the first stage, within the framework of one

organization, the necessary proposals are developed and appropriate agreements are concluded. Since the 1990s, "test zone" for the introduction of a new law is adopted in the CIS. Then, in accordance with a cooperation agreement with another organization, a repeated process of harmonization occurs, due to which the majority of states in the region come to a unified legislation. At the same time, harmonization also occurs at the level of bilateral relations, which partially helps speed up this process. However, reliable practice is also extremely weak. At the same time, Russia, which is part of the majority of organizations opposing terrorism in the East of Eurasia, most often makes proposals for progressive legislation. At the external level, Russia has fairly developed anti-terrorism legislation, as well as progressive control over cyberterrorism. The downside of the Russian system is too strict control over the use of data, as well as the fight against the anonymity of services. China, in turn, pursues a very modest anti-terrorism policy. Recently, wider participation in anti-terrorist activities has become possible, although this activity concerns either bilateral relations or activities in the SCO.

Thirdly, the growing trend toward religious terrorism and the difficulties of finding universal mechanisms to combat it are aggravated by global instability. The events of 2021 in Afghanistan once again demonstrate the complexity of international communication and effective mechanisms of terrorist deterrence. Taking into account the complexity of this problem and the impossibility of solving it by military means, as many years of experience have revealed, it becomes obvious that it is necessary to reconsider the approach to working with terrorism. It is worth noting that effective practices for controlling digital terrorism in Russia can be effectively used within the framework of European legislation. Already in France, there are a number of similar laws that also effectively combat the propaganda of radical movements and terrorist groups. At the same time, one cannot fail to note the effectiveness of small rapid response teams at the national level in individual EU states, as well as the initial results of the digital counter-terrorism unit. Strengthening interaction between organizations in Eastern Eurasia and partially accelerating the harmonization of legislation in the field of countering terrorism could significantly improve control over the situation in a number of states. At the same time, the main areas of development of counter-terrorism legislation should remain the prevention of terrorist propaganda, early warning, and prevention of terrorist acts. Control mechanisms in these areas are currently very limited. It is possible to use more stringent digital control measures, in particular, analysis of the digital activity of individuals based on reliable information using a simplified scheme and so forth. Although current control mechanisms remain imperfect in the East and West, it is worth noting that there are positive trends that may lead to positive results in the future.

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Through examining the development of new trends in terrorism, it is evident that the purpose of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has yet to be achieved since the terror landscape is constantly changing due to new developments. The Israel and Hamas war that began in October 2023 has awakened many militant organizations and has amplified the efforts of active militants on the ground and online. Therefore, such attacks will motivate like-minded individuals and continue the legacy of militancy, making it a challenge to eradicate. Hence, it is evident that the GWOT is constantly being challenged by new circumstances in the global terror landscape. This book provides a comprehensive overview of counterterrorism efforts such as the GWOT.

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